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Abstract
This chapter reviews the microeconometrics literature on partial identification, focus-
ing on the developments of the last thirty years. The topics presented illustrate that the
available data combined with credible maintained assumptions may yield much informa-
tion about a parameter of interest, even if they do not reveal it exactly. Special attention
is devoted to discussing the challenges associated with, and some of the solutions put
forward to, (1) obtain a tractable characterization of the values for the parameters of
interest which are observationally equivalent, given the available data and maintained
assumptions; (2) estimate this set of values; (3) conduct test of hypotheses and make
confidence statements. The chapter reviews advances in partial identification analysis
both as applied to learning (functionals of) probability distributions that are well-defined
in the absence of models, as well as to learning parameters that are well-defined only in
the context of particular models. A simple organizing principle is highlighted: the source
of the identification problem can often be traced to a collection of random variables that
are consistent with the available data and maintained assumptions. This collection may
be part of the observed data or be a model implication. In either case, it can be formal-
ized as a random set. Random set theory is then used as a mathematical framework to
unify a number of special results and produce a general methodology to carry out partial
identification analysis.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Why Partial Identification?
Knowing the population distribution that data are drawn from, what can one learn about
a parameter of interest? It has long been understood that assumptions about the data
generating process (DGP) play a crucial role in answering this identification question at
the core of all empirical research. Inevitably, assumptions brought to bear enjoy a varying
degree of credibility. Some are rooted in economic theory (e.g., optimizing behavior) or
in information available to the researcher on the DGP (e.g., randomization mechanisms).
These assumptions can be argued to be highly credible. Others are driven by concerns for
tractability and the desire to answer the identification question with a certain level of precision
(e.g., functional form and distributional assumptions). These are arguably less credible.
Early on, Koopmans and Reiersol (1950) highlighted the importance of imposing re-
strictions based on prior knowledge of the phenomenon under analysis and some criteria of
simplicity, but not for the purpose of identifiability of a parameter that the researcher hap-
pens to be interested in, stating (p. 169): “One might regard problems of identifiability as a
necessary part of the specification problem. We would consider such a classification accept-
able, provided the temptation to specify models in such a way as to produce identifiability
of relevant characteristics is resisted.”
Much work, spanning multiple fields, has been devoted to putting forward strategies
to carry out empirical research while relaxing distributional, functional form, or behavioral
assumptions. One example, embodied in the research program on semiparameteric and non-
parametric methods, is to characterize sufficient sets of assumptions, that exclude many
suspect ones –sometimes as many as possible– to guarantee that point identification of spe-
cific economically interesting parameters attains. This literature is reviewed in, e.g., Matzkin
(2007, 2013), and is not discussed here.
Another example, embodied in the research program on Bayesian model uncertainty, is
to specify multiple models (i.e., multiple sets of assumptions), put a prior on the parame-
ters of each model and on each model, embed the various separate models within one large
hierarchical mixture model, and obtain model posterior probabilities which can be used for
a variety of inferences and decisions. This literature is reviewed in, e.g., Wasserman (2000)
and Clyde and George (2004), and is not discussed here.
The approach considered here fixes a set of assumptions and a parameter of interest a
priori, in the spirit of Koopmans and Reiersol (1950), and asks what can be learned about
that parameter given the available data, recognizing that even partial information can be
illuminating for empirical research, while enjoying wider credibility thanks to the weaker
assumptions imposed. The bounding methods at the core of this approach appeared in the
literature nearly a century ago. Arguably, the first exemplar that leverages economic rea-
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soning is given by the work of Marschak and Andrews (1944). They provided bounds on
Cobb-Douglas production functions in models of supply and demand, building on optimiza-
tion principles and restrictions from microeconomic theory. Leamer (1981) revisited their
analysis to obtain bounds on the elasticities of demand and supply in a linear simultaneous
equations system with uncorrelated errors. The first exemplars that do not rely on specific
economic models appear in Gini (1921), Frisch (1934), and Reiersol (1941), who bounded the
coefficient of a simple linear regression in the presence of measurement error. These results
were extended to the general linear regression model with errors in all variables by Klepper
and Leamer (1984) and Leamer (1987).
This chapter surveys some of the methods proposed over the last thirty years in the mi-
croeconometrics literature to further this approach. These methods belong to the systematic
program on partial identification analysis started with Manski (1989, 1990, 1995, 2003, 2007a,
2013b) and developed by several authors since the early 1990s. Within this program, the fo-
cus shifts from points to sets: the researcher aims to learn what is the set of values for the
parameters of interest that can generate the same distribution of observables as the one in the
data, for some DGP consistent with the maintained assumptions. In other words, the focus is
on the set of observationally equivalent values, which henceforth I refer to as the parameters’
sharp identification region. In the partial identification paradigm, empirical analysis begins
with characterizing this set using the data alone. This is a nonparametric approach that
dispenses with all assumptions, except basic restrictions on the sampling process such that
the distribution of the observable variables can be learned as data accumulate. In subsequent
steps, one incorporates additional assumptions into the analysis, reporting how each assump-
tion (or set of assumptions) affects what one can learn about the parameters of interest, i.e.,
how it modifies and possibly shrinks the sharp identification region. Point identification may
result from the process of increasingly strengthening the maintained assumptions, but it is
not the goal in itself. Rather, the objective is to make transparent the relative role played by
the data and the assumptions in shaping the inference that one draws.
There are several strands of independent, but thematically related literatures that are
not discussed in this chapter. As a consequence, many relevant contributions are left out of
the presentation and the references. One example is the literature in finance. Hansen and
Jagannathan (1991) developed nonparametric bounds for the admissible set for means and
standard deviations of intertemporal marginal rates of substitution (IMRS) of consumers.
The bounds were developed exploiting the condition, satisfied in many finance models, that
the equilibrium price of any traded security equals the expectation (conditioned on current
information) of the product’s future payoff and the IMRS of any consumer.1 Luttmer (1996)
1Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) deduce a duality relation with the mean variance theory of Markowitz
(1952) and Fama (1996), but the relation does not apply to the sharp bounds they derive. In the Arbitrage
Pricing Model (Ross, 1976), bounds on extensions of existing pricing functions, consistent with the absence of
arbitrage opportunities, were considered by Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Kreps (1981).
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extended the analysis to economies with frictions. Hansen, Heaton, and Luttmer (1995)
developed econometric tools to estimate the regions, to assess asset pricing models, and to
provide nonparametric characterizations of asset pricing anomalies. Earlier on, the existence
of volatility bounds on IMRSs were noted by Shiller (1982) and Hansen (1982a). The bound-
ing arguments that build on the minimum-volatility frontier for stochastic discount factors
proposed by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) have become a litmus test to detect anomalies
in asset pricing models (see, e.g. Shiller, 2003, p. 89). I refer to the textbook presentations
in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Chapter 13) and Cochrane (2005, Chapters 5 and 21), and
the review articles by Ferson (2003) and Campbell (2014), for a careful presentation of this
literature.
In macroeconomics, Faust (1998), Canova and De Nicolo (2002), and Uhlig (2005) pro-
posed bounds for impulse response functions in sign-restricted structural vector autoregres-
sion models, and carried out Bayesian inference with a non-informative prior for the non-
identified parameters. I refer to Kilian and Lu¨tkepohl (2017, Chapter 13) for a careful
presentation of this literature.
In microeconomic theory, bounds were derived from inequalities resulting as necessary
and sufficient conditions that data on an individual’s choice need to satisfy in order to be
consistent with optimizing behavior, as in the research pioneered by Samuelson (1938) and
advanced early on by Houthakker (1950) and Richter (1966). Afriat (1967) and Varian
(1982) extended this research program to revealed preference extrapolation. Notably, in
this work no stochastic terms enter the analysis. Block and Marschak (1960), Marschak
(1960), Hall (1973), McFadden (1975), Falmagne (1978), and McFadden and Richter (1991),
extended revealed preference arguments to random utility models, and obtained bounds on
the distributions of preferences. I refer to the survey articles by Crawford and De Rock
(2014) and Blundell (2019, Chapter XXX in this Volume) for a careful presentation of this
literature.
A complementary approach to partial identification is given by sensitivity analysis, advo-
cated for in different ways by, e.g., Gilstein and Leamer (1983), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983),
Leamer (1985), Rosenbaum (1995), Imbens (2003), and others. Within this approach, the
analysis begins with a fully parametric model that point identifies the parameter of interest.
One then reports the set of values for this parameter that result when the more suspicious
assumptions are relaxed.
Related literatures, not discussed in this chapter, abound also outside Economics. For
example, in probability theory, Hoeffding (1940) and Frchet (1951) put forward bounds on
the joint distributions of random variables, and Makarov (1981), Ru¨schendorf (1982), and
Frank, Nelsen, and Schweizer (1987) on the sum of random variables, when only marginal
distributions are observed. The literature on probability bounds is discussed in the text-
book by Shorack and Wellner (2009, Appendix A). Addressing problems faced in economics,
sociology, epidemiology, geography, history, political science, and more, Duncan and Davis
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(1953) derived bounds on correlations among variables measured at the individual level based
on observable correlations among variables measured at the aggregate level. The so called
ecological inference problem they studied, and the associated literature, is discussed in the
survey article by Cho and Manski (2009) and references therein.
1.2 Goals and Structure of this Chapter
To carry out econometric analysis with partial identification, one needs: (1) computationally
feasible characterizations of the parameters’ sharp identification region; (2) methods to es-
timate this region; and (3) methods to test hypotheses and construct confidence sets. The
goal of this chapter is to provide insights into the challenges posed by each of these desider-
ata, and into some of their solutions. In order to discuss the partial identification literature
in microeconometrics with some level of detail while keeping this chapter to a manageable
length, I focus on a selection of papers and not on a complete survey of the literature. As a
consequence, many relevant contributions are left out of the presentation and the references.
I also do not discuss the important but separate topic of statistical decisions in the presence
of partial identification, for which I refer to the textbook treatments in Manski (2005, 2007a)
and to the review by Hirano and Porter (2019, Chapter XXX in this Volume).
The presumption in identification analysis that the distribution from which the data are
drawn is known allows one to keep separate the identification question from the distinct
question of statistical inference from a finite sample. I use the same separation in this
chapter. I assume solid knowledge of the topics covered in first year Economics PhD courses
in econometrics and microeconomic theory.
I begin in Section 2 with the analysis of what can be learned about features of prob-
ability distributions that are well defined in the absence of an economic model, such as
moments, quantiles, cumulative distribution functions, etc., when one faces measurement
problems. Specifically, I focus on cases where the data is incomplete, either due to selec-
tively observed data or to interval measurements. I refer to Manski (1995, 2003, 2007a) for
textbook treatments of many other cases. I lay out formally the maintained assumptions for
several examples, and then discuss in detail what is the source of the identification problem.
I conclude with providing tractable characterizations of what can be learned about the pa-
rameters of interest, with formal proofs. I show that even in simple problems, great care may
be needed to obtain the sharp identification region. It is often easier to characterize an outer
region, i.e., a collection of values for the parameter of interest that contains the sharp one
but may contain also additional values. Outer regions are useful because of their simplicity
and because in certain applications they may suffice to answer questions of great interest,
e.g., whether a policy intervention has a nonnegative effect. However, compared to the sharp
identification region they may afford the researcher less useful predictions, and a lower ability
to test for misspecification, because they do not harness all the information in the observed
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data and maintained assumptions.
In Section 3 I use the same approach to study what can be learned about features of
parameters of structural econometric models when the model is incomplete (Tamer, 2003;
Haile and Tamer, 2003; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009). Specifically, I discuss single agent dis-
crete choice models under a variety of challenging situations (interval measured as well as
endogenous explanatory variables; unobserved as well as counterfactual choice sets); finite
discrete games with multiple equilibria; auction models under weak assumptions on bidding
behavior; and network formation models. Again I formally derive sharp identification regions
for several examples.
I conclude each of these sections with a brief discussion of further theoretical advances
and empirical applications that is meant to give a sense of the breadth of the approach, but
not to be exhaustive. I refer to the recent survey by Ho and Rosen (2017) for a thorough
discussion of empirical applications of partial identification methods.
In Section 4 I discuss finite sample inference. I limit myself to highlighting the challenges
that one faces for consistent estimation when the identified object is a set, and several coverage
notions and requirements that have been proposed over the last 20 years. I refer to the recent
survey by Canay and Shaikh (2017) for a thorough discussion of methods to tests hypotheses
and build confidence sets in moment inequality models.
In Section 5 I discuss the distinction between refutable and non-refutable assumptions, and
how model misspecification may be detectable in the presence of the former, even within the
partial identification paradigm. I then highlight certain challenges that model misspecification
presents for the interpretation of sharp identification (as well as outer) regions, and for the
construction of confidence sets.
In Section 6 I highlight that while most of the sharp identification regions characterized in
Section 2 can be easily computed, many of the ones in Section 3 are more challenging. This is
because the latter are obtained as level sets of criterion functions in moderately dimensional
spaces, and tracing out these level sets or their boundaries is a non-trivial computational
problem. In Section 7 I conclude providing some considerations on what I view as open
questions for future research.
I refer to Tamer (2010) for an earlier review of this literature, and to Lewbel (2018) for a
careful presentation of the many notions of identification that are used across the econometrics
literature, including an important historical account of how these notions developed over time.
1.3 Random Set Theory as a Tool for Partial Identification Analysis
Throughout Sections 2 and 3, a simple organizing principle for much of partial identification
analysis emerges. The cause of the identification problems discussed can be traced back to
a collection of random variables that are consistent with the available data and maintained
assumptions. For the problems studied in Section 2, this set is often a simple function of the
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observed variables. The incompleteness of the data stems from the fact that instead of observ-
ing the singleton variables of interest, one observes set-valued variables to which these belong,
but one has no information on their exact value within the sets. For the problems studied
in Section 3, the collection of random variables consistent with the maintained assumptions
comprises what the model predicts for the endogenous variable(s). The incompleteness of the
model stems from the fact that instead of making a singleton prediction for the variable(s)
of interest, the model makes multiple predictions but does not specify how one is chosen.
The central role of set-valued objects, both stochastic and nonstochastic, in partial iden-
tification renders random set theory a natural toolkit to aid the analysis.2 This theory
originates in the seminal contributions of Choquet (1953/54), Aumann (1965), and Debreu
(1967), with the first self contained treatment of the theory given by Matheron (1975). I re-
fer to Molchanov (2017) for a textbook presentation, and to Molchanov and Molinari (2014,
2018) for a treatment focusing on its applications in econometrics.
Beresteanu and Molinari (2008) introduce the use of random set theory in econometrics to
carry out identification analysis and statistical inference with incomplete data. Beresteanu,
Molchanov, and Molinari (2011, 2012) propose it to characterize sharp identification regions
both with incomplete data and with incomplete models. Galichon and Henry (2011) propose
the use of optimal transportation methods that in some applications deliver the same char-
acterizations as the random set methods. I do not discuss optimal transportation methods
in this chapter, but refer to Galichon (2016) for a thorough treatment.
Over the last ten years, random set methods have been used to unify a number of spe-
cific results in partial identification, and to produce a general methodology for identification
analysis that dispenses completely with case-by-case distinctions. In particular, as I show
throughout the chapter, the methods allow for simple and tractable characterizations of sharp
identification regions. The collection of these results establishes that indeed this is a useful
tool to carry out econometrics with partial identification, as exemplified by its prominent
role both in this chapter and in Chapter XXX in this Volume by Chesher and Rosen (2019),
which focuses on general classes of instrumental variable models. The random sets approach
complements the more traditional one, based on mathematical tools for (single valued) ran-
dom vectors, that proved extremely productive since the beginning of the research program
in partial identification.
This chapter shows that to fruitfully apply random set theory for identification and in-
ference, the econometrician needs to carry out three fundamental steps. First, she needs to
define the random closed set that is relevant for the problem under consideration using all
information given by the available data and maintained assumptions. This is a delicate task,
but one that is typically carried out in identification analysis regardless of whether random
2The first idea of a general random set in the form of a region that depends on chance appears in Kol-
mogorov (1950), originally published in 1933. For another early example where confidence regions are explicitly
described as random sets, see Haavelmo (1944, p. 67). The role of random sets in this chapter is different.
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Table 1.1: Notation Used
(Ω,F,P) Nonatomic probability space
Rd, ‖ · ‖ Euclidean space equipped with the Euclidean norm
F ,G,K Collection of closed, open, and compact subsets of Rd (respectively)
Sd−1 = {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖ = 1} Unit sphere in Rd
Bd = {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖ ≤ 1} Unit ball in Rd
conv(A), cl(A), |B| Convex hull and closure of a set A ⊂ Rd (respectively), and cardinality of a finite set B ⊂ Rd
x,y, z, . . . Random vectors
x, y, z, . . . Realizations of random vectors or deterministic vectors
X,Y ,Z, . . . Random sets
X,Y, Z, . . . Realizations of random sets or deterministic sets
, ε, ν, ζ Unobserved random variables (heterogeneity)
Θ, θ, ϑ Parameter space, data generating value for the parameter vector, and a generic element of Θ
R Joint distribution of all variables (observable and unobservable)
P Joint distribution of the observable variables
Q Joint distribution whose features one wants to learn
M A joint distribution of observed variables implied by the model
qτ (α) Quantile function at level α ∈ (0, 1) for a random variable distributed τ ∈ {R,P,Q}
Eτ Expectation operator associated with distribution τ ∈ {R,P,Q}
TX(K) = P{X ∩K 6= ∅}, K ∈ K Capacity functional of random set X
CX(F ) = P{X ⊂ F}, F ∈ F Containment functional of random set X
p→, a.s.→, ⇒ Convergence in probability, convergence almost surely, and weak convergence (respectively)
x
d
= y x and y have the same distribution
x ⊥ y Statistical independence between random variables x and y
x>y Inner product between vectors x and y, x, y ∈ Rd
U, u Family of utility functions and one of its elements
qP Criterion function that aggregates violations of the population moment inequalities
qn Criterion function that aggregates violations of the sample moment inequalities
HP[·] Sharp identification region of the functional in square brackets (a function of P)
OP[·] An outer region of the functional in square brackets (a function of P)
set theory is applied. Indeed, throughout the chapter I highlight how relevant random closed
sets were characterized in partial identification analysis since the early 1990s, albeit the con-
nection to the theory of random sets was not made. As a second step, the econometrician
needs to determine how the observable random variables relate to the random closed set. Of-
ten, one of two cases occurs: either the observable variables determine a random set to which
the unobservable variable of interest belongs with probability one, as in incomplete data sce-
narios; or the (expectation of the) (un)observable variable belongs to (the expectation of) a
random set determined by the model, as in incomplete model scenarios. Finally, the econo-
metrician needs to determine which tool from random set theory should be utilized. To date,
new applications of random set theory to econometrics have fruitfully exploited (Aumann)
expectations and their support functions, (Choquet) capacity functionals, and laws of large
numbers and central limit theorems for random sets. Appendix A reports basic definitions
from random set theory of these concepts, as well as some useful theorems. The chapter
explains in detail through applications to important identification problems how these steps
can be carried out.
9
1.4 Notation
This chapter employs consistent notation that is summarized in Table 1.1. Some important
conventions are as follows: y denotes outcome variables, (x,w) denote explanatory variables,
and z denotes instrumental variables (i.e., variables that satisfy some form of independence
with the outcome or with the unobservable variables, possibly conditional on x,w).
I denote by P the joint distribution of all observable variables. Identification analysis is
carried out using the information contained in this distribution, and finite sample inference
is carried out under the presumption that one draws a random sample of size n from P. I
denote by Q the joint distribution whose features the researcher wants to learn. If Q were
identified given the observed data (e.g., if it were a marginal of P), point identification of the
parameter or functional of interest would attain. I denote by R the joint distribution of all
variables, observable and unobservable ones; both P and Q can be obtained from it. In the
context of structural models, I denote by M a distribution for the observable variables that is
consistent with the model. I note that model incompleteness typically implies that M is not
unique. I let HP[·] denote the sharp identification region of the functional in square brackets,
and OP[·] an outer region. In both cases, the regions are indexed by P, because they depend
on the distribution of the observed data.
2 Partial Identification of Probability Distributions
The literature reviewed in this chapter starts with the analysis of what can be learned about
functionals of probability distributions that are well-defined in the absence of a model. The
approach is nonparametric, and it is typically constructive, in the sense that it leads to
“plug-in” formulae for the bounds on the functionals of interest.
2.1 Selectively Observed Data
As in Manski (1989), suppose that a researcher is interested in learning the probability that an
individual who is homeless at a given date has a home six months later. Here the population
of interest is the people who are homeless at the initial date, and the outcome of interest y is
an indicator of whether the individual has a home six months later (so that y = 1) or remains
homeless (so that y = 0). A random sample of homeless individuals is interviewed at the
initial date, so that individual background attributes x are observed, but six months later
only a subset of the individuals originally sampled can be located. In other words, attrition
from the sample creates a selection problem whereby y is observed only for a subset of the
population. Let d be an indicator of whether the individual can be located (hence d = 1)
or not (hence d = 0). The question is what can the researcher learn about EQ(y|x = x),
with Q the distribution of (y,x)? Manski (1989) showed that EQ(y|x = x) is not point
identified in the absence of additional assumptions, but informative nonparametric bounds
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on this quantity can be obtained. In this section I review his approach, and discuss several
important extensions of his original idea.
Throughout the chapter, I formally state the structure of the problem under study as
an “Identification Problem”, and then provide a solution, either in the form of a sharp
identification region, or of an outer region. To set the stage, and at the cost of some repetition,
I do the same here, slightly generalizing the question stated in the previous paragraph.
Identification Problem 2.1 (Conditional Expectation of Selectively Observed Data):
Let y ∈ Y ⊂ R and x ∈ X ⊂ Rd be, respectively, an outcome variable and a vector of
covariates with support Y and X respectively, with Y a compact set. Let d ∈ {0, 1}. Suppose
that the researcher observes a random sample of realizations of (x,d) and, in addition,
observes the realization of y when d = 1. Hence, the observed data is (yd,d,x) ∼ P. Let
g : Y 7→ R be a measurable function that attains its lower and upper bounds g0 = miny∈Y g(y)
and g1 = maxy∈Y g(y), and assume that −∞ < g0 < g1 < ∞. Let yj ∈ Y be such that
g(yj) = gj , j = 0, 1.
3 In the absence of additional information, what can the researcher learn
about EQ(g(y)|x = x), with Q the distribution of (y,x)? 4
Manski’s analysis of this problem begins with a simple application of the law of total
probability, that yields
Q(y|x = x) = P(y|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x) + R(y|x = x,d = 0)P(d = 0|x = x). (2.1)
Equation (2.1) lends a simple but powerful anatomy of the selection problem. While P(y|x =
x,d = 1) and P(d|x = x) can be learned from the observable distribution P(yd,d,x), under
the maintained assumptions the sampling process reveals nothing about R(y|x = x,d = 0).
Hence, Q(y|x = x) is not point identified.
If one were to assume exogenous selection (or data missing at random conditional on
x), i.e., R(y|x,d = 0) = P(y|x,d = 1), point identification would obtain. However, that
assumption is non-refutable and it is well known that it may fail in applications.4 Let T
denote the space of all probability measures with support in Y. The unknown functional
vector is {τ(x), υ(x)} ≡ {Q(y|x = x),R(y|x = x,d = 0)}. What the researcher can learn, in
the absence of additional restrictions on R(y|x = x,d = 0), is the region of observationally
equivalent distributions for y|x = x, and the associated set of expectations taken with respect
to these distributions.
Theorem SIR-2.1 (Conditional Expectations of Selectively Observed Data): Under the
3The bounds g0, g1 and the values y0, y1 at which they are attained may differ for different functions g(·).
4Section 5 discusses the consequences of model misspecification (with respect to refutable assumptions).
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assumptions in Identification Problem 2.1,
HP[EQ(g(y)|x = x)] =
[
EP(g(y)|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x) + g0P (d = 0|x = x),
EP(g(y)|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x) + g1P(d = 0|x = x)
]
(2.2)
is the sharp identification region for EQ(g(y)|x = x).
Proof. Due to the discussion following equation (2.1), the collection of observationally equiv-
alent distribution functions for y|x = x is
HP[Q(y|x = x)] =
{
τ(x) ∈ T : τ(x) = P(y|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x)
+ υ(x)P(d = 0|x = x), for some υ(x) ∈ T
}
. (2.3)
Next, observe that the lower bound in equation (2.2) is achieved by integrating g(y) against
the distribution τ(x) that results when υ(x) places probability one on y0. The upper bound
is achieved by integrating g(y) against the distribution τ(x) that results when υ(x) places
probability one on y1. Both are contained in the set HP[Q(y|x = x)] in equation (2.3).
These are the worst case bounds, so called because assumptions free and therefore repre-
senting the widest possible range of values for the parameter of interest that are consistent
with the observed data. A simple “plug-in” estimator for HP[EQ(g(y)|x = x)] replaces all
unknown quantities in (2.2) with consistent estimators, obtained, e.g., by kernel or sieve
regression. I return to consistent estimation of partially identified parameters in Section 4.
Here I emphasize that identification problems are fundamentally distinct from finite sample
inference problems. The latter are typically reduced as sample size increase (because, e.g.,
the variance of the estimator becomes smaller). The former do not improve, unless a differ-
ent and better type of data is collected, e.g. with a smaller prevalence of missing data (see
Dominitz and Manski, 2017, for a discussion).
Manski (2003, Section 1.3) shows that the proof of Theorem SIR-2.1 can be extended to
obtain the smallest and largest points in the sharp identification region of any parameter that
respects stochastic dominance.5 This is especially useful to bound the quantiles of y|x = x.
For any given α ∈ (0, 1), let qg(y)P (α, 1, x) ≡ {min t : P(g(y) ≤ t|d = 1,x = x) ≥ α}. Then
5Recall that a probability distribution F ∈ T stochastically dominates F′ ∈ T if F(−∞, t] ≤ F′(−∞, t] for
all t ∈ R. A real-valued functional d : T → R respects stochastic dominance if d(F) ≥ d(F′) whenever F
stochastically dominates F′.
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the smallest and largest admissible values for the α-quantile of g(y)|x = x are, respectively,
r(α, x) ≡
q
g(y)
P
([
1− (1−α)P(d=1|x=x)
]
, 1, x
)
if P(d = 1|x = x) > 1− α,
g0 otherwise;
s(α, x) ≡
q
g(y)
P
([
α
P(d=1|x=x)
]
, 1, x
)
if P(d = 1|x = x) ≥ α,
g1 otherwise.
The lower bound on EQ(g(y)|x = x) is informative only if g0 > −∞, and the upper bound
is informative only if g1 < ∞. By comparison, for any value of α, r(α, x) and s(α, x) are
generically informative if, respectively, P(d = 1|x = x) > 1 − α and P(d = 1|x = x) ≥ α,
regardless of the range of g.
Stoye (2010) further extends partial identification analysis to the study of spread pa-
rameters in the presence of missing data (as well as interval data, data combinations, and
other applications). These parameters include ones that respect second order stochastic dom-
inance, such as the variance, the Gini coefficient, and other inequality measures, as well as
other measures of dispersion which do not respect second order stochastic dominance, such
as interquartile range and ratio.6 Stoye shows that the sharp identification region for these
parameters can be obtained by fixing the mean or quantile of the variable of interest at a
specific value within its sharp identification region, and deriving a distribution consistent
with this value which is “compressed” with respect to the ones which bound the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the variable of interest, and one which is “dispersed” with
respect to them. Heuristically, the compressed distribution minimizes spread, while the dis-
persed one maximizes it (the sense in which this optimization occurs is formally defined in
the paper). The intuition for this is that a compressed CDF is first below and then above
any non-compressed one; a dispersed CDF is first above and then below any non-dispersed
one. Second-stage optimization over the possible values of the mean or the quantile delivers
unconstrained bounds. The main results of the paper are sharp identification regions for
the expectation and variance, for the median and interquartile ratio, and for many other
combinations of parameters.
Key Insight 2.1 (Identification is not a binary event): Identification Problem 2.1 is
mathematically simple, but it puts forward a new approach to empirical research. The tradi-
tional approach aims at finding a sufficient (possibly minimal) set of assumptions guaranteeing
point identification of parameters, viewing identification as an “all or nothing” notion, where
either the functional of interest can be learned exactly or nothing of value can be learned.
The partial identification approach pioneered by Manski (1989) points out that much can be
6Earlier related work includes, e.g., Gastwirth (1972) and Cowell (1991), who obtain worst case bounds on
the sample Gini coefficient under the assumption that one knows the income bracket but not the exact income
of every household.
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learned from combination of data and assumptions that restrict the functionals of interest to
a set of observationally equivalent values, even if this set is not a singleton. Along the way,
Manski (1989) points out that in Identification Problem 2.1 the observed outcome is the sin-
gleton y when d = 1, and the set Y when d = 0. This is a random closed set, see Definition
A.1. I return to this connection in Section 2.3.
Despite how transparent the framework in Identification Problem 2.1 is, important sub-
tleties arise even in this seemingly simple context. For a given t ∈ R, consider the function
g(y) = 1(y ≤ t), with 1(A) the indicator function taking the value one if the logical condition
in parentheses holds and zero otherwise. Then equation (2.2) yields pointwise-sharp bounds
on the CDF of y at any fixed t ∈ R:
HP[Q(y ≤ t|x = x)] = [P(y ≤ t|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x) ,
P(y ≤ t|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x) + P(d = 0|x = x)] . (2.4)
Yet, the collection of CDFs that belong to the band defined by (2.4) is not the sharp identi-
fication region for the CDF of y|x = x. Rather, it constitutes an outer region, as originally
pointed out by Manski (1994, p. 149 and note 2).
Theorem OR-2.1 (Cumulative Distribution Function of Selectively Observed Data): Let
C denote the collection of cumulative distribution functions on Y. Then, under the assump-
tions in Identification Problem 2.1,
OP[F(y|x = x)] = {F ∈ C : P(y ≤ t|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x) ≤ F(t|x) ≤
P(y ≤ t|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x) + P(d = 0|x = x) ∀t ∈ R} (2.5)
is an outer region for the CDF of y|x = x.
Proof. Any admissible CDF for y|x = x belongs to the family of functions in equation (2.5).
However, the bound in equation (2.5) does not impose the restriction that for any t0 ≤ t1,
Q(t0 ≤ y ≤ t1|x = x) ≥ P(t0 ≤ y ≤ t1|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x). (2.6)
This restriction is implied by the maintained assumptions, but is not necessarily satisfied by
all CDFs in OP[F(y|x = x)], as illustrated in the following simple example.
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CDF
t0 1 2 3
P(y ≤ t|d = 1)P(d = 1) + P(d = 0)
P(y ≤ t|d = 1)P(d = 1)
F(t)
1
1/3
2/3
5/9
1
Figure 2.1: The tube defined by inequalities (2.4) in the set-up of Example 2.1, and the CDF in (2.7).
Example 2.1. Omit x for simplicity, let P(d = 1) = 23 , and let
P(y ≤ t|d = 1)

0 if t < 0,
1
3 t if 0 ≤ t < 3,
1 if t ≥ 3.
The bounding functions and associated tube from the inequalities in (2.4) are depicted in
Figure 2.1. Consider the cumulative distribution function
F(t) =

0 if t < 0,
5
9 t if 0 ≤ t < 1,
1
9 t+
4
9 if 1 ≤ t < 2,
1
3 t if 2 ≤ t < 3,
1 if t ≥ 3.
(2.7)
For each t ∈ R, F(t) lies in the tube defined by equation (2.4). However, it cannot be the
CDF of y, because F(2) − F(1) = 19 < P(1 ≤ y ≤ 2|d = 1)P(d = 1), directly contradicting
equation (2.6). 4
How can one characterize the sharp identification region for the CDF of y|x = x un-
der the assumptions in Identification Problem 2.1? In general, there is not a single answer
to this question: different methodologies can be used. Here I use results in Manski (2003,
Corollary 1.3.1) and Molchanov and Molinari (2018, Theorem 2.25), which yield an alter-
native characterization of HP[Q(y|x = x)] that translates directly into a characterization of
HP[F(y|x = x)].7
Theorem SIR-2.2 (Conditional Distribution and CDF of Selectively Observed Data):
Given τ ∈ T , let τK(x) denote the probability that distribution τ assigns to set K conditional
7Whereas Manski (1994) is very clear that the collection of CDFs in (2.4) is an outer region for the CDF
of y|x = x, and Manski (2003) provides the sharp characterization in (2.8), Manski (2007a, p. 39) does not
state all the requirements that characterize HP[F(y|x = x)].
15
on x = x, with τy(x) ≡ τ{y}(x). Under the assumptions in Identification Problem 2.1,
HP[Q(y|x = x)] =
{
τ(x) ∈ T : τK(x) ≥ P(y ∈ K|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x), ∀K ⊂ Y
}
,
(2.8)
where K is measurable. If Y is countable,
HP[Q(y|x = x)] =
{
τ(x) ∈ T : τy(x) ≥ P(y = y|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x), ∀y ∈ Y
}
.
(2.9)
If Y is a bounded interval,
HP[Q(y|x = x)] =
{
τ(x) ∈ T : τ[t0,t1](x) ≥
P(t0 ≤ y ≤ t1|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x), ∀t0 ≤ t1, t0, t1 ∈ Y
}
. (2.10)
Proof. The characterization in (2.8) follows from equation (2.3), observing that if τ(x) ∈
HP[Q(y|x = x)] as defined in equation (2.3), then there exists a distribution υ(x) ∈ T
such that τ(x) = P(y|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x) + υ(x)P(d = 0|x = x). Hence, by
construction τK(x) ≥ P(y ∈ K|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x), ∀K ⊂ Y. Conversely,
if one has τK(x) ≥ P(y ∈ K|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x), ∀K ⊂ Y, one can define
υ(x) = τ(x)−P(y|x=x,d=1)P(d=1|x=x)P(d=0|x=x) . The resulting υ(x) is a probability measure, and hence
τ(x) ∈ HP[Q(y|x = x)] as defined in equation (2.3). When Y is countable, if τy(x) ≥ P(y =
y|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x) it follows that for any K ⊂ Y,
τK(x) =
∑
y∈K
τy(x) ≥
∑
y∈K
P(y = y|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x)
= P(y ∈ K|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1|x = x).
The result in equation (2.10) is proven in Molchanov and Molinari (2018, Theorem 2.25)
using elements of random set theory, to which I return in Section 2.3. Using elements of
random set theory it is also possible to show that the characterization in (2.8) requires only
to check the inequalities for K the compact subsets of Y.
This section provides sharp identification regions and outer regions for a variety of func-
tionals of interest. The computational complexity of these characterizations varies widely.
Sharp bounds on parameters that respect stochastic dominance only require computing the
parameters with respect to two probability distributions. An outer region on the CDF can be
obtained by evaluating all tail probabilities of a certain distribution. A sharp identification
region on the CDF requires evaluating the probability that a certain distribution assigns to
all intervals. I return to computational challenges in partial identification in Section 6.
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2.2 Treatment Effects with and without Instrumental Variables
The discussion of partial identification of probability distributions of selectively observed data
naturally leads to the question of its implications for program evaluation. The literature on
program evaluation is vast. The purpose of this section is exclusively to show how the ideas
presented in Section 2.1 can be applied to learn features of treatment effects of interest, when
no assumptions are imposed on treatment selection and outcomes. I also provide examples of
assumptions that can be used to tighten the bounds. To keep this chapter to a manageable
length, I discuss only partial identification of the average response to a treatment and of the
average treatment effect (ATE). There are many different parameters that received much
interest in the literature. Examples include the local average treatment effect of Imbens and
Angrist (1994) and the marginal treatment effect of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001, 2005).
For thorough discussions of the literature on program evaluation, I refer to the textbook
treatments in Manski (1995, 2003, 2007a) and Imbens and Rubin (2015), to the Handbook
chapters by Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b) and Abbring and Heckman (2007), and to the
review articles by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Mogstad and Torgovitsky (2018).
Using standard notation (e.g., Neyman, 1923), let y : T 7→ Y be an individual-specific
response function, with T = {0, 1, . . . , T} a finite set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
treatments, and let s denote the individual’s received treatment (taking its realizations in
T).8 The researcher observes data (y, s,x) ∼ P, with y ≡ y(s) the outcome corresponding
to the received treatment s, and x a vector of covariates. The outcome y(t) for s 6= t
is counterfactual, and hence can be conceptualized as missing. Therefore, we are in the
framework of Identification Problem 2.1 and all the results from Section 2.1 apply in this
context too, subject to adjustments in notation.9 For example, using Theorem SIR-2.1,
HP[EQ(y(t)|x = x)] =
[
EP(y|x = x, s = t)P(s = t|x = x) + y0P (s 6= t|x = x),
EP(y|x = x, s = t)P(s = t|x = x) + y1P (s 6= t|x = x)
]
, (2.11)
where y0 ≡ infy∈Y y, y1 ≡ supy∈Y y. If y0 < ∞ and/or y1 < ∞, these worst case bounds are
informative. When both are infinite, the data is uninformative in the absence of additional
restrictions.
8Here the treatment response is a function only of the (scalar) treatment received by the given individual,
an assumption known as stable unit treatment value assumption (Rubin, 1978).
9Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2012) and Molchanov and Molinari (2018, Section 2.5) provide a
characterization of the sharp identification region for the joint distribution of [y(t), t ∈ T].
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If the researcher is interested in an Average Treatment Effect (ATE), e.g.
EQ(y(t1)|x = x)− EQ(y(t0)|x = x) =
EP(y|x = x, s = t1)P(s = t1|x = x) + EQ(y(t1)|x = x, s 6= t1)P(s 6= t1|x = x)
− EP(y|x = x, s = t0)P(s = t0|x = x)− EQ(y(t0)|x = x, s 6= t0)P(s 6= t0|x = x),
with t0, t1 ∈ T, sharp worst case bounds on this quantity can be obtained as follows. First,
observe that the empirical evidence reveals EP(y|x = x, s = tj) and P(s|x = x), but is
uninformative about EQ(y(tj)|x = x, s 6= tj), j = 0, 1. Each of the latter quantities (the
expectations of y(t0) and y(t1) conditional on different realizations of s and x = x) can take
any value in [y0, y1]. Hence, the sharp lower bound on the ATE is obtained by subtracting
the upper bound on EQ(y(t0)|x = x) from the lower bound on EQ(y(t1)|x = x). The sharp
upper bound on the ATE is obtained by subtracting the lower bound on EQ(y(t0)|x = x)
from the upper bound on EQ(y(t1)|x = x). The resulting bounds have width equal to
(y1 − y0)[2 − P(s = t1|x = x) − P(s = t0|x = x)] ∈ [(y1 − y0), 2(y1 − y0)], and hence are
informative only if both y0 > −∞ and y1 < ∞. As the largest logically possible value for
the ATE (in the absence of information from data) cannot be larger than (y1 − y0), and the
smallest cannot be smaller than −(y1− y0), the sharp bounds on the ATE always cover zero.
Key Insight 2.2: How should one think about the finding on the size of the worst case
bounds on the ATE? On the one hand, if both y0 <∞ and y1 <∞ the bounds are informative,
because they are a strict subset of the ATE’s possible realizations. On the other hand, they
reveal that the data alone are silent on the sign of the ATE. This means that assumptions
play a crucial role in delivering stronger conclusions about this policy relevant parameter.
The partial identification approach to empirical research recommends that as assumptions are
added to the analysis, one systematically reports how each contributes to shrinking the bounds,
making transparent their role in shaping inference.
What assumptions may researchers bring to bear to learn more about treatment effects of
interest? The literature has provided a wide array of well motivated and useful restrictions.
Here I consider two examples. The first one entails shape restrictions on the treatment re-
sponse function, leaving selection unrestricted. Manski (1997b) obtains bounds on treatment
effects under the assumption that the response functions are monotone, semi-monotone, or
concave-monotone. These restrictions are motivated by economic theory, where it is com-
monly presumed, e.g., that demand functions are downward sloping and supply functions are
upward sloping. Let the set T be ordered in terms of degree of intensity. Then Manski’s
monotone treatment response assumption requires that
t1 ≥ t0 ⇒ Q(y(t1) ≥ y(t0)) = 1 ∀t0, t1 ∈ T.
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Under this assumption, one has a sharp characterization of what can be learned about y(t):
y(t) ∈

(−∞,y] ∩ Y if t < s,
{y} if t = s,
[y,∞) ∩ Y if t > s.
(2.12)
Hence, the sharp bounds on EQ(y(t)|x = x) are (Manski, 1997b, Proposition M1)
HP[EQ(y(t)|x = x)] =
[
EP(y|x = x, s ≤ t)P(s ≤ t|x = x) + y0P (s > t|x = x),
EP(y|x = x, s ≥ t)P(s ≥ t|x = x) + y1P (s < t|x = x)
]
. (2.13)
This finding highlights some important facts. Under the monotone treatment response as-
sumption, the bounds on EQ(y(t)|x = x) are obtained using information from all (y, s) pairs
(given x = x), while the bounds in (2.11) only use the information provided by (y, s) pairs
for which s = t (given x = x). As a consequence, the bounds in (2.13) are informative even
if P(s = t|x = x) = 0, whereas the worst case bounds are not.
Concerning the ATE with t1 > t0, under monotone treatment response its lower bound
is zero, and its upper bound is obtained by subtracting the lower bound on EQ(y(t0)|x = x)
from the upper bound on EQ(y(t1)|x = x), where both bounds are obtained as in (2.13)
(Manski, 1997b, Proposition M2).
The second example of assumptions used to tighten worst case bounds is that of exclusion
restrictions, as in, e.g., Manski (1990). Suppose the researcher observes a random variable
z, taking its realizations in Z, such that10
EQ(y(t)|z,x) = EQ(y(t)|x) ∀t ∈ T, x-a.s.. (2.14)
This assumption is treatment-specific, and requires that the treatment response to t is mean
independent with z. It is easy to show that under the assumption in (2.14), the bounds on
EQ(y(t)|x = x) become
HP[EQ(y(t)|x = x)] =
[
ess sup
z
EP(y|x = x, s = t, z)P(s = t|x = x, z)+y0P (s 6= t|x = x, z),
ess inf
z
EP(y|x = x, s = t, z)P(s = t|x = x, z) + y1P (s 6= t|x = x, z)
]
. (2.15)
These are called intersection bounds because they are obtained as follows. Given x and z, one
uses (2.11) to obtain sharp bounds on EQ(y(t)|z = z,x = x). Due to the mean independence
10Stronger exclusion restrictions include statistical independence of the response function at each t with z:
Q(y(t)|z,x) = Q(y(t)|x) ∀t ∈ T, x-a.s.; and statistical independence of the entire response function with
z: Q([y(t), t ∈ T]|z,x) = Q([y(t), t ∈ T]|x), x-a.s. Examples of partial identification analysis under these
conditions can be found in Balke and Pearl (1997), Manski (2003), Kitagawa (2009), Beresteanu, Molchanov,
and Molinari (2012), Machado, Shaikh, and Vytlacil (2018), and many others.
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assumption in (2.14), EQ(y(t)|x = x) must belong to each of these bounds z-a.s., hence to
their intersection. The expression in (2.15) follows. If the instrument affects the probability
of being selected into treatment, or the average outcome for the subpopulation receiving
treatment t, the bounds on EQ(y(t)|x = x) shrink. If the bounds are empty, the mean
independence assumption can be refuted (see Section 5 for a discussion of misspecification in
partial identification). Manski and Pepper (2000, 2009) generalize the notion of instrumental
variable to monotone instrumental variable, and show how these can be used to obtain
tighter bounds on treatment effect parameters.11 They also show how shape restrictions
and exclusion restrictions can jointly further tighten the bounds. Manski (2013a) generalizes
these findings to the case where treatment response may have social interactions – that is,
each individual’s outcome depends on the treatment received by all other individuals.
2.3 Interval Data
Identification Problem 2.1, as well as the treatment evaluation problem in Section 2.2, is an
instance of the more general question of what can be learned about (functionals of) probability
distributions of interest, in the presence of interval valued outcome and/or covariate data.
Such data have become commonplace in Economics. For example, since the early 1990s the
Health and Retirement Study collects income data from survey respondents in the form of
brackets, with degenerate (singleton) intervals for individuals who opt to fully reveal their
income (see, e.g., Juster and Suzman, 1995). Due to concerns for privacy, public use tax
data are recorded as the number of tax payers which belong to each of a finite number of
cells (see, e.g., Picketty, 2005). The Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program at
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018) collects wage data from
employers as intervals, and uses these data to construct estimates for wage and salary workers
in more than 800 detailed occupations. Manski and Molinari (2010) and Giustinelli, Manski,
and Molinari (2019b) document the extensive prevalence of rounding in survey responses to
probabilistic expectation questions, and propose to use a person’s response pattern across
different questions to infer his rounding practice, the result being interpretation of reported
numerical values as interval data. Other instances abound. Here I focus first on the case of
interval outcome data.
Identification Problem 2.2 (Interval Outcome Data): Assume that in addition to
being compact, either Y is countable or Y = [y0, y1], with y0 = miny∈Y y and y1 = maxy∈Y y.
Let (yL,yU,x) ∼ P be observable random variables and y be an unobservable random variable
whose distribution (or features thereof) is of interest, with yL,yU,y ∈ Y. Suppose that
(yL,yU,y) are such that R(yL ≤ y ≤ yU) = 1.12 In the absence of additional information,
11See Chesher and Rosen (2019, Chapter XXX in this Volume) for further discussion.
12In Identification Problem 2.1 the observable variables are (yd,d,x), and (yL,yU) are determined as
follows: yL = yd+ y0(1− d), yU = yd+ y1(1− d). For the analysis in Section 2.2, the data is (y, s,x) and
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what can the researcher learn about features of Q(y|x = x), the conditional distribution of
y given x = x? 4
It is immediate to obtain the sharp identification region
HP[EQ(y|x = x)] = [EP(yL|x = x),EP(yU|x = x)] .
As in the previous section, it is also easy to obtain sharp bounds on parameters that respect
stochastic dominance, and pointwise-sharp bounds on the CDF of y at any fixed t ∈ R:
P(yU ≤ t|x = x) ≤ Q(y ≤ t|x = x) ≤ P(yL ≤ t|x = x). (2.16)
In this case too, however, as in Theorem OR-2.1, the tube of CDFs satisfying equation (2.16)
for all t ∈ R is an outer region for the CDF of y|x = x, rather than its sharp identification
region. Indeed, also in this context it is easy to construct examples similar to Example 2.1.
How can one characterize the sharp identification region for the probability distribution
of y|x when one observes (yL,yU,x) and assumes R(yL ≤ y ≤ yU) = 1? Again, there is not a
single answer to this question. Depending on the specific problem at hand, e.g., the specifics
of the interval data and whether y is assumed discrete or continuous, different methods can
be applied. I use random set theory to provide a characterization of HP[Q(y|x = x)]. Let
Y ≡ [yL,yU] ∩ Y.
Then Y is a random closed set according to Definition A.1.13 The requirement R(yL ≤ y ≤
yU) = 1 can be equivalently expressed as
y ∈ Y almost surely. (2.17)
Equation (2.17), together with knowledge of P, exhausts all the information in the data and
maintained assumptions. In order to harness such information to characterize the set of
observationally equivalent probability distributions for y, one can leverage a result due to
Artstein (1983) (and Norberg, 1992), reported in Theorem A.1 in Appendix A, which allows
one to translate (2.17) into a collection of conditional moment inequalities. Specifically, let
T denote the space of all probability measures with support in Y.
Theorem SIR-2.3 (Conditional Distribution of Interval-Observed Outcome Data): Given
τ ∈ T , let τK(x) denote the probability that distribution τ assigns to set K conditional on
x = x. Under the assumptions in Identification Problem 2.2, the sharp identification region
yL = y1(s = t) + y01(s 6= t), yU = y1(s = t) + y11(s 6= t). Hence, P(yL ≤ y ≤ yU) = 1 by construction.
13For a proof of this statement, see Molchanov and Molinari (2018, Example 1.11).
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for Q(y|x = x) is
HP[Q(y|x = x)] =
{
τ(x) ∈ T : τK(x) ≥ P(Y ⊂ K|x = x), ∀K ⊂ Y, K compact
}
(2.18)
When Y = [y0, y1], equation (2.18) becomes
HP[Q(y|x = x)] =
{
τ(x) ∈ T : τ[t0,t1](x) ≥ P(yL ≥ t0,yU ≤ t1|x = x), ∀t0 ≤ t1, t0, t1 ∈ Y
}
.
(2.19)
Proof. Theorem A.1 yields (2.18). If Y = [y0, y1], Molchanov and Molinari (2018, Theorem
2.25) show that it suffices to verify the inequalities in (2.19) for sets K that are intervals.
Compare equation (2.18) with equation (2.8). Under the set-up of Identification Problem
2.1, when d = 1 we have Y = {y} and when d = 0 we have Y = Y. Hence, for any K ( Y,
P(Y ⊂ K|x = x) = P(y ∈ K|x = x,d = 1)P(d = 1).14 It follows that the characterizations
in (2.18) and (2.8) are equivalent. If Y is countable, it is easy to show that (2.18) simplifies
to (2.8) (see, e.g., Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari, 2012, Proposition 2.2).
Key Insight 2.3 (Random set theory and partial identification): The mathematical
framework for the analysis of random closed sets embodied in random set theory is naturally
suited to conduct identification analysis and statistical inference in partially identified models.
This is because, as argued by Beresteanu and Molinari (2008) and Beresteanu, Molchanov,
and Molinari (2011, 2012), lack of point identification can often be traced back to a collection
of random variables that are consistent with the available data and maintained assumptions.
In turn, this collection of random variables is equal to the family of selections of a properly
specified random closed set, so that random set theory applies. The interval data case is a
simple example that illustrates this point. More examples are given throughout this chapter.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the exercise of defining the random closed set that is rel-
evant for the problem under consideration is routinely carried out in partial identification
analysis, even when random set theory is not applied. For example, in the case of treat-
ment effect analysis with monotone response function, Manski (1997b) derived the set in the
right-hand-side of (2.12), which satisfies Definition (A.1).
An attractive feature of the characterization in (2.18) is that it holds regardless of the
specific assumptions on yL, yU, and Y. Later sections in this chapter illustrate how Theorem
A.1 delivers the sharp identification region in other more complex instances of partial identi-
fication of probability distributions, as well as in structural models. In Chapter XXX in this
Volume, Chesher and Rosen (2019) apply Theorem A.1 to obtain sharp identification regions
for functionals of interest in the important class of generalized instrumental variable models.
To avoid repetitions, I do not systematically discuss that class of models in this chapter.
14For K = Y, both (2.18) and (2.8) hold trivially.
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When addressing questions about features of Q(y|x = x) in the presence of interval
outcome data, an alternative approach (e.g. Tamer, 2010; Ponomareva and Tamer, 2011)
looks at all (random) mixtures of yL,yU. The approach is based on a random variable u
(a selection mechanism that picks an element of Y ) with values in [0, 1], whose distribution
conditional on yL,yU is left completely unspecified. Using this random variable, one defines
yu = uyL + (1− u)yU. (2.20)
The sharp identification region in Theorem SIR-2.3 can be characterized as the collection
of conditional distributions of all possible random variables yu as defined in (2.20), given
x = x. This is because each yu is a (stochastic) convex combination of yL,yU, hence each
of these random variables satisfies R(yL ≤ yu ≤ yU) = 1. While such characterization is
sharp, it can be of difficult implementation in practice, because it requires working with all
possible random variables yu built using all possible random variables u with support in
[0, 1]. Theorem A.1 allows one to bypass the use of u, and obtain directly a characterization
of the sharp identification region for Q(y|x = x) based on conditional moment inequalities.15
Horowitz and Manski (1998, 2000) study nonparametric conditional prediction problems
with missing outcome and/or missing covariate data. Their analysis shows that this problem
is considerably more pernicious than the case where only outcome data are missing. For
the case of interval covariate data, Manski and Tamer (2002) provide a set of sufficient
conditions under which simple and elegant sharp bounds on functionals of Q(y|x) can be
obtained, even in this substantially harder identification problem. Their assumptions are
listed in Identification Problem 2.3, and their result (with proof) in Theorem SIR-2.4.
Identification Problem 2.3 (Interval Covariate Data): Let (y,xL,xU) ∼ P be observ-
able random variables in R×R×R and x ∈ R be an unobservable random variable. Suppose
that R, the joint distribution of (y,x,xL,xU), is such that: (I) R(xL ≤ x ≤ xU) = 1; (M)
EQ(y|x = x) is weakly increasing in x; and (MI) ER(y|x,xL,xU) = EQ(y|x). In the ab-
sence of additional information, what can the researcher learn about EQ(y|x = x) for given
x ∈ X ? 4
Compared to the earlier discussion for the interval outcome case, here there are two
additional assumptions. The monotonicity condition (M) is a simple shape restrictions, which
however requires some prior knowledge about the joint distribution of (y,x). The mean
independence restriction (MI) requires that if x were observed, knowledge of (xL,xU) would
not affect the conditional expectation of y|x. The assumption is not innocuous, as pointed
15It can be shown that the collection of random variables yu equals the collection of measurable selections
of the random closed set Y ≡ [yL,yU] (see Definition A.3); see Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011,
Lemma 2.1). Theorem A.1 provides a characterization of the distribution of any yu that satisfies yu ∈ Y a.s.,
based on a dominance condition that relates the distribution of yu to the distribution of the random set Y .
Such dominance condition is given by the inequalities in (2.18).
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out by the authors. For example, it may fail if censoring is endogenous.16
Theorem SIR-2.4 (Conditional Expectation with Interval-Observed Covariate Data):
Under the assumptions of Identification Problem 2.3, the sharp identification region for
EQ(y|x = x) for given x ∈ X is
HP[EQ(y|x = x)] =
[
sup
xU≤x
EP(y|xL,xU), inf
xL≥x
EP(y|xL,xU)
]
. (2.21)
Proof. The law of iterated expectations and the independence assumption yield EP(y|xL,xU) =∫
EQ(y|x)dR(x|xL,xU). For all x ≤ x¯, the monotonicity assumption and the fact that x ∈
[xL,xU]-a.s. yield EQ(y|x = x) ≤
∫
EQ(y|x)dR(x|xL = x,xU = x¯) ≤ EQ(y|x = x¯). Putting
this together with the previous result, EQ(y|x = x) ≤ EP(y|xL = x,xU = x¯) ≤ EQ(y|x = x¯).
Then (using again the monotonicity assumption) for any x ≥ x¯, EP(y|xL = x,xU = x¯) ≤
EQ(y|x = x) so that the lower bound holds. The bound is weakly increasing as a function of
x, so that the monotonicity assumption on EQ(y|x = x) holds and the bound is sharp. The
argument for the upper bound can be concluded similarly.
Learning about functionals of Q(y|x = x) naturally implies learning about predictors of
y|x = x. For example, HP[EQ(y|x = x)] yields the collection of values for the best predictor
under square loss; HP[MQ(y|x = x)], with MQ the median with respect to distribution Q,
yields the collection of values for the best predictor under absolute loss. And so on. A related
but distinct problem is that of parametric conditional prediction. Often researchers specify
not only a loss function for the prediction problem, but also a parametric family of predictor
functions, and wish to learn the member of this family that minimizes expected loss. To
avoid confusion, let me clarify that here I am not referring to a parametric assumption on the
best predictor, e.g., that EQ(y|x) is a linear function of x. I return to such assumptions at
the end of this section. For now, in the example of linearity and square loss, I am referring to
best linear prediction, i.e., best linear approximation to EQ(y|x). Manski (2003, pp. 56-58)
discusses what can be learned about the best linear predictor of y conditional on x, when
only interval data on (y,x) is available.
I treat first the case of interval outcome and perfectly observed covariates.
Identification Problem 2.4 (Parametric Prediction with Interval Outcome Data):
Maintain the same assumptions as in Identification Problem 2.2. Let (yL,yU,x) ∼ P be
observable random variables and y be an unobservable random variable, with R(yL ≤ y ≤
yU) = 1. In the absence of additional information, what can the researcher learn about the
best linear predictor of y given x = x? 4
16For the case of missing covariate data, which is a special case of interval covariate data similarly to
arguments in footnote 12, Aucejo, Bugni, and Hotz (2017) show that the MI restriction implies the assumption
that data is missing at random.
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For simplicity suppose that x is a scalar, and let θ = [θ0 θ1]
> ∈ Θ ⊂ R2 denote the
parameter vector of the best linear predictor of y|x. Assume that V ar(x) > 0. Combining
the definition of best linear predictor with a characterization of the sharp identification region
for the joint distribution of (y,x), we have that
HP[θ] =
{
ϑ = arg min
∫
(y − θ0 − θ1x)2 dη, η ∈ HP[Q(y,x)]
}
, (2.22)
where, using an argument similar to the one in Theorem SIR-2.3,
HP[Q(y,x)] =
{
η : η([t0,t1],(−∞,s]) ≥ P(yL ≥ t0,yU ≤ t1,x ≤ s)
∀t0 ≤ t1, t0, t1 ∈ R,∀s ∈ R
}
. (2.23)
Beresteanu and Molinari (2008, Proposition 4.1) show that (2.22) can be re-written in an
intuitive way that generalizes the well-known formula for the best linear predictor that arises
when y is perfectly observed. Define the random segment G and the matrix ΣP as
G =
{(
y
yx
)
: y ∈ Sel(Y )
}
⊂ R2, and ΣP = EP
(
1 x
x x2
)
, (2.24)
where Sel(Y ) is the set of all measurable selections from Y , see Definition A.3. Then,
Theorem SIR-2.5 (Best Linear Predictor with Interval Outcome Data): Under the as-
sumptions of Identification Problem 2.4, the sharp identification region for the parameters of
the best linear predictor of y|x is
HP[θ] = Σ−1P EPG, (2.25)
with EPG the Aumann (or selection) expectation of G as in Definition A.4.
Proof. By Theorem A.1, (y˜, x˜) ∈ (Y ×x) (up to an ordered coupling as discussed in Appendix
A), if and only if the distribution of (y˜, x˜) belongs to HP[Q(y,x)]. The result follows.
In either representation (2.22) or (2.25), HP[θ] is the collection of best linear predictors
for each selection of Y .17 Why should one bother with the representation in (2.25)? The
reason is that HP[θ] is a convex set, as it can be evinced from representation (2.25): G has
almost surely convex realizations that are segments and the Aumann expectation of a convex
set is convex.18 Hence, it can be equivalently represented through its support function hHP[θ],
17Under our assumption that Y is a bounded interval, all the selections of Y are integrable. Beresteanu and
Molinari (2008) consider the more general case where Y is not required to be bounded.
18In R2 in our example, in Rd if x is a d− 1 vector and the predictor includes an intercept.
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see Definition A.5 and equation (A.2). In particular, in this example,
hHP[θ](u) = EP[(yL1(f(x, u) < 0) + yU1(f(x, u) ≥ 0))f(x, u)], u ∈ S, (2.26)
where f(x, u) ≡ [1 x]Σ−1P u.19 The characterization in (2.26) results from Theorem A.2,
which yields hHP[θ](u) = hΣ−1P EPG(u) = EPhΣ−1P G(u), and the fact that EPhΣ−1P G(u) equals
the expression in (2.26). As I discuss in Section 4 below, because the support function fully
characterizes the boundary of HP[θ], (2.26) allows for a simple sample analog estimator, and
for inference procedures with desirable properties. It also immediately yields sharp bounds
on linear combinations of θ by judicious choice of u.20 Stoye (2007) and Magnac and Maurin
(2008) provide the same characterization as in (2.26) using, respectively, direct optimization
and the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem.
A natural generalization of Identification Problem 2.4 allows for both outcome and co-
variate data to be interval valued.
Identification Problem 2.5 (Parametric Prediction with Interval Outcome and Co-
variate Data): Maintain the same assumptions as in Identification Problem 2.4, but with
x ∈ X ⊂ R unobservable. Let the researcher observe (yL,yU,xL,xU) such that R(yL ≤
y ≤ yU,xL ≤ x ≤ xU) = 1. Let X ≡ [xL,xU] and let X be bounded. In the absence of
additional information, what can the researcher learn about the best linear predictor of y
given x = x? 4
Abstractly, HP[θ] is as given in (2.22), with
HP[Q(y,x)] = {η : ηK ≥ P((Y ×X) ⊂ K) ∀ compact K ⊂ Y × X}
replacing (2.23) by an application of Theorem A.1. While this characterization is sharp, it is
cumbersome to apply in practice, see Horowitz, Manski, Ponomareva, and Stoye (2003).
On the other hand, when both y and x are perfectly observed, the best linear predictor
is simply equal to the parameter vector that yields a mean zero prediction error that is
uncorrelated with x. How can this basic observation help in the case of interval data? The
idea is that one can use the same insight applied to the set-valued data, and obtain HP[θ] as
the collection of θ’s for which there exists a selection (y˜, x˜) ∈ Sel(Y ×X), and associated
prediction error εθ = y˜ − θ0 − θ1x˜, satisfying EPεθ = 0 and EP(εθx˜) = 0 (as shown by
Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari, 2011).21 To obtain the formal result, define the θ-
19See Beresteanu and Molinari (2008, p. 808) and Bontemps, Magnac, and Maurin (2012, p. 1136).
20For example, in the case that x is a scalar, sharp bounds on θ1 can be obtained by choosing u = [0 1]
> and
u = [0 −1]>, which yield θ1 ∈ [θ1L, θ1U ] with θ1L = miny∈[yL,yU] Cov(x,y)V ar(x) = EP[(x−EPx)(yL1(x>EPx)+yU1(x≤Ex))]EPx2−(EPx)2
and θ1U = maxy∈[yL,yU]
Cov(x,y)
V ar(x)
= EP[(x−EPx)(yL1(x<EPx)+yU1(x≥Ex))]EPx2−(EPx)2 .
21Here for simplicity I suppose that both xL and xU have bounded support. Beresteanu, Molchanov, and
Molinari (2011) do not make this simplifying assumption.
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dependent set22
Eθ =
{(
y˜ − θ0 − θ1x˜
(y˜ − θ0 − θ1x˜)x˜
)
: (y˜, x˜) ∈ Sel(Y ×X)
}
.
Theorem SIR-2.6 (Best Linear Predictor with Interval Outcome and Covariate Data):
Under the assumptions of Identification Problem 2.5, the sharp identification region for the
parameters of the best linear predictor of y|x is
HP[θ] = {θ ∈ Θ : 0 ∈ EPEθ} =
{
θ ∈ Θ : min
u∈Bd
EPhEθ(u) = 0
}
, (2.27)
where hEθ(u) = maxy∈Y ,x∈X [u1(y − θ0 − θ1x) + u2(yx− θ0x− θ1x2)] is the support function
of the set Eθ in direction u ∈ Sd−1, see Definition A.5.
Proof. By Theorem A.1, (y˜, x˜) ∈ (Y ×X) (up to an ordered coupling as discussed in Ap-
pendix A), if and only if the distribution of (y˜, x˜) belongs to HP[Q(y,x)]. For given θ, one
can find (y˜, x˜) ∈ (Y ×X) such that EPεθ = 0 and EP(εθx˜) = 0 with εθ ∈ Eθ if and only if the
zero vector belongs to EPEθ. By Theorem A.2, EPEθ is a convex set and by (A.9), 0 ∈ EPEθ
if and only if 0 ≤ hEPEθ(u)∀u ∈ Bd. The final characterization follows from (A.7).
The support function hEθ(u) is an easy to calculate convex sublinear function of u, regard-
less of whether the variables involved are continuous or discrete. The optimization problem
in (2.27), determining whether θ ∈ HP[θ], is a convex program, hence easy to solve. See for
example the CVX software by Grant and Boyd (2010). It should be noted, however, that the
set HP[θ] itself is not necessarily convex. Hence, tracing out its boundary is non-trivial. I
discuss computational challenges in partial identification in Section 6.
I conclude this section by discussing parametric regression. Manski and Tamer (2002)
study identification of parametric regression models under the assumptions in Identification
Problem 2.6; Theorem SIR-2.7 below reports the result. The proof is omitted because it
follows immediately from the proof of Theorem SIR-2.4.
Identification Problem 2.6 (Parametric Regression with Interval Covariate Data):
Let (y,xL,xU,w) ∼ P be observable random variables in R × R × R × Rd, d < ∞, and
let x ∈ R be an unobservable random variable. Assume that the joint distribution R of
(y,x,xL,xU) is such that R(xL ≤ x ≤ xU) = 1 and ER(y|w,x,xL,xU) = EQ(y|w,x).
Suppose that EQ(y|w,x) = f(w,x; θ), with f : Rd×R×Θ 7→ R a known function such that
for each w ∈ R and θ ∈ Θ, f(w, x; θ) is weakly increasing in x. In the absence of additional
information, what can the researcher learn about θ? 4
22Note that while G is a convex set, Eθ is not.
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Theorem SIR-2.7 (Parametric Regression with Interval Covariate Data): Under the
Assumptions of Identification Problem 2.6, the sharp identification region for θ is
HP[θ] =
{
ϑ ∈ Θ : f(w,xL;ϑ) ≤ EP(y|w,xL,xU) ≤ f(w,xU;ϑ), (w,xL,xU)-a.s.
}
. (2.28)
Aucejo, Bugni, and Hotz (2017) study Identification Problem 2.6 for the case of missing
covariate data without imposing the mean independence restriction of Manski and Tamer
(2002) (Assumption MI in Identification Problem 2.3). As discussed in footnote 16, restriction
MI is undesirable in this context because it implies the assumption that data are missing at
random. Aucejo, Bugni, and Hotz (2017) characterize HP[θ] under the weaker assumptions,
but face the problem that this characterization is usually too complex to compute or to use
for inference. They therefore provide outer regions that are easier to compute, and they show
that these regions are informative and relatively easy to use.
2.4 Measurement Error and Data Combination
One of the first examples of bounding analysis appears in Frisch (1934), to assess the impact
in linear regression of covariate measurement error. This analysis was substantially extended
in Gilstein and Leamer (1983), Klepper and Leamer (1984), and Leamer (1987). The more
recent literature in partial identification has provided important advances to learn features of
probability distributions when the observed variables are error-ridden measures of the vari-
ables of interest. Here I briefly mention some of the papers in this literature, and refer to
Chapter XXX in this Volume by Schennach (2019) for a thorough treatment of identification
and inference with mismeasured and unobserved variables. In an influential paper, Horowitz
and Manski (1995) study what can be learned about features of the distribution of y|x in
the presence of contaminated or corrupted outcome data. Whereas a contaminated sampling
model assumes that data errors are statistically independent of sample realizations from the
population of interest, the corrupted sampling model does not. These models are regularly
used in the important literature on robust estimation (e.g., Huber, 1964, 2004; Hampel,
Ronchetti, Rousseeuw, and Stahel, 2011). However, the goal of that literature is to charac-
terize how point estimators of population parameters behave when data errors are generated
in specified ways. As such, the inference problem is approached ex-ante: before collecting the
data, one looks for point estimators that are not greatly affected by error. The question ad-
dressed by Horowitz and Manski (1995) is conceptually distinct. It asks what can be learned
about specific population parameters ex-post, that is, after the data has been collected. For
example, whereas the mean is well known not to be a robust estimator in the presence of
contaminated data, Horowitz and Manski (1995) show that it can be (non-trivially) bounded
provided the probability of contamination is strictly less than one. Dominitz and Sherman
(2004, 2005) and Kreider and Pepper (2007, 2008) extend the results of Horowitz and Manski
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to allow for (partial) verification of the distribution from which the data are drawn. They
apply the resulting sharp bounds to learn about school performance when the observed test
scores may not be valid for all students. Molinari (2008) provides sharp bounds on the dis-
tribution of a misclassified outcome variable under an array of different assumptions on the
extent and type of misclassification.
A completely different problem is that of data combination. Applied economists often
face the problem that no single data set contains all the variables that are necessary to con-
duct inference on a population of interest. When this is the case, they need to integrate the
information contained in different samples; for example, they might need to combine survey
data with administrative data (see Ridder and Moffitt, 2007, for a survey of the econometrics
of data combination). From a methodological perspective, the problem is that while the sam-
ples being combined might contain some common variables, other variables belong only to
one of the samples. When the data is collected at the same aggregation level (e.g., individual
level, household level, etc.), if the common variables include a unique and correctly recorded
identifier of the units constituting each sample, and there is a substantial overlap of units
across all samples, then exact matching of the data sets is relatively straightforward, and the
combined data set provides all the relevant information to identify features of the population
of interest. However, it is rather common that there is a limited overlap in the units con-
stituting each sample, or that variables that allow identification of units are not available in
one or more of the input files, or that one sample provides information at the individual or
household level (e.g., survey data) while the second sample provides information at a more
aggregate level (e.g., administrative data providing information at the precinct or district
level). Formally, the problem is that one observes data that identify the joint distributions
P(y,x) and P(x,w), but not data that identifies the joint distribution Q(y,x,w) whose
features one wants to learn. The literature on statistical matching has aimed at using the
common variable(s) x as a bridge to create synthetic records containing (y,x,w) (see, e.g.,
Okner, 1972, for an early contribution). As Sims (1972) points out, the inherent assumption
at the base of statistical matching is that conditional on x, y and w are independent. This
conditional independence assumption is strong and untestable. While it does guarantee point
identification of features of the conditional distributions Q(y|x,w), it often finds very little
justification in practice. Early on, Duncan and Davis (1953) provided numerical illustrations
on how one can bound the object of interest, when both y and w are binary variables. Cross
and Manski (2002) provide a general analysis of the problem. They obtain bounds on the
long regression EQ(y|x,w), under the assumption that w has finite support. They show that
sharp bounds on EQ(y|x,w = w) can be obtained using the results in Horowitz and Manski
(1995), thereby establishing a connection with the analysis of contaminated data. They then
derive sharp identification regions for [EQ(y|x = x,w = w), x ∈ X , w ∈ W]. They show that
these bounds are sharp when y has finite support, and Molinari and Peski (2006) establish
sharpness without this restriction. Fan, Sherman, and Shum (2014) address the question of
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what can be learned about counterfactual distributions and treatment effects under the data
scenario just described, but with x replaced by s, a binary indicator for the received treatment
(using the notation of the previous section). In this case, the exogenous selection assumption
(conditional on w) does not suffice for point identification of the objects of interest. The
authors derive, however, sharp bounds on these quantities using monotone rearrangement
inequalities. Pacini (2017) provides partial identification results for the coefficients in the
linear projection of y on (x,w).
2.5 Further Theoretical Advances and Empirical Applications
In order to discuss the partial identification approach to learning features of probability
distributions in some level of detail while keeping this chapter to a manageable length, I
have focused on a selection of papers. In this section I briefly mention several other excellent
theoretical contributions that could be discussed more closely, as well as several papers that
have applied partial identification analysis to answer important empirical questions.
While selectively observed data are commonplace in observational studies, in randomized
experiments subjects are randomly placed in designated treatment groups conditional on
x, so that the assumption of exogenous selection is satisfied with respect to the assigned
treatment. Yet, identification of some highly policy relevant parameters can remain elusive
in the absence of strong assumptions. One challenge results from noncompliance, where
individuals’ received treatments differs from the randomly assigned ones. Balke and Pearl
(1997) derive sharp bounds on the ATE in this context, when Y = T = {0, 1}. Even if one is
interested in the intention-to-treat parameter, selectively observed data may continue to be a
problem. For example, Lee (2009) studies the wage effects of the Job Corps training program,
which randomly assigns eligibility to participate in the program. Individuals randomized
to be eligible were not compelled to receive treatment, hence Lee (2009) focuses on the
intention-to-treat effect. Because wages are only observable when individuals are employed,
a selection problem persists despite the random assignment of eligibility to treatment, as
employment status may be affected by the training program. Lee obtains sharp bounds on the
intention-to-treat effect, through a trimming procedure that leverages results in Horowitz and
Manski (1995). Molinari (2010) analyzes the problem of identification of the ATE and other
treatment effects, when the received treatment is unobserved for a subset of the population.
Missing treatment data may be due to item or survey nonresponse in observational studies,
or noncompliance with randomly assigned treatments that are not directly monitored. She
derives sharp worst case bounds leveraging results in Horowitz and Manski (1995), and she
shows that these are a function of the available prior information on the distribution of
missing treatments. If the response function is assumed monotone as in (2.13), she obtains
informative bounds without restrictions on the distribution of missing treatments.
Even randomly assigned treatments and perfect compliance with no missing data may
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not suffice for point identification of all policy relevant parameters. Important examples are
given by Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) and Manski (1997a). Heckman, Smith, and
Clements show that features of the joint distribution of the potential outcomes of treatment
and control, including the distribution of treatment effects impacts, cannot be point identified
in the absence of strong restrictions. This is because although subjects are randomized to
treatment and control, nobody’s outcome is observed under both states. Nonetheless, the
authors obtain bounds for the functionals of interest. Mullahy (2018) derives related bounds
on the probability that the potential outcome of one treatment is larger than that of the
other treatment, and applies these results to health economics problems. Manski shows that
features of outcome distributions under treatment rules in which treatment may vary within
groups cannot be point identified in the absence of strong restrictions. This is because data
resulting from randomized experiments with perfect compliance allow for point identification
of the outcome distributions under treatment rules that assign all persons with the same x to
the same treatment group. However, such data only allow for partial identification of outcome
distributions under rules in which treatment may vary within groups. Manski derives sharp
bounds for functionals of these distributions.
Analyses of data resulting from natural experiments also face identification challenges.
Hotz, Mullin, and Sanders (1997) study what can be learned about treatment effects when
one uses a contaminated instrumental variable, i.e. when a mean-independence assumption
holds in a population of interest, but the observed population is a mixture of the population
of interest and one in which the assumption doesn’t hold. They extend the results of Horowitz
and Manski (1995) to learn about the causal effect of teenage childbearing on a teen mother’s
subsequent outcomes, using the natural experiment of miscarriages to form an instrumental
variable for teen births. This instrument is contaminated because miscarriges may not occur
randomly for a subset of the population (e.g., higher miscarriage rates are associated with
smoking and drinking, and these behaviors may be correlated with the outcomes of interest).
Of course, analyses of selectively observed data present many challenges, including but
not limited to the ones described in Section 2.1. Athey and Imbens (2006) generalize the
difference-in-difference (DID) design to a changes-in-changes (CIC) model, where the distri-
bution of the unobservables is allowed to vary across groups, but not overtime within groups,
and the additivity and linearity assumptions of the DID are dispensed with. For the case
that the outcomes have a continuous distribution, Athey and Imbens provide conditions for
point identification of the entire counterfactual distribution of effects of the treatment on the
treatment group as well as the distribution of effects of the treatment on the control group,
without restricting how these distributions differ from each other. For the case that the out-
come variables are discrete, they provide partial identification results, as well as additional
conditions compared to their baseline model under which point identification attains.
Motivated by the question of whether the age-adjusted mortality rate from cancer in
2000 was lower than that in the early 1970s, Honor and Lleras-Muney (2006) study partial
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identification of competing risk models (see Peterson, 1976, for earlier partial identification
results). To answer this question, they need to contend with the fact that mortality rate from
cardiovascular disease declined substantially over the same period of time, so that individuals
that in the early 1970s might have died from cardiovascular disease before being diagnosed
with cancer, do not in 2000. In this context, it is important to carry out the analysis without
assuming that the underlying risks are independent. Honor and Lleras-Muney show that
bounds for the parameters of interest can be obtained as the solution to linear programming
problems. The estimated bounds suggest much larger improvements in cancer mortality rates
than previously estimated.
Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir (2007) use UK data to study changes over time
in the distribution of male and female wages, and in wage inequality. Because the composition
of the workforce changes over time, it is difficult to disentangle that effect from changes in
the distribution of wages, given that the latter are observed only for people in the workforce.
Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir begin their empirical analysis by reporting worst
case bounds (as in Manski, 1994) on the CDF of wages conditional on covariates. They then
consider various restrictions on treatment selection, e.g., a first order stochastic dominance
assumption according to which people with higher wages are more likely to work, and derive
tighter bounds under this assumption (and under weaker ones). Finally, they bring to bear
shape restrictions. At each step of the analysis, they report the resulting bounds, thereby
illuminating the role played by each assumption in shaping the inference. Chandrasekhar,
Chernozhukov, Molinari, and Schrimpf (2018) provide best linear approximations to the iden-
tification region for the quantile gender wage gap using Current Population Survey repeated
cross-sections data from 1975-2001, using treatment selection assumptions in the spirit of
Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir (2007) as well as exclusion restrictions.
Bhattacharya, Shaikh, and Vytlacil (2012) study the effect of Swan-Ganz catheterization
on subsequent mortality.23 Previous research had shown, using propensity score matching
(assuming that there are no unobserved differences between catheterized and non catheterized
patients) that Swan-Ganz catheterization increases the probability that patients die within
180 days from admission to the intensive care unit. Bhattacharya, Shaikh, and Vytlacil
re-analyze the data using (and extending) bounds results obtained by Shaikh and Vytlacil
(2011). These results are based on exclusion restrictions combined with a threshold crossing
structure for both the treatment and the outcome variables in problems where Y = T =
{0, 1}. Bhattacharya, Shaikh, and Vytlacil use as instrument for Swan-Ganz catheterization
the day of the week that the patient was admitted to the intensive care unit. The reasoning
is that patients are less likely to be catheterized on the weekend, but the admission day to
the intensive care unit is plausibly uncorrelated with subsequent mortality. Their results
confirm that for some diagnoses, Swan-Ganz catheterization increases mortality at 30 days
23The Swan-Ganz catheter is a device placed in patients in the intensive care unit to guide therapy.
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after catheterization and beyond.
Manski and Pepper (2018) use data from Maryland, Virginia and Illinois to learn about
the impact of laws allowing individuals to carry concealed handguns (right-to-carry laws)
on violent and property crimes. Point identification of these treatment effects is possible
under invariance assumptions that certain features of treatment response are constant across
states and years. Manski and Pepper propose the use of weaker but more credible restrictions
according to which these features exhibit bounded variation – the invariance case being the
limit where the bound on variation equals zero. They carry out their analysis under different
combinations of the bounded variation assumptions, and at each step they report the resulting
bounds, thereby illuminating the role played by each assumption in shaping the inference.
Mourifie´, Henry, and Me´ango (2018) provide sharp bounds on the joint distribution of
potential (binary) outcomes in a Roy model with sector specific unobserved heterogeneity
and self selection based on potential outcomes. The key maintained assumption is that the
researcher has access to data that includes a stochastically monotone instrumental variable.
This is a selection shifter that is restricted to affect potential outcomes monotonically. An
example is parental education, which may not be independent from potential wages, but
plausibly does not negatively affect future wages. Under this assumption, Mourifie´, Henry,
and Me´ango show that all observable implications of the model are embodied in the stochastic
monotonicity of observed outcomes in the instrument, hence Roy selection behavior can be
tested by checking this stochastic monotonicity. They apply the method to estimate a Roy
model of college major choice in Canada and Germany, with special interest in the under-
representation of women in STEM.
Mogstad, Santos, and Torgovitsky (2018) provide a general method to obtain sharp
bounds on a certain class of treatment effects parameters. This class is comprised of pa-
rameters that can be expressed as weighted averages of marginal treatment effects (Heckman
and Vytlacil, 1999, 2001, 2005). Torgovitsky (2019b) provides a general method, based on
copulas, to obtain sharp bounds on treatment effect parameters in semiparametric binary
models. A notable feature of both Mogstad, Santos, and Torgovitsky (2018) and Torgovitsky
(2019b) is that the bounds are obtained as solutions to convex (even linear) optimization
problems, rendering them computationally attractive. Freyberger and Horowitz (2015) pro-
vide partial identification results and inference methods for a linear functional `(g) when
g : X 7→ R is such that y = g(x) +  and E(y|z) = 0. The instrumental variable z and
regressor x have discrete distributions, and z has fewer points of support than x, so that `(g)
can only be partially identified. They impose shape restrictions on g (e.g., monotonicity or
convexity) to achieve interval identification of `(g), and they show that the lower and upper
points of the interval can be obtained by solving linear programming problems. They also
show that the bootstrap can be used to carry out inference.
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3 Partial Identification of Structural Models
In this section I focus on the literature concerned with learning features of structural econo-
metric models. These are models where economic theory is used to postulate relationships
among observable outcomes y, observable covariates x, and unobservable variables ν. For
example, economic theory may guide assumptions on economic behavior (e.g., utility maxi-
mization) and equilibrium that yield a mapping from (x, ν) to y. The researcher is interested
in learning features of these relationships (e.g., utility function, distribution of preferences),
and to this end may supplement the data and economic theory with functional form as-
sumptions on the mapping of interest and distributional assumptions on the observable and
unobservable variables.
The earlier literature on partial identification of features of structural models includes
important examples of nonparametric analysis of random utility models and revealed prefer-
ence extrapolation, e.g. Block and Marschak (1960), Marschak (1960), Hall (1973), McFadden
(1975), Falmagne (1978), McFadden and Richter (1991), and others. The earlier literature
also addresses semiparametric analysis, where the underlying models are specified up to pa-
rameters that are finite dimensional (e.g., preference parameters) and parameters that are
infinite dimensional (e.g., distribution functions); important examples include Marschak and
Andrews (1944), Markowitz (1952), Fisher (1966, Section 2.10), Harrison and Kreps (1979),
Kreps (1981), Leamer (1981), Manski (1988b), Jovanovic (1989), Phillips (1989), Hansen
and Jagannathan (1991), Hansen, Heaton, and Luttmer (1995), Luttmer (1996), and others.
Contrary to the nonparametric bounds results discussed in Section 2, and especially in the
case of semiparametric models, structural partial identification often yields an identification
region that is not constructive.24 Indeed, the boundary of the set is not obtained in closed
form as a functional of the distribution of the observable data. Rather, the identification
region can often be characterized as a level set of a properly specified criterion function.
The recent spark of interest in partial identification of structural microeconometric models
was fueled by the work of Manski and Tamer (2002), Tamer (2003) and Ciliberto and Tamer
(2009), and Haile and Tamer (2003). Each of these papers has advanced the literature in
fundamental ways, studying conceptually very distinct problems. Manski and Tamer (2002)
are concerned with partial identification of the decision process yielding binary outcomes in
a semiparametric model, when one of the explanatory variables is interval valued. Hence, the
root cause of the identification problem they study is that the data is incomplete.25
Tamer (2003) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) are concerned with identification (and
estimation) of simultaneous equation models with dummy endogeneous variables which are
24Of course, this is not always the case, as exemplified by the bounds in Hansen and Jagannathan (1991).
25Manski and Tamer (2002) study also partial identification (and estimation) of nonparametric, semipara-
metric, and parametric conditional expectation functions that are well defined in the absence of a structural
model, when one of the conditioning variables is interval valued. I refer to Section 2 for a discussion.
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representations of two-player entry games with multiple equilibria.26 Haile and Tamer (2003)
are concerned with nonparametric identification and estimation of the distribution of valua-
tions in a model of English auctions under weak assumptions on bidders’ behavior. In both
cases, the root cause of the identification problem is that the structural model is incomplete.
This is because the model makes multiple predictions for the observed outcome variables
(respectively: the players’ actions; and the bidders’ bids), but does not specify how one of
them is selected to yield the observed data.
Set-valued predictions for the observable outcome (endogenous variables) are a key feature
of partially identified structural models. The goal of this section is to explain how they
result in a wide array of theoretical frameworks, and how sharp identification regions can
be characterized using a unified approach based on random set theory. Although the work
of Manski and Tamer (2002), Tamer (2003) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), and Haile and
Tamer (2003) has spurred many of the developments discussed in this section, for pedagogical
reasons I organize the presentation based on application topic rather than chronologically.
The work of Pakes (2010) and Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2015) further stimulated a large
empirical literature that applies partial identification methods to a wide array of questions
of substantive economic importance, to which I return in Section 3.5.
3.1 Discrete Choice in Single Agent Random Utility Models
Let I denote a population of decision makers and Y = {c1, . . . , c|Y|} a finite universe of
potential alternatives (feasible set henceforth). Let U be a family of real valued functions
defined over the elements of Y. Let ∈∗ denote “is chosen from.” Then observed choice is
consistent with a random utility model if there exists a function ui drawn from U according
to some probability distribution, such that P(c ∈∗ C) = P(ui(c) ≥ ui(b) ∀b ∈ C) for all c ∈ C,
all non empty sets C ⊂ Y, and all i ∈ I (Block and Marschak, 1960). See Manski (2007a,
Chapter 13) for a textbook presentation of this class of models, and Matzkin (2007) for a
review of sufficient conditions for point identification of nonparametric and semiparametric
limited dependent variables models.
As in the seminal work of McFadden (1974), assume that the decision makers and alter-
natives are characterized by observable and unobservable vectors of real valued attributes.
Denote the observable attributes by xi ≡ {x1i , (x2ic, c ∈ Y)}, i ∈ I. These include attribute
vectors x1i that are specific to the decision maker, as well as attribute vectors x
2
ic that include
components that are specific to the alternative and components that are indexed by both.
Denote the unobservable attributes (preferences) by νi ≡ (ζi, {ic, c ∈ Y}), i ∈ I. These are
idiosyncratic to the decision maker and similarly may include alternative and decision maker
specific terms. Denote X ,V the supports of x, ν, respectively.
In what follows, I label “standard” a random utility model that maintains some form of
26Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) consider more general multi-player entry games.
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exogeneity for xi (e.g., mean or quantile or statistical independence with νi) and presupposes
observation of data that include {(Ci,yi,xi) : yi ∈∗ Ci}, i = 1, . . . , n, with Ci the choice set
faced by decision maker i and |Ci| ≥ 2 (e.g., Manski, 1975, Assumption 1). Often it is also
assumed that all members of the population face the same choice set, Ci = D for all i ∈ I
and some known D ⊆ Y, although this requirement is not critical to identification analysis.
3.1.1 Semiparametric Binary Choice Models with Interval Valued Covariates
Manski and Tamer (2002) provide inference methods for nonparametric, semiparametric, and
parametric conditional expectation functions when one of the conditioning variables is inter-
val valued. I have discussed their nonparametric and parametric sharp bounds on conditional
expectations with interval valued covariates in Identification Problems 2.3 and 2.6, and The-
orems SIR-2.4 and SIR-2.7, respectively. Here I focus on their analysis of semiparametric
binary choice models. Compared to the generic notation set forth at the beginning of Section
3.1, I let Ci = Y = {0, 1} for all i ∈ I, and with some abuse of notation I denote the vector
of observed covariates (xL,xU,w).
Identification Problem 3.1 (Semiparametric Binary Regression with Interval Covari-
ate Data): Let (y,xL,xU,w) ∼ P be observable random variables in {0, 1} × R × R × Rd,
d < ∞, and let x ∈ R be an unobservable random variable. Let y = 1(wθ + δx +  > 0).
Assume δ > 0, and further normalize δ = 1 because the threshold-crossing condition is in-
variant to the scale of the parameters. Here  is an unobserved heterogeneity term with
continuous distribution conditional on (w,x,xL,xU), (w,x,xL,xU)-a.s., and θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rd
is a parameter vector representing decision makers’ preferences, with compact parameter
space Θ. Assume that R, the joint distribution of (y,x,xL,xU,w, ), is such that R(xL ≤
x ≤ xU) = 1; R(|w,x,xL,xU) = R(|w,x); and for a specified α ∈ (0, 1), qR(α,w,x) = 0
and R( ≤ 0|w,x) = α, (w,x)-a.s.. In the absence of additional information, what can the
researcher learn about θ? 4
Compared to Identification Problem 2.3 (see p. 23), here one continues to impose x ∈
[xL,xU] a.s. The sign restriction on δ replaces the monotonicity restriction (M) in Identi-
fication Problem 2.3, but does not imply it unless the distribution of  is independent of x
conditional on w. The quantile independence restriction is inspired by Manski (1985).
For given θ ∈ Θ, this model yields set valued predictions because y = 1 can occur
whenever  > −wθ−xU, whereas y = 0 can occur whenever  ≤ −wθ−xL, and −wθ−xU ≤
−wθ−xL. Conversely, observation of y = 1 allows one to conclude that  ∈ (−wθ−xU,+∞),
whereas observation of y = 0 allows one to conclude that  ∈ (−∞,−wθ − xL], and these
regions of possible realizations of  overlap. In contrast, when x is observed the prediction
is unique because the value −wθ − x partitions the space of realizations of  in two disjoint
sets, one associated with y = 1 and the other with y = 0. Figure 3.1 depicts the model’s
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Model predicts y = 0
when  is realized here
Model predicts y = 1
when  is realized here
Model predicts
y = 0 or y = 1
when  is realized here
−wθ − xU −wθ − x −wθ − xL
Model admits  ∈ (−∞,−wθ − xL] when y = 0
Model admits  ∈ (−wθ − xU,+∞) when y = 1
1
Figure 3.1: Predicted value of y as a function of , and admissible values of  for each realization of
y, in Identification Problem 3.1, conditional on (w,xL,xU).
set-valued predictions for y given (w,xL,xU) as a function of , and the model’s set valued
predictions for  given (w,xL,xU) as a function of y.
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Why does this set-valued prediction hinder point identification? The reason is that the dis-
tribution of the observable data relates to the model structure in an incomplete manner. The
model predicts M(y = 1|w,xL,xU) =
∫
R(y = 1|w,x,xL,xU)dR(x|w,xL,xU) =
∫
R( >
−wθ − x|w,x)dR(x|w,xL,xU), (w,xL,xU)-a.s. Because the distribution R(x|w,xL,xU) is
left completely unspecified, one can find multiple values for (θ,R(x|w,xL,xU),R(|w,x)),
satisfying the assumptions in Identification Problem 3.1, such that M(y = 1|w,xL,xU) =
P(y = 1|w,xL,xU), (w,xL,xU)-a.s. Nonetheless, in general, not all values of θ ∈ Θ
can be paired with some R(x|w,xL,xU) and R(|w,x) so that they are compatible with
P(y = 1|w,xL,xU), (w,xL,xU)-a.s. and with the maintained assumptions. Hence, θ can be
partially identified using the information in the model and observed data.
Theorem SIR-3.1 (Semiparametric Binary Regression with Interval Covariate Data):
Under the Assumptions of Identification Problem 3.1, the sharp identification region for θ is
HP[θ] =
{
ϑ ∈ Θ : P
(
(w,xL,xU) : {0 ≤ wϑ+ xL ∩ P(y = 1|w,xL,xU) ≤ 1− α}
∪ {wϑ+ xU ≤ 0 ∩ P(y = 1|w,xL,xU) ≥ 1− α}
)
= 0
}
. (3.1)
Proof. For any ϑ ∈ Θ, define the set of possible values for the unobservable associated with
27Figure 3.1 is based on Figure 1 in Manski and Tamer (2002). See Chesher and Rosen (2019, Chapter
XXX in this Volume) for an extensive discussion of the duality between the model’s set valued predictions for
y as a function of  and for  as a function of y, in both cases given the observed covariates.
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the possible realizations of (y,w,xL,xU), illustrated in Figure 3.1, as
28
Eϑ(y,w,xL,xU) =
{
(−∞,−wϑ− xL] if y = 0,
[−wϑ− xU,+∞) if y = 1.
(3.2)
Then Eϑ(y,w,xL,xU) is a random closed set as per Definition A.1. To simplify notation, let
Eϑ(y) ≡ Eϑ(y,w,xL,xU) suppressing the dependence on (w,xL,xU). Let (Eϑ(y),w,xL,xU) =
Eϑ(y) × (w,xL,xU) = {(e,w,xL,xU) : e ∈ Eϑ(y)}. If the model is correctly specified, for
the data generating value θ, (,w,xL,xU) ∈ (Eθ(y),w,xL,xU) a.s. By Theorem A.1 and
Theorem 2.33 in Molchanov and Molinari (2018), this occurs if and only if
R( ∈ C|w,xL,xU) ≥ P(Eθ(y) ⊂ C|w,xL,xU), (w,xL,xU)-a.s. ∀C ∈ F , (3.3)
where F here denotes the collection of closed subsets of R.
We then have that ϑ is observationally equivalent to θ if and only if (3.3) holds for Eϑ(y)
as defined in (3.2). The condition can be rewritten as∫
R( ∈ C|w,x,xL,xU)dR(x|w,xL,xU) ≥ P(Eϑ(y) ⊂ C|w,xL,xU), (w,xL,xU)-a.s. ∀C ∈ F .
The assumption that R(|w,x,xL,xU) = R(|w,x) yields that the above system of inequali-
ties reduces to∫
R( ∈ C|w,x)dR(x|w,xL,xU) ≥ P(Eϑ(y) ⊂ C|w,xL,xU), (w,xL,xU)-a.s. ∀C ∈ F .
Next, note that given the possible realizations of Eϑ(y), the above inequality is trivially
satisfied unless C = (−∞, t] or C = [t,∞) for some t ∈ R. Finally, the only restriction
on the distribution of  is the quantile independence condition, hence it suffices to consider
t = 0. To see why this is the case, let for example t > 0 and fix a realization (w, xL, xU )
for (w,xL,xU).
29 Then for the inequality not to be trivially satisfied it must be that either
wϑ + xL ≥ −t or wϑ + xU ≤ −t (both are not possible because wϑ + xL ≤ wϑ + xU ). If
wϑ+ xU ≤ −t, it must be that t ∈ (0,−wϑ− xU ] and −wϑ− xU > 0. Then a distribution R
such that
∫
R( ∈ [0, t)|w = w,x)dR(x|w = w,xL = xL,xU = xU ) = 0 is always feasible for
t ∈ (0,−wϑ − xU ]. A similar argument holds if wϑ + xL ≥ −t; and also if t < 0. We then
have that if the inequalities are satisfied for t = 0, they are satisfied also for t 6= 0.
28In the definition of Eϑ(1,w,xL,xU) I exploit the fact that under the maintained assumptions P( =
−wϑ− xU|w,x,xL,xU) = 0 to enforce its closedness.
29There are no (w,xL,xU)-cross restrictions.
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Finally, using the definition of Eϑ(y), for t = 0 we have
1− α ≥ P(y = 1|w,xL,xU) for all (w,xL,xU) such that wϑ+ xU ≤ 0, (3.4)
1− α ≤ P(y = 1|w,xL,xU) for all (w,xL,xU) such that wϑ+ xL ≥ 0. (3.5)
Any given ϑ ∈ Θ, ϑ 6= θ, violates the above conditions if and only if P((w,xL,xU) : {0 ≤
wϑ+xL∩P(y = 1|w,xL,xU) ≤ 1−α}∪{wϑ+xU ≤ 0∩P(y = 1|w,xL,xU) ≥ 1−α}
)
> 0.
Key Insight 3.1: The analysis in Manski and Tamer (2002) systematically studies what
can be learned under increasingly strong sets of assumptions. These include both assumptions
that constrain the model from fully nonparametric to semiparametric to parametric, as well
as assumptions that constrain the distribution of the observable covariates. For example,
Manski and Tamer (2002, Corollary to Proposition 2) provide sufficient conditions on the
joint distribution of (w,xL,xU) that allow for identification of the sign of components of
θ, as well as for point identification of θ.30 The careful analysis of the identifying power
of increasingly stronger assumptions is the pillar of the partial identification approach to
empirical research proposed by Manski, as illustrated in Section 2. The work of Manski and
Tamer (2002) was the first example of this kind in semiparametric structural models.
Revisiting Manski and Tamer’s 2002 study of Identification Problem 3.1 nearly 20 years
later yields important insights on the differences between point and partial identification
analysis. It is instructive to take as a point of departure the analysis of Manski (1985), which
under the additional assumption that (y,w,x) is observed yields
wθ + x > 0⇔ P(y = 1|w,x) > 1− α.
In this case, θ is identified relative to ϑ ∈ Θ if
P ((w,x) : {wθ + x ≤ 0 < wϑ+ x} ∪ {wϑ+ x ≤ 0 < wθ + x}) > 0. (3.6)
Manski and Tamer extend this reasoning to the case that x is unobserved, but known to
satisfy x ∈ [xL,xU] a.s. The first part of their analysis, collected in their Proposition 2,
characterizes the collection of values that cannot be distinguished from θ on the basis of
P(w,xL,xU) alone, through a clear generalization of (3.6):
{ϑ ∈ Θ : P ((w,xL,xU) : {wθ + xU ≤ 0 < wϑ+ xL} ∪ {wϑ+ xU ≤ 0 < wθ + xL}) = 0}.
(3.7)
It is worth emphasizing that the characterization in (3.7) depends on θ, and makes no use
of the information in P(y|w,xL,xU). The Corollary to Proposition 2 yields conditions on
30This Corollary is related in spirit to the analysis in Manski (1988b).
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P(w,xL,xU) under which either the sign of components of θ, or θ itself, can be identified,
regardless of the distribution of y|w,xL,xU.
Manski and Tamer (2002, Lemma 1) provide a second characterization, which presupposes
knowledge of P(y,w,xL,xU), yields a set smaller than the one in (3.7), and coincides with
the result in Theorem SIR-3.1. Manski and Tamer (2002) use the same notation for the
two sets, although the sets are conceptually and mathematically distinct.31 The result in
Theorem SIR-3.1 is due to Manski and Tamer (2002, Lemma 1), but the proof provided here
is new, as is the use of random set theory in this application.32
Key Insight 3.2: The preceding discussion allows me to draw a novel connection between
the two characterizations in Manski and Tamer (2002), and the distinction put forward by
Chesher and Rosen (2017a) and Chesher and Rosen (2019, Chapter XXX in this Volume,
Definition 2) in partial identification between potential observational equivalence and obser-
vational equivalence.33 Applying Chesher and Rosen’s definition, parameter vectors θ and ϑ
are potentially observationally equivalent if there exists some distribution of y|w,xL,xU for
which conditions (3.4)-(3.5) hold. Simple algebra confirms that this yields the region in (3.7).
This notion of potential observational equivalence parallels one of the notions used to obtain
sufficient conditions for point identification in the semiparametric literature (as in, e.g. Man-
ski, 1985). Both notions, as explained in Chesher and Rosen (2019, Section 4.1), make no
reference to the conditional distribution of outcomes given covariates delivered by the process
being studied. To obtain that parameters θ and ϑ are observationally equivalent one requires
instead that conditions (3.4)-(3.5) hold for the observed distribution P(y = 1|w,xL,xU) (as
opposed to “for some distribution” as in the case of potential observational equivalence). This
yields the sharp identification region in (3.1).
Manski (2010) studies random expected utility models, where agents choose the alternative
that maximizes their expected utility. The core difference with standard models is that
Manski does not fully specify the subjective beliefs that agents use to form their expectations,
but only a set of such beliefs. Manski shows that the resulting, partially identified, discrete
choice model can be formulated similarly to how Manski and Tamer (2002) treat interval
31This was confirmed in personal communication with Chuck Manski and Elie Tamer.
32The proof closes a gap in the argument in Manski and Tamer (2002) connecting their Proposition 2 and
Lemma 1, due to the fact that for a given ϑ the sets {(w,xL,xU) : {wθ+xU ≤ 0 < wϑ+xL} ∪ {wϑ+xU ≤
0 < wθ + xL}} and {(w,xL,xU) : {0 < wϑ + xL ∩ P(y = 1|w,xL,xU) ≤ 1 − α} ∪ {wϑ + xU ≤ 0 ∩ P(y =
1|w,xL,xU) > 1− α}} need not coincide, with the former being a subset of the latter due to part (c) of the
proof of Proposition 2 in Manski and Tamer (2002).
33This distinction echos the distinction drawn by Manski (1988a, Section 1.1.1) between point identification
and uniform point identification. Manski considers a scenario where a parameter vector of interest θ is defined
as the solution to an equation of the form qP(θ) = 0 for some criterion function qP : Θ 7→ R+. Then θ is point
identified relative to (P,Θ) if it is the unique solution to qP(θ) = 0. It is uniformly point identified relative
to (P,Θ), with P a space of probability distributions to which P belongs, if for every P˜ ∈ P, qP˜(ϑ) = 0 has a
unique solution.
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valued covariates, and leverages their results to obtain bounds on preference parameters.34
Magnac and Maurin (2008) consider a different but closely related model to the semi-
parametric binary response model studied by Manski and Tamer. They assume that an
instrumental variable z is available, that  is independent of x conditional on (w, z), and
that Corr(z, ) = 0. They assume that the distribution of x is absolutely continuous with
support [v1, vk], and that x is not a deterministic linear function of (w, z). They consider
the case that x is unobserved but known to belong to one of the fixed (and known) intervals
[vi, vi+1), i = 1, . . . , k− 1, with R[x ∈ [vi, vi+1)|w, z] > 0 almost surely for all i. Finally, they
assume that (−wθ− ) ∈ [v1, vk] with probability one. They do not, however, make quantile
independence assumptions.
Their point of departure is the fact that under these conditions, if x were observed, one
could employ a transformation proposed by Lewbel (2000) for the binary outcome y, such
that θ can be identified through a simple linear moment condition. Specifically, let
y˜ =
y − 1x>0
fx(x|w, z) ,
where fx(·|w, z) is the conditional density function of x. Then, using the assumption that z
and  are uncorrelated, one has
EP(zy˜)− EP(zw>)θ = 0. (3.8)
With interval valued x, Magnac and Maurin (2008) denote by x∗ the random variable
that takes value i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} if x ∈ [vi, vi+1), so that the observed data are draws from
the joint distribution of (y,w, z,x∗). They let δ(x∗) = vx∗+1 − vx∗ denote the length of the
x∗-th interval, and define the transformed outcome variable:
y∗ =
δ(x∗)
P(x∗ = i|w, z)y − vk.
The assumptions on x yield that, given z and w,  does not depend on x∗. Moreover,
P(y = 1|x∗,w, z) is non-decreasing in x∗ and F(·|z,w,x,x∗) = F(·|z,w). Magnac and
Maurin (2008) show that the sharp identification region for θ is
HP[θ] = EP(zw>)−1EP(zy∗ + zU), (3.9)
where EP(zy∗+ zU) is the Aumann (or selection) expectation of the random interval zy∗+
34Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011, Supplementary Appendix F) extend the analysis of Manski
and Tamer (2002) to multinomial choice models with interval covariates.
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zU , see Definition A.4, with
U =
[
−
k−1∑
i=1
(ri(w, z)− ri−1(w, z))(vi+1 − vi),
k−1∑
i=1
(ri+1(w, z)− ri(w, z))(vi+1 − vi)
]
.
In this expression, rx∗(w, z) ≡ P(y = 1|x∗,w, z) and by convention r0(w, z) = 0 and
rK(w, z) = 1, see Magnac and Maurin (2008, Theorem 4). If ri(w, z), i = 0, . . . , k, were
observed, this characterization would be very similar to the one provided by Beresteanu and
Molinari (2008) for Identification Problem 2.4, see equation (2.25). However, these random
functions need to be estimated. While the first-stage estimation of ri(w, z), i = 0, . . . , k,
does not affect the identification arguments, it does complicate inference, see Chandrasekhar,
Chernozhukov, Molinari, and Schrimpf (2018) and the discussion in Section 4.
3.1.2 Endogenous Explanatory Variables
Whereas the standard random utility model presumes some form of exogeneity for x, in
practice often some explanatory variables are endogenous. This problem has been addressed
in the literature to obtain point identification of the model through a combination of several
assumptions, including large support conditions, special regressors, control function restric-
tions, and more (see, e.g., Matzkin, 1993; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995; Lewbel, 2000;
Petrin and Train, 2010). Hong and Tamer (2003b) analyze the distinct but related problem
of identification in a censored regression model with endogeneous explanatory variables, and
provide sufficient conditions for point identification.35
Here I discuss how to carry out identification analysis in the absence of such assumptions
when instrumental variables z are available, as proposed by Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski
(2013). They consider a more general case than I do here, with utility function that is not
parametrically specified and not restricted to be separable in the unobservables. Even in that
more general case, the identification analysis follows through similar steps as reported here.
Identification Problem 3.2 (Discrete Choice with Endogenous Explanatory Vari-
ables): Let (y,x, z) ∼ P be observable random variables in Y × X × Z. Let all members of
the population face the same choice set Y. Suppose that each alternative has one unobserv-
able attribute c, c ∈ Y and let ν ≡ (c1 , . . . , c|Y|).36 Let ν ∼ Q and assume that ν ⊥ z.
Suppose Q belongs to a nonparametric family of distributions T , and that the conditional
distribution of ν|x, z, denoted R(ν|x, z), is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure with everywhere positive density on its support, (x, z)-a.s. Suppose utility is sepa-
35The estimator that they propose extends the minimum distance estimator put forward by Manski and
Tamer (2002), see Section 4.2, so that if the conditions required for point identification do not hold, it estimates
the parameter’s identification region (under regularity conditions). Hong and Tamer (2003a) carry out a similar
analysis for the binary choice model with endogenous explanatory variables.
36Compared to the general model put forward in Section 3.1, in this model there are no preference hetero-
geneity terms ζ (random coefficients) that vary only across decision makers.
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rable in unobservables and has a functional form known up to finite dimensional parameter
vector θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rm, so that ui(c) = g(xc; θ) + c, (xc, c)-a.s., for all c ∈ Y. Maintain the
normalizations g(xc|Y| ; θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ and all x ∈ X , and g(x0c ; θ) = g¯ for known (x0c , g¯)
for all θ ∈ Θ and c ∈ Y.37 Given (x, z, ν), suppose y is the utility maximizing choice in Y.
In the absence of additional information, what can the researcher learn about (θ,Q)? 4
The key challenge to identification here results because the distribution of ν can vary
across different values of x, both conditional and unconditional on z. Why does this fact
hinder point identification? For a given ϑ ∈ Θ and for any c ∈ Y and x ∈ X , the model yields
that c is optimal, and hence chosen, if and only if ν realizes in the set
Eϑ(c, x) = {e ∈ V : g(xc;ϑ) + ec ≥ g(xd;ϑ) + ed ∀d ∈ Y}. (3.10)
Figure 3.2 plots the set Eϑ(y,x) in a stylized example with Y = {1, 2, 3} and X = {x1, x2}, as
a function of (1 − 3, 2 − 3).38 Consider the model implied distribution, denoted M below,
of the optimal choice. Then, recalling the restriction z ⊥ ν, we have
M(c|x ∈ Rx, z;ϑ) =
∫
x∈Rx
R(Eϑ(c,x)|x = x, z)dP(x|z), ∀ Rx ⊆ X , z-a.s. (3.11)
Q(F ) =
∫
x∈X
R(F |x = x, z)dP(x|z), ∀ F ⊆ V, z-a.s., (3.12)
Because the joint distribution of (x, ν) conditional on z is left completely unrestricted (other
than (3.12)), one can find multiple triplets (ϑ,Q,R(ν|x, z)) satisfying the maintained as-
sumptions and with M(c|x ∈ Rx, z;ϑ) = P(c|x ∈ Rx, z) for all c ∈ Y and Rx ⊆ X , z-a.s.
It is instructive to compare (3.11)-(3.12) with McFadden’s 1974 conditional logit. Under
the standard assumptions, x ⊥ ν so that no instrumental variables are needed. This yields
Q(ν) = R(ν|x) x-a.s., and in addition Q is typically known, with corresponding simplifications
in (3.11). The resulting system of equalities can be inverted under standard order and rank
conditions to yield point identification of θ.
Further insights can be gained by looking at Figure 3.2. As the value of x changes
from x1 to x2, the region of values where, say, alternative 1 is optimal changes. When
x is exogenous, say independent of ν, this yields a system of equalities relating (θ,Q) to
the observed distribution P(y,x) which, as stated above, can be inverted to obtain point
identification. When x is endogenous, this reasoning breaks down because the conditional
distribution R(ν|x, z) may change across realizations of x. Figure 3.2 also offers an instructive
way to connect Identification Problem 3.2 with the identification problem studied in Section
37Of course, under these conditions one can work directly with utility differences. To try and economize on
notation, I do not explicitly do so here.
38This figure is based on Figures 1-3 in Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski (2013).
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1 − 3
2 − 3
−g(x21;ϑ)
−g(x22;ϑ)
−g(x11;ϑ)
−g(x12;ϑ)
(a) Eϑ(y,x) for y = 1
1 − 3
2 − 3
−g(x21;ϑ)
−g(x22;ϑ)
−g(x11;ϑ)
−g(x12;ϑ)
(b) Eϑ(y,x) for y = 2
1 − 3
2 − 3
−g(x21;ϑ)
−g(x22;ϑ)
−g(x11;ϑ)
−g(x12;ϑ)
(c) Eϑ(y,x) for y = 3
1
Figure 3.2: The set Eϑ in equation (3.10) and the corresponding admissible values for (y,x) as a
function of (1 − 3, 2 − 3) under the simplifying assumption that X = {x1, x2} and Y = {1, 2, 3}.
The admissible values for (y,x) are {(c, x1)} in the gray area, and {(c, x2)} in the area with vertical
lines. Because the two areas overlap, the model has set-valued predictions for (y,x).
3.1.1 (as well as with those in Sections 3.2-3.3 below). In the latter, the model has set-
valued predictions for the outcome variable given realizations of the covariates and unobserved
heterogeneity terms, which overlap across realizations of the unobserved heterogeneity terms.
In the problem studied here, the model has singleton-valued predictions for the outcome
variable of interest y as a function of the observable explanatory variables x and unobservables
ν. However, for given realization of ν, the model admits sets of values for the endogenous
variables (y,x), which overlap across realizations of ν. Because the model is silent on the
joint distribution of (x, ν) (except for requiring that the marginal distribution of ν does not
depend on z), partial identification results.
It is possible to couple the maintained assumptions with the observed data to learn
features of (θ,Q). Because the observed choice y is assumed to maximize utility, for the data
generating (θ,Q) the model yields
ν ∈ Eθ(y,x)-a.s., (3.13)
with Eθ(y,x) a random closed set as per Definition A.1. Equation (3.13) exhausts the mod-
eling content of Identification Problem 3.2. Theorem A.1 (as expressed in (A.5)) can then
be leveraged to extract its empirical content from the observed distribution P(y,x, z). As a
preparation for doing so, note that for given F ∈ F (with F the collection of closed subsets
of V) and ϑ ∈ Θ, we have
P(Eϑ(y,x) ⊆ F |z) =
∫
x∈X
∑
c∈Y
1(Eϑ(c, x) ⊆ F )P(y = c|x = x, z)dP(x|z),
so that this probability can be learned from the observed data.
Theorem SIR-3.2 (Discrete Choice with Endogenous Explanatory Variables): Under
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the assumptions of Identification Problem 3.2, the sharp identification region for (θ,Q) is
HP[θ,Q] =
{
ϑ ∈ Θ, Q˜ ∈ T : Q˜(F ) ≥ P(Eϑ(y,x) ⊆ F |z), ∀F ∈ F , z-a.s.
}
. (3.14)
Proof. To simplify notation, I write Eϑ ≡ Eϑ(y,x). Let (Eϑ,x, z) = {(e,x, z) : e ∈ Eϑ}. If
the model is correctly specified, (ν,x, z) ∈ (Eθ,x, z)-a.s. for the data generating value of
(θ,Q). Using Theorem A.1 and Theorem 2.33 in Molchanov and Molinari (2018), it follows
that (ϑ, Q˜) is observationally equivalent to (θ,Q) if and only if
Q˜(F |x, z) ≥ P(Eϑ(y,x) ⊆ F |x, z), ∀F ∈ F , (x, z)-a.s.
As the distribution of ν is only restricted so that ν ⊥ z, one can integrate both sides of the
inequality with respect to x. The final result follows because Q˜ does not depend on z.
While Theorem SIR-3.2 relies on checking inequality (3.14) for all F ∈ F , the results in
Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski (2013, Theorem 2) and Molchanov and Molinari (2018, Chap-
ter 2) can be used to obtain a smaller collection of sets over which to verify it. In particular,
if x has a discrete distribution, it suffices to use a finite collection of sets. For example, in
the case depicted in Figure 3.2 with X = {x1, x2}, Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski (2013,
Section 3.3 of the 2011 CeMMAP working paper version CWP39/11) show that HP[θ,Q]
is obtained by checking at most twelve inequalities in (3.14). The left hand side of these
inequalities is a linear function of six values that the distribution Q˜ assigns to each of the
component regions depicted in Figure 3.2 (the one where Eϑ(1, x1) ∩ Eϑ(1, x2) realizes; the
one where Eϑ(1, x1)∩Eϑ(3, x2) realizes; etc.) Hence, in this example, (ϑ, Q˜) ∈ HP[θ,Q] if and
only if Q˜ assigns to these six regions a probability mass such that for ϑ the twelve inequalities
characterized by Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski hold.
Key Insight 3.3: A conceptual contribution of Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski (2013)
is to show that one can frame models with endogenous explanatory variables as incomplete
models. Incompleteness here results from the fact that the model does not specify how the
endogenous variables x are determined. One can then think of these as models with set-
valued predictions for the endogeneous variables (y and x in this application), even though the
outcome of the model (y) is uniquely predicted by the realization of the observed explanatory
variables (x) and the unobserved heterogeneity terms (ν). Random set theory can again be
leveraged to characterize sharp identification regions.
Chesher and Rosen (2019, Chapter XXX in this Volume) discuss related generalized
instrumental variables models where random set methods are used to obtain characterizations
of sharp identification regions in the presence of endogenous explanatory variables.
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3.1.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity in Choice Sets and/or Consideration Sets
Compared to the general framework set forth at the beginning of Section 3.1, as pointed
out in Manski (1977), often the researcher observes (yi,xi) but not Ci, i = 1, . . . , n. Even
when Ci is observable, the researcher may be unaware of which of its elements the decision
maker actually evaluates before selecting one. In what follows, to shorten expressions, I refer
to both the measurement problem of unobserved choice sets and the (cognitive) problem of
limited consideration as “unobserved heterogeneity in choice sets.”
Learning features of preferences using discrete choice data in the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity in choice sets is a formidable task. When a decision maker chooses an alterna-
tive, this may be because her choice set equals the feasible set and the chosen alternative is
the one yielding the highest utility. Then observed choice reveals preferences. But it can also
be that the decision maker has access to/considers only the chosen alternative (e.g., Block
and Marschak, 1960, p. 99). Then observed choice is driven entirely by choice set compo-
sition, and is silent about preferences. A plethora of scenarios between these extremes is
possible, but the researcher does not know which has generated the observed data. This fun-
damental identification problem calls either for restrictions on the random utility model and
consideration set formation process, or for collection of richer data that eliminates unobserved
heterogeneity in Ci or allows for enhanced modeling of it (see, e.g., Caplin, 2016).
A sizable literature spanning behavioral economics, econometrics, experimental economics,
marketing, microeconomics, and psychology, has put forward different models to formalize the
complex process that leads to the formation of the set of alternatives that the agent considers
or can choose from (see, e.g., Simon, 1959; Howard, 1963; Tversky, 1972, for early contri-
butions). Manski (1977) proposes both a general econometric model where decision makers
draw choice sets from an unknown distribution, as well as a specific model of choice set for-
mation, independent from preferences, and studies their implications for the distributional
structure of random utility models.39
However, assumptions about the choice set formation process are often rooted in a desire
to achieve point identification rather than in information contained in the model or observed
data.40 It is then important to ask what can be learned about decision maker’s preferences
under minimal assumptions on the choice set formation process. Allowing for unrestricted
dependence between choice sets and preferences, while challenging for identification analysis,
is especially relevant. Indeed, decision makers’ unobserved attributes may determine both
their preferences and which items in the feasible set they pay attention to or are available to
them (e.g., through unobserved liquidity constraints, unobserved characteristics such as reli-
39The specific model in Manski (1977, Section II-A) is often used in applications. It posits that each
alternative c ∈ Y enters the decision maker’s choice set with probability φc, independently of the other
alternatives. The probability φc may depend on observable individual characteristics, and φc = 1 for at least
one option c ∈ Y (the “default” good).
40These assumptions are akin to assumptions about selection mechanisms in models with multiple equilibria.
The latter are discussed further below in Section 3.2.1, along with their criticisms.
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ν
ν¯|Y|−2,|Y| · · · ν¯2,4 ν¯1,3ν¯|Y|−1,|Y| ν¯2,3 ν¯1,2
Model predicts
y = c|Y|−1 or y = c|Y|
· · · Model predicts
y = c2 or y = c3
Model predicts
y = c1 or y = c2
1
Figure 3.3: Predicted value of y in Identification Problem 3.3 as a function of ν for κ = |Y| − 1. In
this case, C = Y \ {c} for some c ∈ Y, and the model predicts either the first or the second best
alternative in Y.
gious preferences in the context of school choice, or behavioral phenomena such as aversion
to extremes, salience, etc.). Here I use the framework put forward by Barseghyan, Cough-
lin, Molinari, and Teitelbaum (2019) to study identification of discrete choice models with
unobserved heterogeneity in choice sets and preferences.
Identification Problem 3.3 (Discrete Choice with Unobserved Heterogeneity in Choice
Sets and Preferences): Let (y,x) ∼ P be observable random variables in Y × X . Assume
that there exists a real valued function g, which for simplicity I posit known up to parameter
δ ∈ ∆ ⊂ Rm and continuous in its second argument, such that ui(c) = g(xic, νi; ), (xic, νi)-
a.s., for all c ∈ Y, i ∈ I, where xic denotes the vectors of attributes relevant to alternative
c, and includes attributes that are alternative invariant and ones that are alternative specific
(respectively, x1i and x
2
ic in the general notation laid out in Section 3.1). Suppose that
y = arg maxc∈C g(xc, ν; δ), where ties are assumed to occur with probability zero and C is an
unobservable choice set drawn from the subsets of Y according to some unknown probability
distribution. Suppose R(|C| ≥ κ) = 1 for some known constant κ ≥ 2. Let Q denote
the distribution of ν, and assume that it is known up to a finite dimensional parameter
γ ∈ Γ ⊂ Rk. For simplicity, assume that ν ⊥ x.41 In the absence of additional information,
what can the researcher learn about θ ≡ [δ; γ]? 4
The model just laid out has set valued predictions for the decision maker’s optimal choice,
because different alternatives might be optimal depending on which choice set the decision
maker draws. Figure 3.3, which is based on the analysis in Barseghyan, Coughlin, Molinari,
and Teitelbaum (2019), illustrates the set valued predictions in a stylized example. In the
figure ν is assumed to be a scalar; ν¯j,m denotes the threshold value of ν above which cj
yields higher utility than cm and below which cm yields higher utility than cj (the threshold’s
dependence on (x; δ) is suppressed for notational convenience). Consider the case that ν ∈
[ν¯2,3, ν¯1,2], so that c2 is the option yielding the highest utility among all options in Y. When
41This assumption can be relaxed as discussed in Matzkin (2007). The procedure proposed here can also
be adapted to allow for endogenous explanatory variables as in Section 3.1.2 by combining the results in
Barseghyan, Coughlin, Molinari, and Teitelbaum (2019) with those in Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski (2013).
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κ = |Y| − 1, the agent may draw a choice set that does not include one of the alternatives
in Y. If the excluded alternative is not c2 (or if C realizes equal to Y), the model predicts
that the decision maker chooses c2. If C realizes equal to Y \ {c2}, the model predicts that
the decision maker chooses the second best: c1 if ν ∈ [ν¯1,3, ν¯1,2], and c3 if ν ∈ [ν¯2,3, ν¯1,3].
Conversely, observation of y = c1 allows one to conclude that ν ≥ ν¯1,3, and y = c2 that
ν ≥ ν¯2,4, with ν¯2,4 ≤ ν¯1,3, and these regions of possible realizations of ν overlap.
Why does this set valued prediction hinder point identification? The reason is similar
to the explanation given for Identification Problem 3.1: the distribution of the observable
data relates to the model structure in an incomplete manner, because the distribution of
the (unobserved) choice sets is left completely unspecified. Barseghyan, Coughlin, Molinari,
and Teitelbaum (2019) show that one can find multiple candidate distributions for C and
parameter vectors ϑ, such that together they yield a model implied distribution for y|x that
matches P(y|x), x-a.s.
Barseghyan, Coughlin, Molinari, and Teitelbaum propose to work directly with the set
of model implied optimal choices given (x, ν) associated with each possible realization of C,
which is depicted in Figure 3.3 for a specific example. The key idea is that, according to
the model, the observed choice maximizes utility among the alternatives in C. Hence, for
the data generating value of θ, it belongs to the set of model implied optimal choices. With
this, the authors are able to characterize HP[θ] through Theorem A.1 as the collection of
parameter vectors that satisfy a finite number of conditional moment inequalities.
Key Insight 3.4: Barseghyan, Coughlin, Molinari, and Teitelbaum (2019) show that
working directly with the set of model implied optimal choices given (x, ν) allows one to
dispense with considering all possible distributions of choice sets that are allowed for in Iden-
tification Problem 3.3 to complete the model. Such distributions may depend on ν even after
conditioning on observables and may constitute an infinite dimensional nuisance parameter,
which creates great difficulties for the computation of HP[θ] and for inference.
Identification Problem 3.3 sets up a structure where preferences include idiosyncratic com-
ponents ν that are decision maker specific and can depend on C, and where heterogeneity in
C can be driven either by a measurement problem, or by the decision maker’s limited atten-
tion to the options available to her. However, for computational and finite sample inference
reasons, it restricts the family of utility functions to be known up to a finite dimensional
parameter vector δ.
A rich literature in decision theory has analyzed a different framework, where the decision
maker’s choice set is observable to the researcher, but the decision maker does not consider all
alternatives in it (for recent contributions see, e.g., Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay, 2012;
Manzini and Mariotti, 2014). In this literature, the utility function is left completely unspec-
ified, so that interest focuses on identification of preference orderings of the available options.
Unobserved heterogeneity in preferences is assumed away, so that heterogeneous choice is
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driven by randomness in consideration sets. If the consideration set formation process is
left unspecified or is subject only to weak restrictions, point identification of the preference
orderings is not possible even if preferences are homogeneous and the researcher observes a
representative agent facing multiple distinct choice problems with varying choice sets. Catta-
neo, Ma, Masatlioglu, and Suleymanov (2019) propose a general model for the consideration
set formation process where the only restriction is a weak and intuitive monotonicity condi-
tion: the probability that any particular consideration set is drawn does not decrease when
the number of possible consideration sets decreases. Within this framework, they provide
revealed preference theory and testable implications for observable choice probabilities.
Identification Problem 3.4 (Homogeneous Preference Orderings in Random Attention
Models): Let (y,C) ∼ P be a pair of observable random variable and random set in Y ×D,
where D = {D : D ⊆ Y} \ ∅.42 Let µ : D × D → [0, 1] denote an attention rule such that
µ(A|G) ≥ 0 for all A ⊆ G, µ(A|G) = 0 for all A * G, and ∑A⊂G µ(A|G) = 1, A,G ∈ D.
Assume that for any b ∈ G \A,
µ(A|G) ≤ µ(A|G \ {b}), (3.15)
and that the decision maker has a strict preference ordering  on Y.43 In the absence of
additional information, what can the researcher learn about ? 4
Cattaneo, Ma, Masatlioglu, and Suleymanov (2019) posit that an observed distribution
of choice P(y|C) has a random attention representation, and hence they name it a random
attention model, if there exists a preference ordering  over Y and a monotonic attention
rule µ such that
p(c|G) ≡ P(y = c|C = G) =
∑
A⊆G
1(c is  -best in A)µ(A|G), ∀c ∈ G, ∀G ∈ D. (3.16)
The sharp identification region for the preference ordering, denoted HP[] henceforth, is
given by the collection of preference orderings for which one can find a monotonic attention
rule to pair it with, so that (3.16) holds.
Of course, an observed distribution of choice can be represented by multiple preference
orderings and attention rules. The authors, however, show in their Lemma 1 that if for some
G ∈ D with {b, c} ∈ G,
p(c|G) > p(c|G \ {b}), (3.17)
then c  b for any  for which one can find a monotonic attention rule µ such that (3.16)
42Here I omit observable covariates x for simplicity.
43Specifically,  is an asymmetric, transitive and complete binary relation.
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holds. Because of preference transitivity, one can also learn a  b if in addition to the above
condition one has p(a|G′) > p(a|G′ \ {c}) for some c ∈ G′ and G′ ∈ D. The authors further
show in their Theorem 1 that the collection of preference relations associated with all possible
instances of (3.17) for all c ∈ G and G ∈ D yield all information about preferences given the
observed choice probabilities. This yields a system of linear inequalities in p(c|G) that fully
characterize HP[]. Let ~p denote the vector with elements [p(c|G) : c ∈ G,G ∈ D] and Π
denote a conformable matrix collecting the constraints on P(y|C) embodied in (3.17) and its
generalizations based on transitive closure. Then
HP[] = {: Π~p ≤ 0}. (3.18)
The authors show that for any given preference ordering , the matrix Π characterizing
whether ∈ HP[] through the system of linear inequalities in (3.18) is unique, and they
provide a simple algorithm to compute it. They also show that mild additional assumptions,
such as, for example, that decision makers facing binary choice sets pay attention to both
alternatives frequently enough, can substantially increase the informational content of the
data (i.e., substantially tighten HP[]).
Key Insight 3.5: Cattaneo, Ma, Masatlioglu, and Suleymanov (2019) show that learning
features of preference orderings in Identification Problem 3.4 requires the existence in the data
of choice problems where the choice probabilities satisfy (3.17). The latter is a violation of
the principle of “regularity” (Luce and Suppes, 1965) according to which the probability of
choosing an alternative from any set is at least as large as the probability of choosing it
from any of its supersets. Regularity is a monotonicity property of choice probabilities, and
it is implied by a wide array of models of decision making. The monotonicity of attention
rules in (3.15) can be viewed as regularity of the process that chooses a consideration set
from the subsets of the choice set. Cattaneo, Ma, Masatlioglu, and Suleymanov (2019) show
that it is implied by various models of limited attention. While the violation required in
(3.17) is weak in that it needs only to occur for some G, it sheds a different light on the
severity of the identification problem described at the beginning of this section. Regularity of
choice probabilities and (partial) identification of preference orderings can co-exist only under
restrictions on the consideration set formation process that are stronger than the regularity
of attention rules in (3.15).
Abaluck and Adams (2018) and Barseghyan, Molinari, and Thirkettle (2019) provide dif-
ferent sets of sufficient conditions for point identification of models of limited consideration.
In both cases, the authors posit specific models of consideration set formation and provide
sufficient conditions for point identification under exclusion and large support assumptions.
Abaluck and Adams (2018) assume that unobserved heterogeneity in preferences and in con-
sideration sets are independent. They exploit violations of Slutsky symmetry that result from
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inattention, assuming that for each alternative there is an observable characteristic with large
support that does not affect the consideration probability of the other options. Barseghyan,
Molinari, and Thirkettle (2019) provide a thorough analysis of the extent of dependency
between consideration and preferences under which semi-nonparametric point identification
of the distribution of preferences and consideration attains. They exploit a requirement of
standard economic theory –the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property of utility functions–
coupled with a mild strengthening of the classic conditions for semi-nonparametric identifi-
cation of discrete choice models with full consideration and identical choice sets (see, e.g.,
Matzkin, 2007), assuming that there is at least one decision maker-specific characteristic with
large support that affects utility but not consideration.
3.1.4 Prediction of Choice Behavior with Counterfactual Choice Sets
Building on Marschak (1960), Manski (2007b) studies a question related but distinct from
those in Identification Problems 3.3-3.4. He is concerned with prediction of choice behavior
when decision makers face counterfactual choice sets. Manski frames this question as one of
predicting treatment response (see Section 2.2). Here the collection of potential treatments is
given by D, the nonempty subsets of the universe of feasible alternatives Y, and the response
function specifies the alternative chosen by a decision maker when facing choice set G ∈ D.
Manski assumes that the researcher observes realized choice sets and chosen alternatives,
(y,C) ∼ P.44 Under the standard assumptions laid out at the beginning of Section 3.1,
specifically if utility functions are (say) linear in ic and the distribution of ic is (say) Type
I extreme value or multivariate normal, prediction of choice behavior with counterfactual
choice sets is immediate (and point identified). Manski, however, leaves utility functions
completely unspecified, and in fact works directly with preference orderings, which he labels
decision maker’s types. He places no restriction on the distribution of preference types, except
requiring that they are independent of the observed choice sets. Manski shows that under
these rather weak assumptions, the distribution of predicted choices from counterfactual
choice sets can be partially identified, and characterized as the solution to linear programs.
Specifically, let y∗(G) denote the decision maker’s optimal choice when facing choice set
G ∈ D. Assume y∗(·) ⊥ C, and let yk denote the choice function for a decision maker of type
k –that is, a decision maker with a specific preference ordering labeled k. One example of such
preference ordering might be c1  c2  · · ·  c|Y|. If a decision maker of this type faces, say,
choice set G = {c2, c3, c4}, then she chooses alternative c2. Let K denote the set of logically
possible types, and θk the probability that a decision maker in the population is of type k.
Suppose that the researcher posits a behavioral model specifying K, {yk, k = 1, . . . ,K}, and
restrictions that constrain θ to lie in some specified set of distributions. Let Θ denote the
values of ϑ that satisfy these requirements plus the conditions ϑk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ K and
44Here I suppress covariates for simplicity.
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∑
k∈K ϑk = 1. Then for any c ∈ Y and ϑ ∈ Θ, the model predicts
Q(y∗(G) = c) =
∑
k∈K
1(yk(G) = c)ϑk.
How can one partially identify this probability based on the observed data? Suppose C is
observed to take realizations D1, . . . , Dm. Then the data reveal
P(y(Dj) = dj) =
∑
k∈K
1(yk(Dj) = dj)θk ∀dj ∈ Dj , j = 1, . . . ,m.
This yields that the sharp identification region for θ is
HP[θ] = {ϑ ∈ Θ : P(y(Dj) = dj) =
∑
k∈K
1(yk(Dj) = dj)ϑk ∀dj ∈ Dj , j = 1, . . . ,m}.
If the behavioral model is correctly specified, HP[θ] is non-empty. In turn, the sharp identi-
fication region for each choice probability is
HP[Q(y∗(G) = c)] =
{∑
k∈K
1(yk(G) = c)ϑk : ϑ ∈ HP[θ]
}
,
and its extreme points can be obtained by solving linear programs.
Kitamura and Stoye (2019) provide closely related sharp bounds on features of counterfac-
tual choices in the nonparametric random utility model of demand, where observable choices
are repeated cross-sections and one allows for unrestricted, unobserved heterogeneity. Their
approach builds on the work of Kitamura and Stoye (2018), who test weather agents’ behavior
is consistent with the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference (SARP) in a random utility
model in which the utility function of each consumer over commodity bundles is assumed
to satisfy only the basic restriction that “more is better” with no satiation. Because the
testing exercise is to be carried out using repeated cross-sections data, the authors maintain
the assumption that multiple populations of consumers who face distinct choice sets have
the same distribution of preferences. With this structure in place, de facto the task is to
test the full implications of rationality without functional form restrictions. Kitamura and
Stoye’s approach is based on several novel ideas. As a first step, they leverage an earlier
insight of McFadden (2005) to discretize the data without loss of information, so that they
can define a large but finite set of rational preferences types. As a second step, they show
that this implies that rationality can be tested by checking whether observed behavior lies in
a cone corresponding to positive linear combinations of preference types. While the problem
is discrete, its dimension is at first sight prohibitive. Nonetheless, Kitamura and Stoye are
able to develop novel computational methods that render the problem tractable. They apply
their method to the U.K. Household Expenditure Survey, adapting to their framework results
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on nonparametric instrumental variable analysis by Imbens and Newey (2009) so that they
can handle price endogeneity.
Kamat (2018) builds on Manski (2007b) to learn program effects when agents are ran-
domly assigned to control or treatment. The treatment group is provided access to the
program, while the control group is not. However, members of the control group may receive
access to the program from outside the experiment, leading to noncompliance with the ran-
domly assigned treatment. The researcher wants to learn about the average effect of program
access on the decision to participate in the program and on the subsequent outcome. While
sufficiently rich data may allow the researcher to learn these effects, Kamat is concerned
with the identification problem that arises when the researcher only observes the treatment
assignment status, the program participation decision, and the outcome, but not the receipt
of program access for every agent. Kamat formalizes this problem as one where the received
treatment is selected from a choice set that depends on the assigned treatment and is un-
observable to the researcher, and the agents optimally choose whether to participate in the
program by maximizing their utility function over their choice set. Importantly, the utility
functions are not subject to parametric restrictions, similarly to Manski (2007b). But while
Manski assumed independence of choice sets and preference types, Kamat allows them to
be arbitrarily dependent on each other, as in Barseghyan, Coughlin, Molinari, and Teitel-
baum (2019). Kamat’s 2018 approach leverages specific assumptions on random assignment
of treatments and on compliance (or lack thereof) of participants to obtain nonparametric
bounds on the treatment effects of interest that can be characterized using tractable linear
programs.
3.2 Static, Simultaneous-Move Finite Games with Multiple Equilibria
3.2.1 An Inference Approach Robust to the Presence of Multiple Equilibria
Tamer (2003) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) substantially enlarge the scope of partial
identification analysis of structural models by showing how to apply it to learn features
of payoff functions in static, simultaneous-move finite games of complete information with
multiple equilibria. Berry and Tamer (2006) extend the approach and considerations that
follow to games of incomplete information. To start, here I focus on two-player entry games
with complete information.45
Identification Problem 3.5 (Complete Information Two Player Entry Game): Let
(y1,y2,x1,x2) ∼ P be observable random variables in {0, 1} × {0, 1} × Rd × Rd, d < ∞.
Suppose that (y1,y2) result from simultaneous move, pure strategy Nash play (PSNE) in a
game where the payoffs are uj(yj ,y3−j ,xj ;βj , δj) ≡ yj(xjβj + δjy3−j + εj), j = 1, 2 and the
45Completeness of information is motivated by the idea that firms in the industry have settled in a long-run
equilibrium, and have detailed knowledge of both their own and their rivals’ profit functions.
53
strategies are “enter” (yj = 1) or “stay out” (yj = 0). Here (x1,x2) are observable payoff
shifters, (ε1, ε2) are payoff shifters observable to the players but not to the econometrician,
δ1 ≤ 0, δ2 ≤ 0 are interaction effect parameters, and β1, β2 are parameter vectors in B ⊂ Rd
reflecting the effect of the observable covariates on payoffs. Each player enters the market
if and only if entering yields non-negative payoff, so that yj = 1(xjβj + δjy3−j + εj ≥ 0).
For simplicity, assume that ε ≡ (ε1, ε2) is independent of x ≡ (x1,x2) and has bivariate
Normal distribution with mean vector zero, variances equal to one (a normalization required
by the threshold crossing nature of the model), and correlation ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. In the absence of
additional information, what can the researcher learn about θ = [δ1 δ2 β1 β2 ρ]? 4
From the econometric perspective, this is a generalization of a standard discrete choice
model to a bivariate simultaneous response model which yields a stochastic representation of
equilibria in a two player, two action game. Generically, for a given value of θ and realization
of the payoff shifters, the model just laid out admits multiple equilibria (existence of PSNE
is guaranteed because the interaction parameters are non-positive). In other words, it yields
set valued predictions as depicted in Figure 3.4.46
Why does this set valued prediction hinder point identification? Intuitively, the challenge
can be traced back to the fact that for different values of θ ∈ Θ, one may find different ways
to assign the probability mass in [−x1β1,−x1β1 − δ1) × [−x2β2,−x2β2 − δ2) to (0, 1) and
(1, 0), so as to match the observed distribution P(y1,y2|x1,x2). More formally, for fixed
ϑ ∈ Θ and given (x, ε) and (y1, y2) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}, let
Eϑ[(1, 0), (0, 1);x] ≡ [−x1β1,−x1β1 − δ1)× [−x2β2,−x2β2 − δ2),
Eϑ[(y1, y2);x] ≡ {(ε1, ε2) : (y1, y2) is the unique equilibrium},
so that in Figure 3.4 Eϑ[(1, 0), (0, 1);x] is the gray region, Eϑ[(0, 1);x] is the dotted region,
etc. Let R(y1, y2|x, ε) be a selection mechanism that assigns to each possible outcome of
the game (y1, y2) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1} the probability that it is played conditional on observable
and unobservable payoff shifters. In order to be admissible, R(y1, y2|x, ε) must be such that
R(y1, y2|x, ε) ≥ 0 for all (y1, y2) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1},
∑
(y1,y2)∈{0,1}×{0,1} R(y1, y2|x, ε) = 1, and
∀ε ∈ Eϑ[(1, 0), (0, 1);x], R(0, 0|x, ε) = R(1, 1|x, ε) = 0 (3.19)
∀ε ∈ Eϑ[(y1, y2);x], R(y˜1, y˜2|x, ε) = 0 ∀(y˜1, y˜2) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1} s.t. (y˜1, y˜2) 6= (y1, y2).
(3.20)
Let Φr denote the probability distribution of a bivariate Normal random variable with zero
means, unit variances, and correlation r ∈ [−1, 1]. Let M(y1, y2|x) denote the model predicted
46This figure is based on Figure 1 in Tamer (2003).
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ε1
ε2
Model predicts y = (0, 1)
Model predicts y = (1, 0)
Model predicts
y = (1, 0) or y = (0, 1)
−x2β2 − δ2
−x1β1 − δ1
Model predicts
y = (1, 1)
Model predicts
y = (0, 0)
−x2β2
−x1β1
1
Figure 3.4: PSNE outcomes of the game in Identification Problem 3.5 as a function of (ε1, ε2).
probability that the outcome of the game realizes equal to (y1, y2). Then the model yields
M(y1, y2|x) =
∫
R(y1, y2|x, ε)dΦr
=
∫
(ε1,ε2)∈Eϑ[(y1,y2);x]
dΦr +
∫
ε1,ε2∈Eϑ[(1,0),(0,1);x]
R(y1, y2|x, ε)dΦr. (3.21)
Because R(·|x, ε) is left completely unspecified, other than the basic restrictions listed above
that render it an admissible selection mechanism, one can find multiple values for (ϑ,R(·|x, ε))
such that M(y1, y2|x) = P(y1, y2|x) for all (y1, y2) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1} x-a.s.
Multiplicity of equilibria implies that the mapping from the model’s exogenous variables
(x1,x2, ε1, ε2) to outcomes (y1,y2) is a correspondence rather than a function. This violates
the classical “principal assumptions” or “coherency conditions” for simultaneous discrete
response models discussed extensively in the econometrics literature (e.g., Heckman, 1978;
Gourieroux, Laffont, and Monfort, 1980; Schmidt, 1981; Maddala, 1983; Blundell and Smith,
1994). Such coherency conditions require the existence of a unique reduced form, mapping
the model’s exogenous variables and parameters to a unique realization of the endogenous
variable; hence, they constrain the model to be recursive or triangular in nature. As pointed
out by Bjorn and Vuong (1984), however, the coherency conditions shut down exactly the
social interaction effect of interest by requiring, e.g., that δ1δ2 = 0, so that at least one
player’s action has no impact on the other player’s payoff.
The desire to learn about interaction effects coupled with the difficulties generated by
multiplicity of equilibria prompted the earlier literature to provide at least two different ways
to achieve point identification. The first one relies on imposing simplifying assumptions that
shift focus to outcome features that are common across equilibria. For example, Bresna-
han and Reiss (1988, 1990, 1991) and Berry (1992) study entry games where the number,
though not the identities, of entrants is uniquely predicted by the model in equilibrium.
Unfortunately, however, these simplifying assumptions substantially constrain the amount
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of heterogeneity in player’s payoffs that the model allows for. The second approach relies
on explicitly modeling a selection mechanism which specifies the equilibrium played in the
regions of multiplicity. For example, Bjorn and Vuong (1984) assume it to be a constant;
Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) assume a more flexible, covariate dependent parametrization;
and Berry (1992) considers two possible selection mechanism specifications, one where the
incumbent moves first, and the other where the most profitable player moves first. Unfor-
tunately, however, the chosen selection mechanism can have non-trivial effects on inference,
and the data and theory might be silent on which is more appropriate. A nice example of this
appears in Berry (1992, Table VII). Berry and Tamer (2006) review and extend a number
of results on the identification of entry models extensively used in the empirical literature.
Jovanovic (1989) discusses the observable implications of models with multiple equilibria,
and within the analysis of a model with homogeneous preferences shows that partial identi-
fication is possible (see Jovanovic, 1989, p. 1435). I refer to de Paula (2013) for a review of
the literature on econometric analysis of games with multiple equilibria.
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) show, on the other hand, that it is possible to partially iden-
tify entry models that allow for rich heterogeneity in payoffs and for any possible selection
mechanism (even ones that are arbitrarily dependent on the unobservable payoff shifters after
conditioning on the observed payoff shifters). In addition, Tamer (2003) provides sufficient
conditions for point identification based on exclusion restrictions and large support assump-
tions. Kline and Tamer (2012) analyze partial identification of nonparametric models of entry
in a two-player model, drawing connections with the program evaluation literature.
Key Insight 3.6: An important conceptual contribution of Tamer (2003) is to clarify the
distinction between a model which is incoherent, so that no reduced form exists, and a model
which is incomplete, so that multiple reduced forms may exist. Models with multiple equilibria
belong to the latter category. Whereas the earlier literature in partial identification had been
motivated by measurement problems, e.g., missing or interval data, the work of Tamer (2003)
and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) is motivated by the fact that economic theory often does not
specify how an equilibrium is selected in the regions of the exogenous variables which admit
multiple equilibria. This is a conceptually completely distinct identification problem.
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) propose to use simple and tractable implications of the model
to learn features of the structural parameters of interest. Specifically, they point out that
the probability of observing any outcome of the game cannot be smaller than the model’s
implied probability that such outcome is the unique equilibrium of the game, and cannot
be larger than the model’s implied probability that such outcome is one of the possible
equilibria of the game. Looking at Figure 3.4 this means, for example, that the observed
P((y1,y2) = (0, 1)|x1,x2) cannot be smaller than the probability that (ε1, ε2) realizes in the
dotted region, and cannot be larger than the probability that it realizes either in the dotted
region or in the gray region. Compared to the model predicted distribution in (3.21), this
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means that P((y1,y2) = (0, 1)|x1,x2) cannot be smaller than the expression obtained setting,
for ε ∈ Eϑ[(1, 0); (0, 1);x], R(0, 1|x, ε) = 0, and cannot be larger than that obtained with
R(0, 1|x, ε) = 1. Denote by Φ(A1, A2; ρ) the probability that the bivariate normal with mean
vector zero, variances equal to one, and correlation ρ assigns to the event {ε1 ∈ A1, ε2 ∈ A2}.
Then Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) show that any ϑ = [d1, d2, b1, b2, r] that is observationally
equivalent to the data generating value θ satisfies, (x1,x2)-a.s.,
P((y1,y2) = (0, 0)|x1,x2) = Φ((−∞,−x1b1), (−∞,−x2b2); r) (3.22)
P((y1,y2) = (1, 1)|x1,x2) = Φ([−x1b1 − d1,∞), [−x2b2 − d2,∞); r) (3.23)
P((y1,y2) = (0, 1)|x1,x2) ≤ Φ((−∞,−x1b1 − d1), (−x2b2,∞); r) (3.24)
P((y1,y2) = (0, 1)|x1,x2) ≥
{
Φ((−∞,−x1b1 − d1), (−x2b2,∞); r)
− Φ((−x1b1,−x1b1 − d1), (−x2b2,−x2b2 − d2); r)
}
(3.25)
While the approach of Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) is summarized here for a two player entry
game, it extends without difficulty to any finite number of players and actions and to solution
concepts other than pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) build on the insights of Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) to
study what is the identification power of equilibrium in games. To do so, they compare the
set-valued model predictions and what can be learned about θ when one assumes only level-k
rationality as opposed to Nash play. In static entry games of complete information, they find
that the model’s predictions when k ≥ 2 are similar to those obtained with Nash behavior
and allowing for multiple equilibria and mixed strategies. Molinari and Rosen (2008) extend
the analysis of Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) to the class of supermodular games.
The collections of parameter vectors satisfying (in)equalities (3.22)-(3.25) yields the sharp
identification region HP[θ] in the case of two player entry games with pure strategy Nash
equilibrium as solution concept, as shown by Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011,
Supplementary Appendix D, Corollary D.4). When there are more than two players or more
than two actions (or with different solutions concepts, such as, e.g., mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; or rationality of level k as in Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer,
2008), the characterization in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) obtained by extending the reasoning
just laid out yields an outer region. Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) use elements
of random set theory to provide a general and computationally tractable characterization of
the identification region that is sharp, regardless of the number of players and actions, or the
solution concept adopted. For the case of PSNE with any finite number of players or actions,
Galichon and Henry (2011) provide a computationally tractable sharp characterization of the
identification region using elements of optimal transportation theory.
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3.2.2 Characterization of Sharpness through Random Set Theory
Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) provide a general approach based on random set
theory that delivers sharp identification regions on parameters of structural semiparametric
models with set valued predictions. Here I summarize it for the case of static, simultaneous
move finite games of complete information, first with PSNE as solution concept and then
with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Then I discuss games of incomplete information.
For a given ϑ ∈ Θ, denote the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria (depicted in Figure
3.4) as Yϑ(x, ε). It is easy to show that Yϑ(x, ε) is a random closed set as in Definition A.1.
Under the assumption in Identification Problem 3.5 that y results from simultaneous move,
pure strategy Nash play, at the true DGP value of θ ∈ Θ, one has
y ∈ Yθ a.s. (3.26)
Equation (3.26) exhausts the modeling content of Identification Problem 3.5. Theorem A.1
can be leveraged to extract its empirical content from the observed distribution P(y,x).
For a given ϑ ∈ Θ and K ⊂ Y, let TYϑ(x,ε)(K; Φr) denote the probability of the event
{Yϑ(x, ε) ∩K 6= ∅} implied when ε ∼ Φr, x-a.s.
Theorem SIR-3.3 (Structural Parameters in Static, Simultaneous Move Finite Games
of Complete Information with PSNE): Under the assumptions of Identification Problem 3.5,
the sharp identification region for θ is
HP[θ] = {ϑ ∈ Θ : P(y ∈ K|x) ≤ TYϑ(x,ε)(K; Φr) ∀K ⊂ Y, x-a.s.}. (3.27)
Proof. To simplify notation, let Yϑ ≡ Yϑ(x, ε). In order to establish sharpness, it suffices
to show that ϑ ∈ HP[θ] if and only if one can complete the model with an admissible selec-
tion mechanism R(y1, y2|x, ε) such that R(y1, y2|x, ε) ≥ 0 for all (y1, y2) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1},∑
(y1,y2)∈{0,1}×{0,1} R(y1, y2|x, ε) = 1, and satisfying (3.19)-(3.20), so that M(y1, y2|x) =
P(y1, y2|x) for all (y1, y2) ∈ {0, 1}×{0, 1} x-a.s., with M(y1, y2|x) defined in (3.21). Suppose
first that ϑ is such that a selection mechanism with these properties is available. Then there
exists a selection of Yϑ which is equal to the prediction selected by the selection mechanism
and whose conditional distribution is equal to P(y|x), x-a.s., and therefore ϑ ∈ HP[θ]. Next
take ϑ ∈ HP[θ]. Then by Theorem A.1, y and Yϑ can be realized on the same probability
space as random elements y′ and Y ′ϑ, so that y
′ and Y ′ϑ have the same distributions, respec-
tively, as y and Yϑ, and y
′ ∈ Sel(Y ′ϑ), where Sel(Y ′ϑ) is the set of all measurable selections
from Y ′ϑ, see Definition A.3. One can then complete the model with a selection mechanism
that picks y′ with probability 1, and the result follows.
The characterization provided in Theorem SIR-3.3 for games with multiple PSNE, taken
from Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011, Supplementary Appendix D), is equivalent
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to the one in Galichon and Henry (2011). When J = 2 and Y = {0, 1}×{0, 1}, the inequalities
in (3.27) reduce to (3.22)-(3.25). With more players and/or more actions, the inequalities
in (3.27) are a superset of those in (3.22)-(3.25), with the latter comprised of the ones in
(3.27) for K = {k} and k = Y \ {k}, for all k ∈ Y. Hence, the inequalities in (3.27) are
more informative. Of course, the computational cost incurred to characterize HP[θ] may
grow with the number of inequalities involved. I discuss computational challenges in partial
identification in Section 6.
Key Insight 3.7: (Random set theory and partial identification – continued) In Identifi-
cation Problem 3.5 lack of point identification can be traced back to the set valued predictions
delivered by the model, which in turn derive from the model incompleteness defined by Tamer
(2003). As stated in the Introduction, constructing the (random) set of model predictions
delivered by the maintained assumptions is an exercise typically carried out in identification
analysis, regardless of whether random set theory is applied. Indeed, for the problem studied in
this section, Tamer (2003, Figure 1) put forward the set of admissible outcomes of the game.
Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) propose to work directly with this random set
to characterize HP[θ]. The fundamental advantage of this approach is that it dispenses with
considering the possible selection mechanisms that may complete the model. Selection mech-
anisms may depend on the model’s unobservables even after conditioning on observables and
may constitute an infinite dimensional nuisance parameter, which creates great difficulties for
the computation of HP[θ] and for inference.
Next, I discuss the case that the outcome of the game results from simultaneous move,
mixed strategy Nash play.47 When mixed strategies are allowed for, the model predicts
multiple mixed strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE). But whereas when only pure strategies are
allowed for, if the model is correctly specified, the observed outcome of the game is one of the
predicted PSNE, with mixed strategy it is only the result of a random mixing draw from one
of the predicted MSNE. Hence, the identification problem is more complex, and in order to
obtain a tractable characterization of θ’s sharp identification region one needs to use different
tools from random set theory.
To keep the treatment simple here I continue to consider the case of two players with two
strategies, as in Identification Problem 3.5, with mixed strategies allowed for, and refer to
Molchanov and Molinari (2018, Section 3.4) for the general case. Fix ϑ ∈ Θ. Let σj : {0, 1} →
[0, 1] denote the probability that player j enters the market, with 1− σj the probability that
she stays out. With some abuse of notation, let uj(σj , σ−j ,xj , εj , ϑ) denote the expected
payoff associated with the mixed strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2). For a given realization (x, e)
47The same reasoning given here applies if instead of mixed strategy Nash the solution concept is correlated
equilibrium, by replacing the set of MSNE below with the set of correlated equilibria.
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Figure 3.5: MSNE strategies (Sϑ), set of multinomial distributions over outcomes of the game (Qϑ),
and its support function (hQϑ), as a function of (ε1, ε2), where σ
∗
1 ≡ −ε2−x2β2ϑ2 , σ∗2 ≡
−ε1−x1β1
ϑ1
.
of (x, ε) and a given value of ϑ ∈ Θ, the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria is
Sϑ(x, e) =
{
σ ∈ [0, 1]2 : uj(σj , σ−j , xj , ej ;ϑ) ≥ uj(σ˜j , σ−j , xj , ej ;ϑ) ∀σ˜j ∈ [0, 1] j = 1, 2
}
.
Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) show that Sϑ ≡ Sϑ(x, ε) is a random closed set
in [0, 1]2. Its realizations are illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 3.5 as a function of (ε1, ε2).
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Define the set of possible multinomial distributions over outcomes of the game associated
with the selections σ of each possible realization of Sϑ as
Qϑ =
q(σ) ≡

(1− σ1)(1− σ2)
σ1(1− σ2)
(1− σ1)σ2
σ1σ2
 : σ ∈ Sϑ
 . (3.28)
As Qϑ is the image of a continuous map applied to the random compact set Sϑ, it is a random
compact set. Its realizations are plotted in Panel (b) of Figure 3.5 as a function of (ε1, ε2).
The multinomial distribution over outcomes of the game determined by a given σ ∈ Sϑ is
a function of ε. To obtain the predicted distribution over outcomes of the game conditional
48This figure is based on Figure 1 in Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011).
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on observed payoff shifters only, one needs to integrate out the unobservable payoff shifters
ε. Doing so requires care, as it needs to be done for each q(σ) ∈ Qϑ. First, observe that all
the q(σ) ∈ Qϑ are contained in the 3 dimensional unit simplex, and are therefore integrable.
Next, define the conditional selection expectation (see Definition A.4) of Qϑ as
EΦr(Qϑ|x) =
{
EΦr(q(σ)|x) : σ ∈ Sel(Sϑ)
}
,
where Sel(Sϑ) is the set of all measurable selections from Sϑ, see Definition A.3. By con-
struction, EΦr(Qϑ|x) is the set of probability distributions over action profiles conditional
on x which are consistent with the maintained modeling assumptions, i.e., with all the
model’s implications (including the assumption that ε ∼ Φr). If the model is correctly spec-
ified, there exists at least one vector θ ∈ Θ such that the observed conditional distribution
p(x) ≡ [P(y = y1|x), . . . ,P(y = y4|x)]> almost surely belongs to the set EΦρ(Qθ|x). Indeed,
by the definition of EΦρ(Qθ|x), p(x) ∈ EΦρ(Qθ|x) almost surely if and only if there exists
q ∈ Sel(Qθ) such that EΦρ(q|x) = p(x) almost surely, with Sel(Qθ) the set of all measurable
selections from Qθ. Hence, the collection of parameter vectors ϑ ∈ Θ that are observationally
equivalent to the data generating value θ is given by the ones that satisfy p(x) ∈ EΦr(Qϑ|x)
almost surely. In turn, observing that by Theorem A.2 the set EΦr(Qϑ|x) is convex, we
have that p(x) ∈ EΦr(Qϑ|x) if and only if u>p(x) ≤ hEΦr (Qϑ|x)(u) for all u in the unit ball
(see, e.g., Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 13.1), where hEΦr (Qϑ|x)(u) is the support function of
EΦr(Qϑ|x), see Definition A.5.
Theorem SIR-3.4 (Structural Parameters in Static, Simultaneous Move Finite Games
of Complete Information with MSNE): Under the assumptions in Identification Problem 3.5,
allowing for mixed strategies and with the observed outcomes of the game resulting from mixed
strategy Nash play, the sharp identification region for θ is
HP[θ] =
{
ϑ ∈ Θ : max
u∈B|Y|
(
u>p(x)− EΦr [hQϑ(u)|x]
)
= 0, x-a.s.
}
(3.29)
=
{
ϑ ∈ Θ :
∫
B|Y|
(u>p(x)− EΦr [hQϑ(u)|x])+dµ(u) = 0, x-a.s.
}
, (3.30)
where µ is any probability measure on B|Y|, and |Y| = 4 in this case.
Proof. Theorem A.2 (equation (A.10)) yields (3.29), because by the arguments given before
the theorem, HP[θ] = {ϑ ∈ Θ : p(x) ∈ EΦr(Qϑ|x), x-a.s.}. The result in (3.30) follows
because the integrand in (3.30) is continuous in u and both conditions inside the curly brackets
are satisfied if and only if u>p(x)− EΦr [hQϑ(u)|x] ≤ 0 ∀u ∈ B|Y| x-a.s.
For a fixed u ∈ B4, the possible realizations of hQϑ(u) are plotted in Panel (c) of Figure
3.5 as a function of (ε1, ε2). The expectation of hQϑ(u) is quite straightforward to compute,
whereas calculating the set EΦr(Qϑ|x) is computationally prohibitive in many cases. Hence,
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the characterization in (3.29) is computationally attractive, because for each ϑ ∈ Θ it re-
quires to maximize an easy-to-compute superlinear, hence concave, function over a convex
set, and check if the resulting objective value vanishes. Several efficient algorithms in convex
programming are available to solve this problem, see for example the MatLab software for dis-
ciplined convex programming CVX (Grant and Boyd, 2010). Nonetheless, HP[θ] itself is not
necessarily convex, hence tracing out its boundary is non-trivial. I return to computational
challenges in partial identification in Section 6.
Key Insight 3.8 (Random set theory and partial identification – continued): Beresteanu,
Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) provide a general characterization of sharp identification
regions for models with convex moment predictions. These are models that for a given ϑ ∈ Θ
and realization of observable variables, predict a set of values for a vector of variables of
interest. This set is not necessarily convex, as exemplified by Yϑ and Qϑ, which are finite.
No restriction is placed on the manner in which, in the DGP, a specific model prediction
is selected from this set. When the researcher takes conditional expectations of the resulting
elements of this set, the unrestricted process of selection yields a convex set of moments
for the model variables (all possible mixtures). This is the model’s convex set of moment
predictions. If this set were almost surely single valued, the researcher would learn (features
of) θ by solving moment equality conditions involving the observed variables and predicted
ones. The approach reviewed in this section is a set-valued method of moments that extends
the singleton-valued one commonly used in econometrics.
I conclude this section discussing the case of static, simultaneous move finite games of
incomplete information, using the results in Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011,
Supplementary Appendix C).49 For clarity, I formalize the maintained assumptions.
Identification Problem 3.6 (Structural Parameters in Static, Simultaneous Move Fi-
nite Games of Incomplete Information with multiple BNE): Impose the same structure on
payoffs, entry decision rule, outcome space, parameter space, and observable variables as
in Identification Problem 3.5. Assume that the observed outcome of the game results from
simultaneous move, pure strategy Bayesian Nash play. Both players and the researcher ob-
serve (x1,x2). However, εj is private information to player j = 1, 2 and unobservable to
the researcher, with ε1 ⊥ ε2|(x1,x2). Assume that players have correct common prior Fγ
on the distribution of (ε1, ε2) and the researcher knows this distribution up to γ, a finite
dimensional parameter vector. Under these assumptions, multiple Bayesian Nash equilibria
49See Berry and Tamer (2006, Section 3) and de Paula (2013) for a thorough discussion of the literature
on identification problems in games of incomplete information with multiple Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE).
Berry and Tamer (2006) explain how to extend the approach proposed by Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) to
obtain outer regions on θ when no restrictions are imposed on the equilibrium selection mechanism that
chooses among the multiple BNE.
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(BNE) may result.50 In the absence of additional information, what can the researcher learn
about θ = [δ1 δ2 β1 β2 γ]? 4
With incomplete information, players’ strategies are decision rules that map the support
of (ε,x) into {0, 1}. The non-negativity condition on expected payoffs that determines each
player’s decision to enter the market results in equilibrium mappings (decision rules) that are
step functions determined by a threshold: yj(εj) = 1(εj ≥ tj), j = 1, 2. As a result, player
j’s beliefs about player 3 − j’s probability of entry under the common prior assumption is∫
y3−j(ε3−j)dFγ(ε3−j |x) = 1− Fγ(t3−j |x), and therefore player j’s best response cutoff is
tbj(t3−j ,x; θ) = −xjβj − δj(1− Fγ(t3−j |x)).
Hence, the set of equilibria can be defined as the set of cutoff rules:
Tθ(x) = {(t1, t2) : tj = tbj(t3−j ,x; θ), j = 1, 2}.
The equilibrium thresholds are functions of x and θ only. The set Tθ(x) might contain a finite
number of equilibria (e.g., if the common prior is the Normal distribution), or a continuum
of equilibria. For ease of notation I suppress its dependence on x in what follows.
Given the equilibrium decision rules (the selections of the set Tθ), it is possible to de-
termine their associated action profiles. Because in the simple two-player entry game that I
consider actions and outcomes coincide, I denote the set of admissible action profiles by Yθ:
Yθ =
y(t) ≡

1(ε1 < t1, ε2 < t2)
1(ε1 ≥ t1, ε2 < t2)
1(ε1 < t1, ε2 ≥ t2)
1(ε1 ≥ t1, ε2 ≥ t2)
 : t ∈ Sel(Tθ)
 , (3.31)
with Sel(Tθ) the set of all measurable selections from Tθ, see Definition A.3. To obtain
the predicted set of multinomial distributions for the outcomes of the game, one needs to
integrate out ε conditional on x. Again this can be done by using the conditional Aumann
expectation:
EFγ (Yθ|x) = {EFγ (y(t)|x) : t ∈ Sel(Tθ)}.
This set is closed and convex. Regardless of whether Tθ contains a finite number of equilibria
or a continuum, Yθ can take on only a finite number of realizations corresponding to each
of the vertices of the three dimensional simplex, because the vectors y(t) in (3.31) collect
threshold decision rules. This implies that EFγ (Yθ|x) is a closed convex polytope x-a.s., fully
characterized by a finite number of supporting hyperplanes. Hence, it is possible to determine
50Both the independence assumption and the correct common prior assumption are maintained here to
simplify exposition. Both could be relaxed with no conceptual difficulty, though computation of the set of
Bayesian Nash equilibria, for example, would become more cumbersome.
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whether ϑ ∈ HP[θ] using efficient algorithms in linear programming.
Theorem SIR-3.5 (Structural Parameters in Static, Simultaneous Move Finite Games
of Incomplete Information with BNE): Under the assumptions in Identification Problem 3.6,
the sharp identification region for θ is
HP[θ] =
{
ϑ ∈ Θ : max
u∈B|Y|
u>p(x)− EFγ˜ [hYϑ(u)|x] = 0, x-a.s.
}
(3.32)
=
{
ϑ ∈ Θ : u>p(x) ≤ EFγ˜ [hYϑ(u)|x], ∀u ∈ D,x-a.s.
}
, (3.33)
=
{
ϑ ∈ Θ : P(y ∈ K|x) ≤ TYϑ(x,ε)(K;Fγ˜) ∀K ⊂ Y, x-a.s.
}
, (3.34)
with D = {u = [u1, . . . , u|Y|]> : ui ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, ..., |Y|}, ϑ = [d1, d2, b1, b2, γ˜], and
TYϑ(x,ε)(K;Fγ˜) the probability that {Yϑ(x, ε) ∩K 6= ∅} implied when ε ∼ Fγ˜, x-a.s.
Proof. The result in (3.32) follows by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem SIR-3.4.
Next I show equivalence of the conditions
(i) u>p(x) ≤ EFγ˜ [hYϑ(u)|x] ∀u ∈ B|Y|,
(ii) u>p(x) ≤ EFγ˜ [hYϑ(u)|x] ∀u ∈ D.
By the positive homogeneity of the support function, condition (i) is equivalent to p(x) ≤
EFγ˜ [hYϑ(u)|x] ∀u ∈ R|Y|, which implies condition (ii). Next I show that condition (ii) im-
plies condition (i). As explained before, the set Yθ, and hence also its convex hull conv(Yθ),
can take on only a finite number of realizations. Let Y1, . . . , Ym be convex compact sets
in the simplex of dimension |Y| − 1 equal to the possible realizations of conv(Yθ), and
let $1(x), . . . , $m(x) denote the probability of each of these realizations conditional on x.
Then by Theorem 2.1.34 in Molchanov (2017), EFγ˜ (Yθ|x) =
∑m
j=1 Yj$j(x). By the prop-
erties of the support function (see, e.g., Schneider, 1993, Theorem 1.7.5), hEFγ˜ (Yθ|x)(u) =∑m
j=1$j(x)hYj (u). For each j = 1, ...,m, the vertices of Yj are a subset of the vertices of the
(|Y| − 1)-dimensional simplex. Hence the supporting hyperplanes of Yj , j = 1, ...,m, are a
subset of the supporting hyperplanes of that simplex, which in turn are obtained through its
support function evaluated in directions u ∈ D. Finally, I show equivalence with the result
in (3.34). Because the vertices of Yj are a subset of the vertices of the (|Y| − 1)-dimensional
simplex, each direction u ∈ D determines a set Ku ⊂ Y. Given the choice of u, the value of
u>y(t) equals one if y(t) ∈ Ku and zero otherwise. Hence, condition (3.33) reduces to
P(y ∈ Ku|x) = u>p(x) ≤ EFγ˜ [hYϑ(u)|x] = EFγ˜
[
sup
y(t)∈Yϑ
u>y(t)|x
]
= EFγ˜ [1(Yϑ ∩Ku 6= ∅)|x] = TYϑ(x,ε)(Ku;Fγ˜).
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Observing that the collection D comprises the 2|Y| vectors with entries equal to either 1 or
0, and that these determine all possible subsets Ku of Y, yields condition (3.34).
One can use the same argument as in the proof of Theorem SIR-3.5, to show that the
Aumann expectation/support function characterization of the sharp identification region in
Theorem SIR-3.4 coincides with the characterization based on the capacity functional in
Theorem SIR-3.3, when only pure strategies are allowed for. This shows that in this class
of models, the capacity functional based characterization is a special case of the Aumann
expectation/support function based one.
Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) study what is the identification power of equilibrium
also in the case of static entry games with incomplete information. They show that in the
presence of multiple equilibria, assuming Bayesian Nash behavior yields more informative
regions for the parameter vector θ than assuming only rational behavior, but at the price of
a higher computational cost.
de Paula and Tang (2012) propose a procedure to test for the sign of the interaction
effects (which here I have assumed to be non-positive) in discrete simultaneous games with
incomplete information and (possibly) multiple equilibria. As a by-product of this procedure,
they also provide a test for the presence of multiple equilibria in the DGP. The test does not
require parametric specifications of players’ payoffs, the distributions of their private signals,
or the equilibrium selection mechanism. Rather, the test builds on the commonly invoked
assumption that players’ private signals are independent conditional on observed states.
Grieco (2014) introduces an important class of models with flexible information structure.
Each player is assumed to have a vector of payoff shifters unobservable by the researcher
composed of elements that are private information to the player, and elements that are
known to all players. The results of Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) reported in
this section apply to this set-up as well.
3.3 Auction Models with Independent Private Values
3.3.1 An Inference Approach Robust to Bidding Behavior Assumptions
Haile and Tamer (2003) study what can be learned about the distribution of valuations in
an open outcry English auction where symmetric bidders have independent private values
for the object being auctioned. The standard theoretical model (Milgrom and Weber, 1982),
called “button auction” model, posits that each bidder holds down a button while the object’s
price rises continuously and exogenously, releasing it (in the dominant strategy equilibrium)
when it reaches her valuation or all her opponents have left. In this case, the distribution of
bidder’s valuation can be learned exactly. Haile and Tamer (2003) show that much can be
learned about the distribution of valuations, even allowing for the fact that real-life auctions
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Figure 3.6: A realization of the model predicted ordered bids B(~vn) in (3.35) for n = 3, ~vn = v
0, δ = 0.
may depart from this stylized framework, as in the following identification problem.51
Identification Problem 3.7 (Incomplete Auction Model with Independent Private
Values): For a given auction with n < ∞ participating bidders, let vi ∼ Q, i = 1, . . . , n, be
bidder i’s valuation for the object being auctioned and assume that vi ⊥ vj for all i 6= j.
Assume that the support of Q is [v, v¯] and that each bidder knows her own valuation but not
that of her opponents. Let the auctioneer set a minimum bid increment δ ∈ [0, v¯), and for
simplicity suppose there is no reserve price.52 Suppose the researcher observes order statistics
of the bids, ~bn ≡ (b1:n, . . . , bn:n) ∼ P in Rn+, with bi:n the i-th lowest of the n bids. Assume
that: (1) Bidders do not bid more than they are willing to pay; (2) Bidders do not allow an
opponent to win at a price they are willing to beat. In the absence of additional information,
what can the researcher learn about Q? 4
The model in Identification Problem 3.7 delivers set valued predictions because given
valuations (v1, . . . ,vn), the two fundamental assumptions about bidder’s behavior yield
~bn ∈ B(~vn) ≡
[{
n−1∏
i=1
[v,vi:n]
}
× [vn−1:n − δ,vn:n]
]
∩ Vn, (3.35)
where ~vn ≡ (v1:n, . . . ,vn:n) denotes the vector of order statistics of the valuations, and
Vn = {v ∈ Rn : v ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ · · · ≤ vn ≤ v¯}.53 Figure 3.6 provides a stylized depiction of a
realization of this set for ~vn = v
0 when there are three bidders (n = 3), v = 0, and δ = 0. In
51Examples of departures from the standard model include the case where active bidding by a player’s
opponents may eliminate her incentives to bid close to her valuation or at all; the econometrician does not
precisely observe the point at which each bidder drops out; there are discrete bid increments; etc.
52If there is a reserve price r > v, nothing can be learned about Q(v ∈ [v, v]) for any v < r. In that case,
one can learn features of the truncated distribution of valuations using the same insights summarized here.
53Using the same convention as for the bids, vi:n denotes the i-th lowest of the n valuations.
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words, B(~vn) collects the model predicted values of ordered bids. The fact that bi:n ≤ vi:n
for all i results from assumption (1): since each bidder bids at most an amount equal to her
valuation, the i-th highest bid cannot exceed the i-th highest valuation (Haile and Tamer,
2003, Lemma 1).54 The fact that bn:n ≥ vn−1,n− δ follows immediately from assumption (2)
(Haile and Tamer, 2003, Lemma 3). The fact that ~bn has to lie in Vn follows because it is a
vector of ordered bids.
Why does this set-valued prediction hinder point identification? The reason is that the
distribution of the observable data relates to the model structure in an incomplete manner.55
Define a bidding rule B(b1:n, . . . , bn:n|v1:n, . . . ,vn:n) to be a conditional joint distribution for
the order statistics of the bids conditional on the order statistics of the valuations. Then,
for a given realization of the valuations v1:n = v1, . . . ,vn:n = vn, the model requires that the
support of B(·|v1, . . . , vn) is in B(~v) as defined in (3.35) with v1:n = v1, . . . ,vn:n = vn, but
imposes no other restriction on it. Hence, the model implied joint distribution of ordered
bids is
M1,...,n:n(·;B,Q) ≡
∫
B(·|v1, . . . , vn)Q1,...,n:n(dv1, . . . , dvn), (3.36)
where Q1,...,n:n is the joint distribution of order statistics of the valuations implied by Q.
Since the bidding rule B is left completely unspecified (other than requiring it to be a valid
joint conditional probability distribution with support in B), one can find multiple pairs
(B,Q) satisfying the assumptions of Identification Problem 3.7, such that M1,...,n:n(·;B,Q) =
G1,...,n:n(·), with G1,...,n:n the observed joint CDF of the order statistics of the bids associated
with P.
Haile and Tamer (2003) propose to use simple and tractable implications of the model to
learn features of Q. Recall that with i.i.d. valuations, the distribution of each order statistic
uniquely determines Q(v), with Q(v) ≡ Q(v ≤ v) for any v ≥ v, through:
Q(v) = qB(Qi:n(v); i, n− i+ 1), (3.37)
where Qi:n is the CDF of vi:n and qB(·; i, n−i+1) is the quantile function of a Beta-distributed
random variable with parameters i and n − i + 1. Using this, their Lemmas 1 and 3 yield,
respectively,
Q(v) ≤ min
n,i
qB(Gi:n(v); i, n− i+ 1), ∀v ∈ [v, v¯], (3.38)
Q(v) ≥ max
n
qB(Gn:n(v − δ); i, n− i+ 1), ∀v ∈ [v, v¯], (3.39)
54Note that bi:n needs not be the bid made by the bidder with valuation vi:n.
55Haile and Tamer (2003, Appendix D) provide the discussion summarized here. Additionally, in their
Appendix B, they give a simple example of a two-bidder auction satisfying all assumptions in Identification
Problem 3.7, where two different distributions Q and Q˜ yield the same distribution of ordered bids.
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where, for any v ≥ v, Gi:n(v) ≡ P(bi:n ≤ v) denotes the observed CDF of bi:n for i = 1, . . . , n.
Key Insight 3.9: The model and analysis put forward by Haile and Tamer (2003) trade
point identification of the distribution of valuation under stringent assumptions on the bidding
rule, for a robust inference approach that yields informative bounds under weak and widely
credible assumptions on bidding behavior. Remarkably, “nothing is lost” due to the use of
their robust approach: point identification is recovered when the standard assumptions of
the button auction model hold.56 This is because in the dominant strategy equilibrium the
top losing bidder exits at her valuation, followed immediately by the winning bidder. Hence,
bn−1:n = vn−1:n = bn:n and δ = 0, so that the upper and the lower bound in (3.38)-(3.39)
coincide and point identify the distribution of valuations.
Haile and Tamer (2003) also provide sharp bounds on the optimal reserve price, which I
do not discuss here. However, they leave open the question of whether the collection of CDFs
satisfying (3.38)-(3.39) yields the sharp identification region for Q. As discussed in Sections
2.1-2.3, pointwise bounds on the CDF deliver tubes of admissible CDFs that in general yield
outer regions on the CDF of interest. But in this identification problem, the issue of sharpness
is even more subtle, and therefore addressed in the following subsection.
Before moving on to that discussion, I note that the work of Haile and Tamer (2003)
spurred a rich literature applying partial identification analysis to the study of auction mod-
els. Tang (2011) studies first price sealed bid auctions with equilibrium behavior, where
affiliated valuations prevent –in the absence of parametric restrictions on the distribution of
the model primitives– point identification of the model. He derives bounds on seller revenue
under various counterfactual scenarios on reserve prices and auction formats. Armstrong
(2013) also studies first price sealed bid auctions with equilibrium behavior, but relaxes the
independence assumptions on symmetric valuations by requiring it to hold only conditional on
unobserved heterogeneity. He derives bounds on various functionals of the distributions of in-
terest, including the mean bid and mean valuation. AradillasLpez, Gandhi, and Quint (2013)
analyze second price auctions with correlated private values. In this case, the distribution
of valuations is not point identified even under the assumptions of the button auction model
(Athey and Haile, 2002, Theorem 4). Nonetheless, AradillasLpez, Gandhi, and Quint (2013)
show that interesting functionals of it (seller profits and bidder surplus) can be bounded,
if one assumes that transaction prices are determined by the second highest valuation and
imposes some restrictions on the joint distribution of the number of bidders and distribution
of the valuations. Komarova (2013) studies a related model of second-price ascending auc-
tions with arbitrary dependence in bidders’ private values. She provides partial identification
results for the joint distribution of values for any subset of bidders under various assumptions
about what data the researcher observes. While in her framework the highest bid is never
56The button auction model yields bidding behavior consistent with Identification Problem 3.7.
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observed, she considers the case where only the winner’s identity and the winning price are
observed, and the case where all the identities and all the bids except for the highest bid are
known. She also investigates the informational content of assuming positive dependence in
bidders’ values. Gentry and Li (2014) are concerned with nonparametric identification of a
two-stage entry and bidding game. Potential bidders are assumed to have private valuations
and observe private signals before deciding whether to enter the auction. The dependence
between signals and valuations is only minimally restricted. Hence, even with some excluded
instruments that affect selection into the auction, the model primitives are only partially
identified. The authors derive bounds on these primitives, and provide conditions under
which point identification is restored. Syrgkanis, Tamer, and Ziani (2018) provide partial
identification results in private value and common value auctions under weak restrictions on
the information available to the bidders. Their approach leverages a result in Bergemann and
Morris (2016) yielding an equivalence between distributions of valuations that obey the re-
strictions imposed by a Bayesian Correlated Equilibrium and those that obey the restrictions
imposed by Bayesian Nash Equilibrium under some information structure. Such equivalence
is particularly helpful because the set of Bayesian Correlated Equilibria can be characterized
through linear programming, so that the sharp identification region provided by Syrgkanis,
Tamer, and Ziani is given by the collection of parameter vectors ϑ for which a linear pro-
gram is feasible. Related results leveraging the linear structure of correlated equilibria in
the context of entry games include Yang (2006), Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011,
Supplementary Appendix E.2), and Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2017).
3.3.2 Characterization of Sharpness through Random Set Theory
Haile and Tamer’s 2003 bounds exploit the information contained in the marginal CDFs
Gi:n for each i and n. However, in Identification Problem 3.7 additional information can be
extracted from the joint distribution of ordered bids. Chesher and Rosen (2017a) obtain the
sharp identification region HP[Q] using random set methods (Artstein’s characterization in
Theorem A.1) applied to a quantile function representation of the order statistics. Here I
provide an equivalent characterization that uses equation (3.35) directly, and which has not
appeared in the literature before. Let T denote the space of probability distributions with
support on [v, v¯], so that Q ∈ T . For a candidate distribution Q˜ ∈ T , let Q˜1,...,n:n denote
the implied distribution of order statistics of n i.i.d. random variables distributed Q˜. Let B˜
be a random closed set defined as in (3.35) with respect to order statistics of i.i.d. random
variables with distribution Q˜. For a given set K ∈ K, with K the collection of compact
subsets of Rn, let TB˜(K; Q˜) denote the probability of the event {B˜ ∩K 6= ∅} implied by Q˜.
Theorem SIR-3.6 (Distribution of Valuations in Incomplete Auction Model with In-
dependent Private Values): Under the assumptions of Identification Problem 3.7, the sharp
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identification region for Q is
HP[Q] =
{
Q˜ ∈ T : P(~bn ∈ K) ≤ TB˜(K; Q˜) ∀K ∈ K
}
. (3.40)
Proof. The sharp identification region for Q is given by the collection of probability distri-
butions Q˜ ∈ T for which one can find a bidding rule B(·|·) with support in B˜ a.s. such that
G1,...,n:n(·) = M1,...,n:n(·;B, Q˜). Here M1,...,n:n(·;B, Q˜) is defined as in (3.36) with Q˜ replacing
Q. Take a distribution Q˜ satisfying this definition of sharpness. Then there exists a selection
of B˜ determined by the bidding rule associated with Q˜, such that its distribution matches
that of ~bn. But then Theorem A.1 implies that the inequalities in (3.40) hold. Conversely,
take Q˜ satisfying the inequalities in (3.40). Then, by Theorem A.1, ~bn and B˜ can be realized
on the same probability space as random elements ~b′n and B˜′, ~bn
d
= ~b′n, B˜
d
= B˜′, such that
~b′n ∈ B˜′ a.s. One can then complete the auction model with a bidding rule that picks ~b′n
with probability 1, and the result follows.
In (3.40), P(~bn ∈ K) is determined by the joint distribution of the ordered bids and hence
can be learned from the data. On the other side, TB˜(K; Q˜) is a function of the model and
Q˜ ∈ T . Hence, it can be computed using (3.35), with B˜ defined with respect to order statistics
of i.i.d. random variables with distribution Q˜ ∈ T. To gain insights in the characterization
of HP[Q], consider for example the set K = {
∏n−1
i=1 (−∞,+∞)}× (−∞, v]. Plugging it in the
inequalities in (3.40), one obtains
Gn:n(v) ≤ Qn−1,n(v), for all n,
which, using (3.37), yields (3.39). Similarly, plugging in the sets Kj = {
∏j−1
i=1 (−∞,+∞)} ×
[v,∞)×{∏nj+1(−∞,+∞)}, j = 1, . . . , n, yields (3.38). So the inequalities proposed by Haile
and Tamer (2003) are a subset of the inequalities yielding the sharp identification region in
Theorem SIR-3.6. More information can be obtained by using additional setsK. For instance,
the set K = [v1,∞)× [v2,∞)× {
∏n
i=1(−∞,+∞)}, v2 ≥ v1, yields P(b1:n ≥ v1, b2:n ≥ v2) ≤
Q1,2:n([v1,∞)× [v2,∞)), which further restricts Q. Numerous examples can be given.
Characterization (3.40) is stated using inequality (A.4) for the collection of compact
subsets of Rn. One can instead use the (equivalent) inequality (A.5), and show that in fact
it suffices to check it for a much smaller collection of sets, as shown by Chesher and Rosen
(2017a) (see also Molchanov and Molinari, 2018, Section 2.2). Nonetheless, this collection
remains extremely large.
Key Insight 3.10 (Random set theory and partial identification – continued): As stated
in the Introduction, constructing the (random) set of model predictions delivered by the main-
tained assumptions is an exercise typically carried out in identification analysis, regardless of
whether random set theory is applied. Indeed, for the problem studied in this section, Haile
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and Tamer (2003, equation D1) put forward the set of admissible bids in (3.35).57 With this
set in hand, the tools of random set theory (in this case, Theorem A.1) immediately deliver
the sharp identification region of interest.
Chesher and Rosen (2017b) further generalize the analysis in this section by dropping
the requirement of independent private values. This allows them, for example, to consider
affiliated private values. They show that even in this significantly more complex context, the
key behavioral restrictions imposed by Haile and Tamer (2003) to relate bids to valuations
can be coupled with the use of random set theory, to characterize sharp identification regions.
3.4 Network Formation Models
Strategic models of network formation generalize the frameworks of single agents and multiple
agents discrete choice models reviewed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. They posit that pairs of agents
(nodes) form, maintain, or sever connections (links) according to an explicit equilibrium
notion and utility structure. Each individual’s utility depends on the links formed by others
(the network) and on utility shifters that may be pair-specific.
One may conjecture that the results reported in Sections 3.1-3.2 apply in this more general
context too. While of course lessons can be carried over, network formation models present
challenges that combined cannot be overcome without the development of new tools. These
include the issue of equilibrium existence and the possibility of multiple equilibria when they
exist, due to the interdependence in agents’ choices (this problem was already discussed in
Section 3.2). Another challenge is the degree of correlation between linking decisions, which
interacts with how the observable data is generated: one may observe a growing number
of independent networks, or a growing number of agents on a single network. Yet another
challenge, which substantially increases the difficulties associated with the previous two, is
the combinatoric complexity of network formation problems. The purpose of this section is
exclusively to discuss some recent papers that have made important progress to address these
specific challenges and carry out partial identification analysis. For a thorough treatment of
the literature on network formation, I refer to the reviews in Graham (2015), Chandrasekhar
(2016), de Paula (2017), and Graham (2019, Chapter XXX in this Volume).58
Depending on whether the researcher observes data from a single network or multiple
independent networks, the underlying population of agents may be represented as a contin-
uum or as a countably infinite set in the first case, or as a finite set in the second case.
Henceforth, I denote generic agents as i, j, k, and m. I consider static models of undirected
network formation with non-transferable utility.59 The collection of all links among nodes
57Equations D1 in Haile and Tamer and (3.35) here differ in that the latter also requires bids to be ordered.
This observation was besides the point in Haile and Tamer’s 2003 discussion that led to equation D1.
58For a review of the literature on peer group effect analysis, see, e.g., Brock and Durlauf (2001), Blume,
Brock, Durlauf, and Ioannides (2011), de Paula (2017), and Graham (2019).
59Undirected means that if a link from node i to node j exists, then the link from j to i exists. The discussion
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forms the network, denoted y. For any pair (i, j) with i 6= j, yij = 1 if they are linked, and
yij = 0 otherwise (yii = 0 for all i by convention). The notation y−{ij} denotes the network
that results if a link present between nodes i and j is deleted, while y + {ij} denotes the
network that results if a link absent between nodes i and j is added. Denote agent i’s payoff
by ui(y,x, ). This payoff depends on the network y and the payoff shifters (x, ), with x
observable both to the agents and to the researcher,  only to the agents, and (x, ) collecting
(xij , ij) for all i and j.
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Following much of the literature, I employ pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996)
as equilibrium notion: y is a pairwise stable network if all linked agents prefer not to sever
their links, and all non-existing links are damaging to at least one agent. Formally,
∀(i, j) : yij = 1, ui(y,x, ) ≥ ui(y − {ij},x, ) and uj(y,x, ) ≥ uj(y − {ij},x, ),
∀(i, j) : yij = 0, if ui(y + {ij},x, ) > ui(y,x, ) then uj(y + {ij},x, ) < uj(y,x, ).
Under this equilibrium notion, if equilibria exist multiplicity is likely; see, among others, the
examples in Graham (2015, p. 475), de Paula (2017, p. 301), and Sheng (2018, example 3.1).
The model is therefore incomplete, because it does not specify how an equilibrium is selected
in the region of multiplicity. For the same reasons as discussed in the context of finite games
in Section 3.2, partial identification results (unless one is willing to impose restrictions on
the equilibrium selection mechanism). However, as I explain below, an immediate applica-
tion of the identification analysis carried out there presents enormous practical challenges
because there are 2n(n−1)/2 possible network configurations to be checked for stability (and
the dimensionality of the space of unobservables is also very large).
In what follows I consider two distinct frameworks that make different assumptions about
the utility function and how the data is generated, and discuss what can be learned about
the parameters of interest in these cases.
3.4.1 Data from Multiple Independent Networks
I first consider the case that the researcher observes data from multiple independent networks.
I follow the set-up put forward by Sheng (2018).
Identification Problem 3.8 (Network Formation Model with Multiple Independent
Networks): Let there be n ∈ {2, 3, . . . }, n < ∞ agents, and let (x,y) ∼ P be observable
random variables in ×nj=1Rd × {0, 1}n(n−1)/2, d < ∞. Suppose that y is a pairwise stable
network. For each agent i, let the utility function be known up to finite dimensional parameter
that follows can be generalized to the case of models with transferable utility.
60Here I consider a framework where the agents have complete information.
72
vector δ ∈ ∆ ⊂ Rp, and given by
ui(y,x, ; δ) =
n∑
j=1
yij(f(xi,xj ; δ1) + ij)
+ δ2
∑n
j=1
∑n
k 6=i,k=1 yijyjk
n− 2 + δ3
∑n
j=1
∑n
k=j+1 yijyikyjk
n− 2 (3.41)
with f(·, ·; ·) a continuous function of its arguments.61 Suppose that ij are independent for
all i 6= j and identically distributed with CDF known up to parameter vector γ ∈ Γ ⊂ Rm,
denoted Fγ . Assume that the support of Fγ is R, that Fγ is absolutely continuous with respect
to Lebesgue measure, and continuously differentiable with respect to γ ∈ Γ. Let Θ = ∆× Γ.
Assume that the researcher observes a random sample of networks and observable payoff
shifters drawn from P. In the absence of additional information, what can the researcher
learn about θ ≡ [δ1 δ2 δ3 γ]? 4
Sheng (2018) analyzes this problem. She establishes equilibrium existence provided that
δ2 ≥ 0 and δ3 ≥ 0 (Sheng, 2018, Proposition 2.2).62 Given payoff shifters (x, ) and parame-
ters ϑ ≡ [δ˜1 δ˜2 δ˜3 γ˜] ∈ Θ, let Yϑ(x, ) denote the collection of pairwise stable networks implied
by the model. It is easy to show that Yϑ(x, ) is a random closed set as in Definition A.1.
The networks in Yϑ(x, ) are n × n symmetric adjacency matrices with diagonal elements
equal to zero and off diagonal elements in {0, 1}. To ease notation, I omit Yϑ’s dependence
on (x, ) in what follows. Under the assumption that y is a pairwise stable network, at the
true data generating value of θ ∈ Θ, one has
y ∈ Yθ a.s. (3.42)
Equation (3.42) exhausts the modeling content of Identification Problem 3.8. Theorem A.1
can be leveraged to extract its empirical content from the observed distribution P(y,x). Let
Y be the collection of n×n symmetric matrices with diagonal elements equal to zero and all
other entries in {0, 1}, so that |Y| = 2n(n−1)/2. For a given set K ⊂ Y, let TYϑ(K;Fγ) denote
the probability of the event {Yϑ ∩K 6= ∅} implied when  ∼ Fγ , x-a.s.
Theorem SIR-3.7 (Structural Parameters in Network Formation Models with Multi-
ple Independent Networks): Under the assumptions of Identification Problem 3.8, the sharp
identification region for θ is
HP[θ] = {ϑ ∈ Θ : P(y ∈ K|x) ≤ TYϑ(K;Fγ˜) ∀K ⊂ Y, x-a.s.}. (3.43)
61The effects of having friends in common and of friends of friends in (3.41) are normalized by n− 2. This
enforces that the marginal utility that i receives from linking with j is affected by j having an additional link
with k to a smaller degree as n grows. This does not result in diminishing network effects.
62With transferable utility, Sheng (2018, Proposition 2.1) establishes existence for any δ2, δ3 ∈ R. See
Hellmann (2013) for an earlier analysis of existence and uniqueness of pairwise stable networks.
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Proof. Follows from similar arguments as for the proof of Theorem 3.3 on p. 58.
The characterization of HP[θ] in Theorem SIR-3.7 is new to this chapter.63 While tech-
nically it entails a finite number of conditional moment inequalities, in practice their number
can be prohibitive as it can be as large as 22
n(n−1)/2 − 2.64 Even using only a subset of the
inequalities in (3.43) to obtain an outer region, for example applying the insights in Ciliberto
and Tamer (2009), may not be practical (with n = 20, |Y| ≈ 1057). Moreover, computation
of TYϑ(K;Fγ) may require (depending on the set K) evaluation of rather complex integrals.
To circumvent these challenges, Sheng (2018) proposes to analyze network formation
through subnetworks. A subnetwork is the restriction of a network to a subset of the agents
(i.e., a subset of nodes and the links between them). For given A ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let yA =
{yij}i,j∈A,i 6=j be the submatrix in y with rows and columns in A, and let y−A be the remaining
elements of y after yA is deleted. With some abuse of notation, let (yA,y−A) denote the
composition of yA and y−A that returns y. Recall that Yϑ ≡ Yϑ(x, ), and let
Y Aϑ = {yA ∈ {0, 1}|A| : ∃y−A ∈ {0, 1}|−A| such that (yA,y−A) ∈ Yϑ}
be the collection of subnetworks with rows and columns in A that can be part of a pairwise
stable network in Yϑ. Let x
A denote the subset of x collecting xij for i, j ∈ A. For a given
yA ∈ {0, 1}|A|, let CY Aϑ (y
A;Fγ) and TY Aϑ
(yA;Fγ) denote, respectively, the probability of the
events {Y Aϑ = {yA}} and {{yA} ∈ Y Aϑ } implied when  ∼ Fγ , x-a.s. The first event means
that only the subnetwork yA is part of a pairwise stable network, while the second event
means that yA is a possible subnetwork that is part of a pairwise stable network but other
subnetworks may be part of it too. Sheng (2018, Proposition 4.1) provides the following outer
region for θ by adapting the insight in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) to subnetworks. In the
theorem I abuse notation compared to Table 1.1 by introducing a superscript, A, to make
explicit the dependence of the outer region on it.
Theorem OR-3.1 (Subnetworks-based Outer Region on Structural Parameters in Net-
work Formation Models with Multiple Independent Networks): Under the assumptions of
Identification Problem 3.8, for any A ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, an A-dependent outer region for θ is
OAP [θ] = {ϑ ∈ Θ : CY Aϑ (y
A;Fγ˜) ≤ P(yA = yA|xA) ≤ TY Aϑ (y
A;Fγ˜)∀yA ⊂ YA, xA-a.s.},
(3.44)
where YA is the collection of |A| × |A| symmetric matrices with diagonal elements equal to
zero and all other elements in {0, 1} so that |YA| = 2|A|(|A|−1)/2.
63Gualdani (2019) has previously used Theorem D.1 in Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011), as I do
here, to characterize sharp identification regions in unilateral and bilateral directed network formation games.
64This number may be reduced drastically using the notion of core determining class of sets, see Definition
A.8 and the discussion on p. 117. Nonetheless, even with relatively few agents, the number of inequalities in
(3.43) may remain overwhelming.
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Proof. Let u(y˜|Yϑ) be a random variable in the unit simplex in Rn(n−1)/2 which assigns to
each possible pairwise stable network y˜ that may realize given (x, ) and ϑ ∈ Θ the probability
that it is selected from Yϑ. Given y ∈ Y, denote by M(y|x) the model predicted probability
that the network realizes equal to y. Then the model yields
M(y|x) =
∫
u(y|Yϑ)dFγ =
∫
y∈Yϑ,|Yϑ|=1
dFγ +
∫
y∈Yϑ,|Yϑ|≥2
u(y|Yϑ)dFγ . (3.45)
The model implied distribution for subnetwork y˜A is obtained by taking the marginal of
expression (3.45) with respect to y˜−A
M(yA|x) =
∑
y−A
M((yA, y−A)|x) =
∫
yA∈Y Aϑ ,|Y Aϑ |=1
dFγ +
∫
yA∈Y Aϑ ,|Y Aϑ |≥2
∑
y−A
u((yA, y−A)|Yϑ)dFγ .
(3.46)
Replacing u in (3.46) with zero and one yields the bounds in (3.44).
Sheng (2018, Section 4.2) further assumes that the selection mechanism u(y˜|Yϑ) is in-
variant to permutations of the labels of the players. Under this condition and the maintained
assumptions on , she shows that the inequalities in (3.44) are invariant under permutations of
labels, so subnetworks in any two subsets A,A′ ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} with |A| = |A′| and xA = xA′
yield the same inequalities for all yA = yA
′
. It is therefore sufficient to consider subnetwork
A and the inequalities in (3.44) associated with it. Leveraging this result, Sheng proposes an
outer region obtained by looking at unlabeled subnetworks of size |A| ≤ a¯ and given by
OP[θ] =
⋂
|A|≤a¯
OAP [θ].
As long as the subnetworks are chosen to be small, e.g., |A| ≤ 2, 3, 4, the inequalities in (3.44)
can be computed even if the network is large. Sheng (2018) shows that the inequalities in
(3.44) remain informative as n grows. This fact highlights the importance of working with
subnetworks. One could have applied the insight of Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) directly to the
full network by setting u equal to zero and to one in (3.45). The resulting bounds, however,
would vanish to zero as n grows and become uninformative for θ. The characterization in
Theorem OR-3.1 can be refined to obtain a smaller region, adapting the results in Beresteanu,
Molchanov, and Molinari (2011, Supplementary Appendix Theorem D.1) to subnetworks.
The size of this refined region is weakly decreasing in |A|.65 However, the refinement does
not yield HP[θ] because it is applied only to subnetworks.
Key Insight 3.11: At the beginning of this section I highlighted some key challenges to
65The idea of using random set methods on subnetworks to obtain the refined region was put forward in an
earlier version of Sheng (2018). She provided a proof that the refined region’s size decreases weakly in |A|.
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inference in network formation models. Identification Problem 3.8 bypasses the concern on
the dependence among linking decisions through the independence assumption on ij and the
presumption that the researcher observes data from multiple independent networks, which al-
lows for identification of P(y,x). Sheng (2018) takes on the remaining challenges by formally
establishing equilibrium existence and allowing for unrestricted selection among multiple equi-
libria. In order to overcome the computational complexity of the problem, she puts forward
the important idea of inference based on subnetworks. While of course information is left on
the table, the approach remains feasible even with large networks.
Miyauchi (2016) considers a framework similar to the one laid out in Identification Prob-
lem 3.8. He assumes non-negative externalities, and shows that in this case the set of pairwise
stable equilibria is a complete lattice with a smallest and a largest equilibrium.66 He then
uses moment functions that are monotone in the pairwise stable network (so that they take
their extreme values at the smallest and largest equilibria), to obtain moment conditions that
restrict θ. Examples of the moment functions used include the proportion of pairs with a link,
the proportion of links belonging to traingles, and many more (see Miyauchi, 2016, Table 1).
Gualdani (2019) considers unilateral and bilateral directed network formation games,
still under a sampling framework where the researcher observes many independent networks.
The equilibrium notion that she uses is pure strategy Nash. She assumes that the payoff that
player i receives from forming link ij is allowed to depend on the number of additional players
forming a link pointing to j, but rules out other spillover effects. Under this assumption
and some regularity conditions, Gualdani shows that the network formation game can be
decomposed into local games (i.e., games whose sets of players and strategy profiles are subsets
of the network formation game’s ones), so that the network formation game is in equilibrium
if and only if each local game is in equilibrium. She then obtains a characterization of HP[θ]
using elements of random set theory.
3.4.2 Data From a Single Network
When the researcher observes data from a single network, extra care has to be taken to
restrict the dependence among linking decisions. This can be done in various ways (see,
e.g., Chandrasekhar, 2016, for some examples). Here I consider a framework proposed by de
Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer (2018).
Identification Problem 3.9 (Network Formation Model with a Single Network): Let
there be a continuum of agents j ∈ I = [0, µ], with µ > 0 their total measure, who choose
whom to link to based on a utility function specified below.67 Let y : I × I → {0, 1} be an
66This approach exploits supermodularity, and is related to Jia (2008) and Echenique (2005).
67This is an approximation to a framework with a large but finite number of agents. The utility function
can be less restrictive than the one considered here (see Assumptions 1 and 2 in de Paula, Richards-Shubik,
and Tamer, 2018).
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adjacency mapping with yjk = 1 if nodes j and k are linked, and yjk = 0 otherwise. Assume
that only connections up to distance d¯ affect utility and that preferences are such that agents
never choose to form more than a total of l¯ links.68 To simplify exposition, let d¯ = 2. Let each
agent j be endowed with characteristics xj ∈ X , with X a finite set in Rp, that are observable
to the researcher. Additionally, let each agent j be endowed with l¯ × |X | preference shocks
j`(x) ∈ R, ` = 1, . . . , l¯, x ∈ X , that are unobservable to the researcher and correspond to the
possible direct connections and their characteristics.69 Suppose that the vector of preference
shocks is independent of x and has a distribution known up to parameter vector γ ∈ Γ ⊂ Rm,
denoted Qγ . Let I(j) = {k : yjk = 1}. Assume that agents with characteristics and preference
shocks (x, e) value links according to the utility function
uj(y, x, e) =
∑
k∈I(j)
(f(xj , xk) + ej`(k)(xk))
+ δ1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
k∈I(j)
I(k)− I(j)− {j}
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ δ2
∑
k∈I(j)
∑
m∈I(j):m>k
ykm −∞1(|I(k)| > l¯) (3.47)
Assume that the network y formed by agents with characteristics and shocks (x, ) is pairwise
stable. Let Θ ≡ Υ×∆×Γ, with Υ the parameter space for f ≡ {f(x,w) : x ∈ X , w ∈ X}. In
the absence of additional information, what can the researcher learn about θ ≡ [f δ1 δ2 γ]? 4
Identification Problem 3.9 enforces dimension reduction through the restrictions on depth
and degree (the bounds d¯ and l¯), so that it is applicable to frameworks with networks that
have limited degree distribution (e.g., close friendships network, but not Facebook network).
It also requires that individual identities are irrelevant. This substantially reduces the richness
of unobserved heterogeneity allowed for and the dimensionality of the space of unobservables.
While the latter feature narrows the domain of applicability of the model, it is very beneficial
to obtain a tractable characterization of what can be learned about θ, and yields equilibria
that may include isolated nodes, a feature often encountered in networks data.
de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer (2018) study Identification Problem 3.9 focusing
on the payoff-relevant local subnetworks that result from the maintained assumptions. These
are distinct from the subnetworks used by Sheng (2018): whereas Sheng looks at subnetworks
formed by arbitrary individuals and whose size is chosen by the researcher on the base of
computational tractability, de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer look at subnetworks among
individuals that are within a certain distance of each other, as determined by the structure
of the preferences. On the other hand, Sheng’s 2018 analysis does not require that agents
have a finite number of types nor bounds the number of links that they may form.
To characterize the local subnetworks relevant for identification analysis in their frame-
68The distance measure used here is the shortest path between two nodes.
69Under this assumption, the preference shocks do not depend on the individual identities of the agents.
Hence, it agents k and m have the same observable characteristics, then j is indifferent between them.
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work, de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer (2018) propose the concepts of network type
and preference class. A network type t = (a, v) describes the local network up to distance
d¯ from the reference node. Here a is a square matrix of size 1 + l¯
∑d¯
d=1(l¯ − 1)d−1 that de-
scribes the local subnetwork that is utility relevant for an agent of type t. It consists of the
reference node, its direct potential neighbors (l¯ elements), its second order neighbors (l¯(l¯−1)
elements), through its d¯-th order neighbors (l¯(l¯ − 1)d¯−1 elements). The other component of
the type, v, is a vector of length equal to the size of a that contains the observable character-
istics of the reference node and her alters. The bounds d¯ and l¯ enforce dimension reduction
by bounding the number of network types. The partial identification approach of de Paula,
Richards-Shubik, and Tamer depends on this number, rather than on the number of agents.
For example, the number of moment inequalities is determined by the number of network
types, not by the number of agents. As such, the approach yields its highest dividends for
dimension reduction in large networks.
Let T denote the collection of network types generated from a preference structure u
and set of characteristics X . For given realization (x, e) of the observable characteristics and
preference shocks of a reference agent, and for given ϑ ∈ Θ, define the collection of network
types for which no agent wants to drop a link by
Hϑ(x, e) = {(a, v) ∈ T : v1 = x and u(a, v, e) ≥ u(a−`, v, e) ∀` = 1, . . . , l¯},
where a−` is equal to the local adjacency matrix a but with the `-th link removed (that is,
it sets the (1, ` + 1) and (` + 1, 1) elements of a equal to zero). Because (x, ) are random
vectors, Hϑ ≡ Hϑ(x, ) is a random closed set as per Definition A.1. This random set takes
on a finite number of realizations (equal to the possible subsets of T ), so that its distribution
is completely determined by the probability with which it takes on each of these realizations.
A preference class H ⊂ T is one of the possible realizations of Hϑ for some ϑ ∈ Θ. The
model implied probability that Hϑ = H is given by
M(H|x;ϑ) ≡ Qγ˜( : Hϑ = H|x). (3.48)
Observation of data from one network allows the researcher, under suitable restrictions on the
sampling process, to learn the distribution of network types in the data (type shares), denoted
P(t).70 For example, in a network of best friends with l¯ = 1 and d¯ = 2, and X = {x1, x2} (e.g.,
a simplified framework with only two possible races), agents are either isolated or in a pair.
Network types are pairs for the agents’ race and the best friend’s race (with second element
equal zero if the agent is isolated). Type shares are the fraction of isolated blacks, the fraction
of isolated whites, the fraction of blacks with a black best friend, the fraction of whites with a
black best friend, and the fraction of whites with a white best friend. The preference classes
70Full observation of the network is not required (and in practice it often does not occur). Sampling
uncertainty results from it because in this model there is a continuum of agents.
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for a black agent are H1(b, e) = {(b, 0)}, H2(b, e) = {(b, 0), (b, b)}, H3(b, e) = {(b, 0), (b, w)},
H4(b, e) = {(b, 0), (b, w), (b, b)} (and similarly for whites). In each case, being alone is part
of the preference class, as there are no links to sever. In the second class the agent has a
preference for having a black friend, in the third class for a white friend, and in the last
class for a friend of either race. It is easy to see that the model is incomplete, as for a given
realization of  it makes multiple predictions on the agent’s preference type.
de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer propose to map the distribution of preference
classes into the observed distribution of preference types in the data through the use of
allocation parameters, denoted αH(t) ∈ [0, 1]. These are distinct from but play the same role
as a selection mechanism, and they represent a candidate distribution for t given Hϑ = H.
The model, augmented with them, implies a probability that an agent is of network type t:
M(t;ϑ, α) =
1
µ
∑
H⊂T
µv1(t)M(H|v1(t);ϑ)αH(t), (3.49)
where µv1(t) is the measure of reference agents with characteristics equal to the second com-
ponent of the preference type t, x = v1(t), and α ≡ {αH(t) : t ∈ T , H ⊂ T }.
de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer provide a characterization of an outer region for θ
based on two key implications of pairwise stability that deliver restrictions on α. They also
show that under some additional assumptions, this characterization yields HP[θ] (de Paula,
Richards-Shubik, and Tamer, 2018, Appendix B). Here I focus on their more general result.
The first implication that they use is that existing links should not be dropped:
t /∈ H ⇒ αH(t) = 0. (3.50)
The condition in (3.50) is embodied in α¯ ≡ {αH(t) : t ∈ H,H ⊂ T }.
The second implication is that it should not be possible to establish mutually beneficial
links among nodes that are far from each other. Let t′ and s′ denote the network types that
are generated if one adds a link in networks of types t and s among two nodes that are at
distance at least 2d¯ from each other and each have less than l¯ links. Then the requirement is(∑
H⊂T
µv1(t)M(H|v1(t);ϑ)αH(t)1(t′ ∈ H)
)(∑
H⊂T
µv1(s)M(H|v1(s);ϑ)αH(s)1(s′ ∈ H)
)
= 0
(3.51)
In words, if a positive measure of agents of type t prefer t′ (i.e., αH(t) > 0 for some H
such that t′ ∈ H), there must be zero measure of type s individuals who prefer s′, because
otherwise the network is unstable. de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer show that the
conditions in (3.51) can be embodied in a square matrix q of size equal to the length of α¯.
The entries of q are constructed as follows. Let H and H˜ be two preference classes with
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t ∈ H and s ∈ H˜. With some abuse of notation, let qαH(t),αH˜(s) denote the element of q
corresponding to the index of the entry in α¯ equal to αH(t) for the row, and to αH˜(s) for the
column. Then set qαH(t),αH˜(s)(ϑ) = 1(t
′ ∈ H)1(s′ ∈ H˜). It follows that this element yields
the term
(
αH(t)1(t
′ ∈ H))(αH˜(s)1(s′ ∈ H˜)) in the quadratic form α¯>qα¯. As long as µv1(·)
and M(·|x;ϑ) in (3.48) are strictly positive, this term is equal to zero if and only if condition
(3.51) holds for types t and s.71
With this background, Theorem OR-3.2 below provides an outer region for θ. The proof
of this result follows from the arguments laid out above (see de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and
Tamer, 2018, Theorems 1 and 2, for the full details).
Theorem OR-3.2 (Outer Region on Parameters of a Network Formation Model with a
Single Network): Under the assumptions of Identification Problem 3.9,
OP[θ] =
ϑ ∈ Θ :

minα¯ α¯
>qα¯
s.t. M(t;ϑ, α¯) = P(t) ∀ t ∈ T∑
t∈H α¯H(t) = 1 ∀H ⊂ T
αH(t) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ H,∀H ⊂ T
 = 0
 . (3.52)
The set in (3.52) does not equal HP[θ] in all models allowed for in Identification Problem
3.9 because condition (3.51) does not embody all implications of pairwise stability on non-
existing links. While the optimization problem in (3.52) is quadratic, it is not necessarily
convex because q may not be positive definite. Nonetheless, the simulations reported by de
Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer suggest that OP[θ] can be computed rapidly, as least for
the examples they considered.
Key Insight 3.12: At the beginning of this section I highlighted some key challenges
to inference in network formation models. When data is observed from a single network,
as in Identification Problem 3.9, de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer’s 2018 proposal to
base inference on local networks achieves two main benefits. First, it delivers consistently
estimable features of the game, namely the probability that an agent belongs to one of a finite
collection of network types. Second, it achieves dimension reduction, so that computation of
outer regions on θ remains feasible even with large networks and allowing for unrestricted
selection among multiple equilibria.
3.5 Further Theoretical Advances and Empirical Applications
In order to discuss the partial identification approach to learning structural parameters of
economic models in some level of detail while keeping this chapter to a manageable length, I
71The possibility that µv1(·) or M(·|x;ϑ) are equal to zero can be accommodated by setting qαH (t),αH˜ (s)(ϑ) =
(µv1(t)M(H|v1(t);ϑ)1(t′ ∈ H))(µv1(s)M(H|v1(s);ϑ)1(s′ ∈ H˜)). However, in that case q depends on ϑ and its
computational cost increases.
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have focused on a selection of papers. In this section I briefly mention several other excellent
theoretical contributions that could be discussed more closely, as well as several empirical
papers that have applied partial identification analysis of structural models to answer a wide
array of questions of substantive economic importance.
Pakes (2010) and Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2015) propose to embed revealed preference-
based inequalities into structural models of both demand and supply in markets where firms
face discrete choices of product configuration or of location. Revealed preference arguments
are a trademark of the literature on discrete choice analysis. Pakes (2010) and Pakes, Porter,
Ho, and Ishii (2015) use these arguments to leverage a subset of the model’s implications
to obtain easy-to-compute moment inequalities. For example, in the context of entry games
such as the ones discussed in Section 3.2, they propose to base inference on the implication
that a player enters the market if and only if (s)he expects to make non-negative profits.
This condition can be exploited even when players have heterogeneous (unobserved to the
researcher) information sets, and it implies that the expected profits for entrants should be
non-negative. Nonetheless, the condition does not suffice to obtain moment inequalities that
include only observed payoff shifters and preference parameters. This is because the expected
value of unobserved payoff shifters for entrants is not equal to zero, as the group of entrants
is selected. The authors require the availability of valid (monotone) instrumental variables
to solve this problem (see Section 2.2 for uses of instrumental variables and monotone instru-
mental variables in partial identification analysis of treatment effects). Interesting features
of their approach include that the researcher does not need to solve for the set of equilibria,
nor to require that the distribution of unobservable payoff shifters is known up to finite di-
mensional parameter vector. Moreover, the same basic ideas can be applied to single agent
models (with or without heterogeneous information sets). A shortcoming of the method is
that the set of parameter vectors satisfying the moment inequalities may be wider than the
sharp identification region under the maintained assumptions.
The breadth of applications of the approach proposed by Pakes (2010) and Pakes, Porter,
Ho, and Ishii (2015) is vast.72 For example, Ho (2009) uses it to model the formation of the
hospital networks offered by US health insurers, and Ho, Ho, and Mortimer (2012) and Lee
(2013) use it to obtain bounds on firm fixed costs as an input to modeling product choices in
the movie industry and in the US video game industry, respectively. Holmes (2011) estimates
the effects of Wal-Mart’s strategy of creating a high density network of stores. While the close
proximity of stores implies cannibalization in sales, Wal-Mart is willing to bear it to achieve
density economies, which in turn yield savings in distribution costs. His results suggest that
Wal-Mart substantially benefits from high store density. Ellickson, Houghton, and Timmins
72Statistical inference in these papers is often carried out using the methods proposed by Chernozhukov,
Hong, and Tamer (2007), Beresteanu and Molinari (2008), and Andrews and Soares (2010). Model specification
tests, if carried out, are based on the method proposed by Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2015). See Sections 4.3 and
5, respectively, for a discussion of confidence sets and specification tests.
81
(2013) measure the effects of chain economies, business stealing, and heterogeneous firms’
comparative advantages in the discount retail industry. Kawai and Watanabe (2013) estimate
a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. As in other
models analyzed in this section, the one they study yields multiple predicted outcomes, so
that partial identification methods are required to carry out the empirical analysis if one does
not assume a specific selection mechanism to resolve the multiplicity. They estimate their
model on Japanese general-election data, and uncover a sizable fraction of strategic voters.
They also estimate that only a small fraction of voters are misaligned (voting for a candidate
other than their most preferred one). Eizenberg (2014) studies whether the rapid removal
from the market for personal computers of existing central processing units upon creation
of new ones through innovation reduces surplus. He finds that a limited group of price-
insensitive consumers enjoys the largest share of the welfare gains from innovation. A policy
that kept older technologies on the shelf would allow for the benefits from innovation to reach
price-sensitive consumers thanks to improved access to mobile computing, but total welfare
would not increase because consumer welfare gains would be largely offset by producer losses.
Ho and Pakes (2014) analyze hospital referrals for labor and birth episodes in California in
2003, for patients enrolled with six health insurers that use, to a different extent, incentives
to referring physicians groups to reduce hospital costs (capitation contracts). The aim is
to learn whether enrollees with high-capitation insurers tend to be referred to lower-priced
hospitals (ceteris paribus) compared to other patients with same-severity conditions, and
whether quality of care was affected. Their model allows for an insurer-specific preference
function that is additively separable in the hospital price paid by the insurer (which is allowed
to be measured with error), the distance traveled, and plan and severity-specific hospital
fixed effects. Importantly, unobserved heterogeneity entering the preference function is not
assumed to be drawn from a distribution known up to finite dimensional parameter vector.
The results of the empirical analysis indicate that the price paid by insurers to hospitals has
an impact on referrals, with higher elasticity to price for insurers whose physicians groups
are more highly capitated. Dickstein and Morales (2018) study how the information that
potential exporters have to predict the profits they will earn when serving a foreign market
influences their decisions to export. They propose a model where the researcher specifies
and observes a subset of the variables that agents use to form their expectations, but may
not observe other variables that affect firms’ expectations heterogeneously (across firms and
markets, and over time). Because only a subset of the variables entering the firms’ information
set is observed, partial identification results. They show that, under rational expectations,
they can test whether potential exporters know and use specific variables to predict their
export profits. They also use their model’s estimates to quantify the value of information.
Wollmann (2018) studies the implications of the $85 billion automotive industry bailout in
2009 on the commercial vehicle segment. He finds that had Chrysler and GM been liquidated
(or aquired by a major competitor) rather than bailed out, the surviving firms would have
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experienced a rise in profits high enough to induce them to introduce new products.
A different use of revealed preference arguments appears in the contributions of Blundell,
Browning, and Crawford (2008), Blundell, Kristensen, and Matzkin (2014), Hoderlein and
Stoye (2014, 2015), Manski (2014), Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum (2016), Hausman
and Newey (2016), Adams (2019), and many others. For example, Manski (2014) proposes
a method to partially identify income-leisure preferences and to evaluate the associated ef-
fects of tax policies. He starts from basic revealed-preference analysis performed under the
assumption that individuals prefer more income and leisure, and no other restriction. The
analysis shows that observing an individual’s time allocation under a status quo tax policy
yields bounds on his allocation that may or may not be informative, depending on how the
person allocates his time under the status quo policy and on the tax schedules. He then ex-
plores what more can be learned if one additionally imposes restrictions on the distribution of
income-leisure preferences, using the method put forward by Manski (2007b). One assump-
tion restricts groups of individuals facing different choice sets to have the same distribution
of preferences. The other assumption restricts this distribution to a parametric family. Kline
and Tartari (2016) build on and expand Manski (2014)’s framework to evaluate the effect
of Connecticut’s Jobs First welfare reform experiment on women’ labor supply and welfare
participation decisions.
Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum (2016) propose a method to learn features of house-
holds’ risk preferences in a random utility model that nests expected utility theory plus a
range of non-expected utility models.73 They allow for unobserved heterogeneity in prefer-
ences (that may enter the utility function non-separably) and leave completely unspecified
their distribution. The authors use revealed preference arguments to infer, for each household,
a set of values for its unobserved heterogeneity terms that are consistent with the household’s
choices in the three lines of insurance coverage. As their core restriction, they assume that
each household’s preferences are stable across contexts: the household’s utility function is
the same when facing distinct but closely related choice problems. This allows them to use
the inferred set valued data to partially identify features of the distribution of preferences,
and to classify households into preference types. They apply their proposed method to an-
alyze data on households’ deductible choices across three lines of insurance coverage (home
all perils, auto collision, and auto comprehensive).74 Their results show that between 70 and
80 percent of the households make choices that can be rationalized by a model with linear
utility and monotone, quadratic, or even linear probability distortions. These probability
73Their model is based on the one put forward by Barseghyan, Molinari, O’Donoghue, and Teitelbaum
(2013). See Barseghyan, Molinari, O’Donoghue, and Teitelbaum (2018) for a review of these and other non-
expected utility models in the context of estimation of risk preferences.
74Auto collision coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle caused by a collision with another vehicle
or object, without regard to fault. Auto comprehensive coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle from
all other causes, without regard to fault. Home all perils (or simply home) coverage pays for damage to the
insured home from all causes, except those that are specifically excluded (e.g., flood, earthquake, or war).
83
distortions substantially overweight small probabilities. By contrast, fewer than 40 percent
can be rationalized by a model with concave utility but no probability distortions.
Hausman and Newey (2016) propose a method to carry out demand analysis while al-
lowing for general forms of unobserved heterogeneity. Preferences and linear budget sets
are assumed to be statistically independent (conditional on covariates and control functions).
Hausman and Newey show that for continuous demand, average surplus is generally not iden-
tified from the distribution of demand for a given price and income, and therefore propose
a partial identification approach. They use bounds on income effects to derive bounds on
average surplus. They apply the bounds to gasoline demand, using data from the 2001 U.S.
National Household Transportation Survey.
Another strand of empirical applications pertains to the analysis of discrete games. Cilib-
erto and Tamer (2009) use the method they develop, described in Section 3.2.1, to study
market structure in the US airline industry and the role that firm heterogeneity plays in
shaping it. Their findings suggest that the competitive effects of each carrier increase in that
carrier’s airport presence, but also that the competitive effects of large carriers (American,
Delta, United) are different from those of low cost ones (Southwest). They also evaluate the
effect of a counterfactual policy repealing the Wright Amendment, and find that doing so
would see an increase in the number of markets served out of Dallas Love.
Grieco (2014) proposes a model of static entry that extends the one in Section 3.2 by
allowing individuals to have flexible information structures, where players’s payoffs depend
on both a common-knowledge unobservable payoff shifter, and a private-information one. His
characterization of HP[θ] is based on using an unrestricted selection mechanism, as in Berry
and Tamer (2006) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). He applies the model to study the impact
of supercenters such as Wal-Mart, that sell both food and groceries, on the profitability of
rural grocery stores. He finds that entry by a supercenter outside, but within 20 miles, of a
local monopolist’s market has a smaller impact on firm profits than entry by a local grocer.
Their entrance has a small negative effect on the number of grocery stores in surrounding
markets as well as on their profits. The results suggest that location and format-based
differentiation partially insulate rural stores from competition with supercenters.
A larger class of information structures is considered in the analysis of static discrete
games carried out by Magnolfi and Roncoroni (2017). They allow for all information struc-
tures consistent with the players knowing their own payoffs and the distribution of opponents’
payoffs. As solution concept they adopt the Bayes Correlated Equilibrium recently developed
by Bergemann and Morris (2016). Also with this solution concept multiple equilibria are
possible. The authors leave completely unspecified the selection mechanism picking the equi-
librium played in the regions of multiplicity, so that partial identification attains. Magnolfi
and Roncoroni use the random sets approach to characterize HP[θ]. They apply the method
to estimate a model of entry in the Italian supermarket industry and quantify the effect of
large malls on local grocery stores. Norets and Tang (2014) provide partial identification
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results (and Bayesian inference methods) for semiparametric dynamic binary choice models
without imposing distributional assumptions on the unobserved state variables. They carry
out an empirical application using Rust (1987)’s model of bus engine replacement. Their
results suggest that parametric assumptions about the distribution of the unobserved states
can have a considerable effect on the estimates of per-period payoffs, but not a noticeable
one on the counterfactual conditional choice probabilities. Berry and Compiani (2019) use
the random sets approach to partially identify and estimate dynamic discrete choice mod-
els with serially correlated unobservables, under instrumental variables restrictions. They
extend two-step dynamic estimation methods to characterize a set of structural parameters
that are consistent with the dynamic model, the instrumental variables restrictions, and the
data.75 Gualdani (2019) uses the random sets approach and a network formation model, to
learn about Italian firms’ incentives for having their executive directors sitting on the board
of their competitors.
Barseghyan, Coughlin, Molinari, and Teitelbaum (2019) use the method described in Sec-
tion 3.1.3 to partially identify the distribution of risk preferences using data on deductible
choices in auto collision insurance.76 They posit an expected utility theory model and al-
low for unobserved heterogeneity in households’ risk aversion and choice sets, with unre-
stricted dependence between them. Motivation for why unobserved heterogeneity in choice
sets might be an important factor in this empirical framework comes from the earlier anal-
ysis of Barseghyan, Molinari, and Teitelbaum (2016) and novel findings that are part of
Barseghyan, Coughlin, Molinari, and Teitelbaum’s 2019 contribution. They show that com-
monly used models that make strong assumptions about choice sets (e.g., the mixed logit
model with each individual’s choice set assumed equal to the feasible set, and various models
of choice set formation) can be rejected in their data. With regard to risk aversion, their key
finding is that their estimated lower bounds are significantly smaller than the point estimates
obtained in the related literature. This suggests that the data can be explained by expected
utility theory with lower and more homogeneous levels of risk aversion than it had been
uncovered before. This provides new evidence on the importance of developing models that
differ in their specification of which alternatives agents evaluate (rather than or in addition
to models focusing on how they evaluate them), and to data collection efforts that seek to
directly measure agents’ heterogeneous choice sets (Caplin, 2016).
Iaryczower, Shi, and Shum (2018) study the effect of pre-vote deliberation on the deci-
sions of US appellate courts. The question of interest is weather deliberation increases or
reduces the probability of an incorrect decision. They use a model where communication
equilibrium is the solution concept, and only observed heterogeneity in payoffs is allowed
for. In the model, multiple equilibria are again possible, and the authors leave the selection
mechanism completely unspecified. They characterize HP[θ] through an optimization prob-
75Statistical inference on θ is carried out using Chernozhukov, Chetverikov, and Kato (2018)’s method.
76Statistical inference on projections of θ is carried out using Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye (2019a)’s method.
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lem, and structurally estimate the model on US Courts of Appeal data. Iaryczower, Shi,
and Shum compare the probability of making incorrect decisions under the pre-vote deliber-
ation mechanism, to that in a counterfactual environment where no deliberation occurs. The
results suggest that there is a range of parameters in HP[θ], for which judges have ex-ante
disagreement of imprecise prior information, for which deliberation is beneficial. Otherwise
deliberation leads to lower effectiveness for the court.
D’Haultfoeuille, Gaillac, and Maurel (2018) propose a test for the hypothesis of rational
expectations for the case that one observes only the marginal distributions of realizations and
subjective beliefs, but not their joint distribution (e.g., when subjective beliefs are observed
in one dataset, and realizations in a different one, and the two cannot be matched). They
establish that the hypothesis of rational expectations can be expressed as testing that a
continuum of moment inequalities is satisfied, and they leverage the results in Andrews
and Shi (2017) to provide a simple-to-compute test for this hypothesis. They apply their
method to test for and quantify deviations from rational expectations about future earnings,
and examine the consequences of such departures in the context of a life-cycle model of
consumption.
Tebaldi, Torgovitsky, and Yang (2019) estimate the demand for health insurance under
the Affordable Care Act using data from California. Methodologically, they use a discrete
choice model that allows for endogeneity in insurance premiums (which enter as explanatory
variables in the model) and dispenses with parametric assumptions about the unobserved
components of utility leveraging the availability of instrumental variables, similarly to the
framework presented in Section 3.1.2. The authors provide a characterization of sharp bounds
on the effects of changing premium subsidies on coverage choices, consumer surplus, and
government spending, as solutions to linear programming problems, rendering their method
computationally attractive.
Another important strand of theoretical literature is concerned with partial identification
of panel data models. Honor and Tamer (2006) consider a dynamic random effects probit
model, and use partial identification analysis to obtain bounds on the model parameters that
circumvent the initial conditions problem. Rosen (2012) considers a fixed effect panel data
model where he imposes a conditional quantile restriction on time varying unobserved het-
erogeneity. Differencing out inequalities resulting from the conditional quantile restriction
delivers inequalities that depend only on observable variables and parameters to be esti-
mated, but not on the fixed effects, so that they can be used for estimation. Chernozhukov,
Fernndez-Val, Hahn, and Newey (2013) obtain bounds on average and quantile treatment
effects in nonparametric and semiparametric nonseparable panel data models. Khan, Pono-
mareva, and Tamer (2016) provide partial identification results in linear panel data models
when censored outcomes, with unrestricted dependence between censoring and observable
and unobservable variables. Their results are derived for two classes of models, one where
the unobserved heterogeneity terms satisfy a stationarity restriction, and one where they
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are nonstationary but satisfy a conditional independence restriction. Torgovitsky (2019a)
provides a method to partially identify state dependence in panel data models where indi-
vidual unobserved heterogeneity needs not be time invariant. Pakes and Porter (2016) study
semiparametric multinomial choice panel models with fixed effects where the random utility
function is assumed additively separable in unobserved heterogeneity, fixed effects, and a
linear covariate index. The key semiparametric assumption is a group stationarity condition
on the disturbances which places no restrictions on either the joint distribution of the distur-
bances across choices or the correlation of disturbances across time. Pakes and Porter propose
a within-group comparison that delivers a collection of conditional moment inequalities that
they use to provide point and partial identification results. Aristodemou (2019) proposes a
related method, where partial identification relies on the observation of individuals whose
outcome changes in two consecutive time periods, and leverages shape restrictions to reduce
the number of between alternatives comparisons needed to determine the optimal choice.
4 Estimation and Inference
4.1 Framework and Scope of the Discussion
The identification analysis carried out in Sections 2-3 presumes knowledge of the joint dis-
tribution P of the observable variables. That is, it presumes that P can be learned with
certainty from observation of the entire population. In practice, one observes a sample of size
n drawn from P. For simplicity I assume it to be a random sample.77
Statistical inference on HP[θ] needs to be conducted using knowledge of Pn, the empirical
distribution of the observable outcomes and covariates. Because HP[θ] is not a singleton, this
task is particularly delicate. To start, care is required to choose a proper notion of consistency
for a set estimator HˆPn [θ] and to obtain palatable conditions under which such consistency
attains. Next, the asymptotic behavior of statistics designed to test hypothesis or build
confidence sets for HP[θ] or for ϑ ∈ HP[θ] might change with ϑ, creating technical challenges
for the construction of confidence sets that are not encountered when θ is point identified.
Many of the sharp identification regions derived in Sections 2-3 can be written as collections of
vectors ϑ ∈ Θ that satisfy conditional or unconditional moment (in)equalities. For simplicity,
I assume that Θ is a compact and convex subset of Rd, and I use the formalization for the
77This assumption is often maintained in the literature. See, e.g., Andrews and Soares (2010) for a treatment
of inference with dependent observations. Epstein, Kaido, and Seo (2016) study inference in games of complete
information as in Identification Problem 3.5, imposing the i.i.d. assumption on the unobserved payoff shifters
{εi1, εi2}ni=1. The authors note that because the selection mechanism picking the equilibrium played in the
regions of multiplicity (see Section 3.2) is left completely unspecified and may be arbitrarily correlated across
markets, the resulting observed variables {wi}ni=1 may not be independent and identically distributed, and
they propose an inference method to address this issue.
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case of a finite number of unconditional moment (in)equalities:
HP[θ] = {ϑ ∈ Θ : EP(mj(wi;ϑ)) ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ J1, EP(mj(wi;ϑ)) = 0 ∀j ∈ J2}. (4.1)
In (4.1), wi ∈ W ⊆ RdW is a random vector collecting all observable variables, with w ∼ P;
mj :W×Θ→ R, j ∈ J ≡ J1∪J2, are known measurable functions characterizing the model;
and J is a finite set equal to {1, . . . , |J |}.78 Instances where HP[θ] is characterized through a
finite number of conditional moment (in)equalities and the conditioning variables have finite
support can easily be recast as in (4.1).79 Consider, for example, the two player entry game
model in Identification Problem 3.5 on p. 53, where w = (y1,y2,x1,x2). Using (in)equalities
(3.22)-(3.25) and assuming that the distribution of (x1,x2) has k¯ points of support, denoted
(x1,k, x2,k), k = 1, . . . , k¯, we have |J | = 4k¯ and for k = 1, . . . , k¯,80
m4k−3(wi;ϑ) = [1((y1,y2) = (0, 0))− Φ((−∞,−x1b1), (−∞,−x2b2); r)]1((x1,x2) = (x1,k, x2,k))
m4k−2(wi;ϑ) = [1((y1,y2) = (1, 1))− Φ([−x1b1 − d1,∞), [−x2b2 − d2,∞); r)]1((x1,x2) = (x1,k, x2,k))
m4k−1(wi;ϑ) = [1((y1,y2) = (0, 1))− Φ((−∞,−x1b1 − d1), (−x2b2,∞); r)]1((x1,x2) = (x1,k, x2,k))
m4k(wi;ϑ) =
[
1((y1,y2) = (0, 1))−
{
Φ((−∞,−x1b1 − d1), (−x2b2,∞); r)
− Φ((−x1b1,−x1b1 − d1), (−x2b2,−x2b2 − d2); r)
}]
1((x1,x2) = (x1,k, x2,k)).
In point identified moment equality models it has been common to conduct estimation
and inference using a criterion function that aggregates moment violations (Hansen, 1982b).
Manski and Tamer (2002) adapt this idea to the partially identified case, through a criterion
function qP : Θ → R+ such that qP(ϑ) = 0 if and only if ϑ ∈ HP[θ]. Many criterion
functions can be used (see, e.g. Manski and Tamer, 2002; Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer,
2007; Romano and Shaikh, 2008; Rosen, 2008; Galichon and Henry, 2009; Andrews and
Guggenberger, 2009; Andrews and Soares, 2010; Canay, 2010; Romano and Shaikh, 2010).
78Examples where the set J is a compact set (e.g., a unit ball) rather than a finite set include the case of
best linear prediction with interval outcome and covariate data, see characterization (2.27) on p. 27, and the
case of entry games with multiple mixed strategy Nash equilibria, see characterization (3.29) on p. 61. A more
general continuum of inequalities is also possible, as in the case of discrete choice with endogenous explanatory
variables, see characterization (3.14) on p. 45. I refer to Andrews and Shi (2017) and Beresteanu, Molchanov,
and Molinari (2011, Supplementary Appendix B) for inference methods in the presence of a continuum of
conditional moment (in)equalities.
79I refer to Khan and Tamer (2009), Andrews and Shi (2013), Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013), Lee,
Song, and Whang (2013), Armstrong (2014, 2015), Armstrong and Chan (2016), Chernozhukov, Chetverikov,
and Kato (2018), and Chetverikov (2018), for inference methods in the case that the conditioning variables
have a continuous distribution.
80In these expressions an index of the form jk not separated by a comma equals the product of j with k.
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Some simple and commonly employed ones include
qP,sum(ϑ) =
∑
j∈J1
[
EP(mj(wi;ϑ))
σP,j(ϑ)
]2
+
+
∑
j∈J2
[
EP(mj(wi;ϑ))
σP,j(ϑ)
]2
, (4.2)
qP,max(ϑ) = max
{
max
j∈J1
[
EP(mj(wi;ϑ))
σP,j(ϑ)
]
+
,max
j∈J2
∣∣∣∣EP(mj(wi;ϑ))σP,j(ϑ)
∣∣∣∣
}2
, (4.3)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0} and σP,j(ϑ) is the population standard deviation of mj(wi;ϑ). In
(4.2)-(4.3) the moment functions are standardized, as doing so is important for statistical
power (see, e.g., Andrews and Soares, 2010, p. 127). To simplify notation, I omit the label
and simply use qP(ϑ). Given the criterion function, one can rewrite (4.1) as
HP[θ] = {ϑ ∈ Θ : qP(ϑ) = 0}. (4.4)
To keep this chapter to a manageable length, I focus my discussion of statistical inference
exclusively on consistent estimation and on different notions of coverage that a confidence set
may be required to satisfy and that have proven useful in the literature.81 The topics of test
of hypotheses and construction of confidence sets in partially identified models are covered
in Canay and Shaikh (2017), who provide a comprehensive survey devoted entirely to them
in the context of moment inequality models. Molchanov and Molinari (2018, Chapters 4 and
5) provide a thorough discussion of related methods based on the use of random set theory.
4.2 Consistent Estimation
When the identified object is a set, it is natural that its estimator is also a set. In order to
discuss statistical properties of a set-valued estimator HˆPn [θ] (to be defined below), and in
particular its consistency, one needs to specify how to measure the distance between HˆPn [θ]
and HP[θ]. Several distance measures among sets exist (see, e.g., Molchanov, 2017, Appendix
D). A natural generalization of the commonly used Euclidean distance is the Hausdorff dis-
tance, see Definition A.6, which for given A,B ⊂ Rd can be written as
dH(A,B) = inf
{
r > 0 : A ⊆ Br, B ⊆ Ar
}
= max
{
sup
a∈A
d(a,B), sup
b∈B
d(b, A)
}
,
with d(a,B) ≡ infb∈B ‖a− b‖.82 In words, the Hausdorff distance between two sets measures
the furthest distance from an arbitrary point in one of the sets to its closest neighbor in the
other set. It is easy to verify that dH metrizes the family of non-empty compact sets; in
particular, given non-empty compact sets A,B ⊂ Rd, dH(A,B) = 0 if and only if A = B. If
81Using the well known duality between tests of hypotheses and confidence sets, the discussion could be
re-framed in terms of size of the test.
82The definition of the Hausdorff distance can be generalized to an arbitrary metric space by replacing the
Euclidean metric by the metric specified on that space.
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either A or B is empty, dH(A,B) =∞.
The use of the Hausdorff distance to conceptualize consistency of set valued estimators in
econometrics was proposed by Hansen, Heaton, and Luttmer (1995, Section 2.4) and Manski
and Tamer (2002, Section 3.2).83
Definition 4.1 (Hausdorff Consistency): An estimator HˆPn [θ] is consistent for HP[θ] if
dH(HˆPn [θ],HP[θ])
p→ 0 as n→∞.
Molchanov (1998) establishes Hausdorff consistency of a plug-in estimator of the set {ϑ ∈
Θ : gP(ϑ) ≤ 0}, with gP : W × Θ → R a lower semicontinuous function of ϑ ∈ Θ that
can be consistently estimated by a lower semicontinuous function gn uniformly over Θ. The
set estimator is {ϑ ∈ Θ : gn(ϑ) ≤ 0}. The fundamental assumption in Molchanov (1998)
is that {ϑ ∈ Θ : gP(ϑ) ≤ 0} ⊆ cl({ϑ ∈ Θ : gP(ϑ) < 0}), see Molchanov and Molinari
(2018, Section 5.2) for a discussion. There are important applications where this condition
holds. Chernozhukov, Kocatulum, and Menzel (2015) provide results related to Molchanov
(1998), as well as important extensions for the construction of confidence sets, and show
that these can be applied to carry out statistical inference on the HansenJagannathan sets of
admissible stochastic discount factors (Hansen and Jagannathan, 1991), the MarkowitzFama
meanvariance sets for asset portfolio returns (Markowitz, 1952), and the set of structural
elasticities in Chetty (2012)’s analysis of demand with optimization frictions. However, these
methods are not broadly applicable in the general moment (in)equalities framework of this
section, as Molchanov’s key condition generally fails for the set HP[θ] in (4.4).
4.2.1 Criterion Function Based Estimators
Manski and Tamer (2002) extend the standard theory of extremum estimation of point iden-
tified parameters to partial identification, and propose to estimate HP[θ] using the collection
of values ϑ ∈ Θ that approximately minimize a sample analog of qP:
HˆPn [θ] =
{
ϑ ∈ Θ : qn(ϑ) ≤ inf
ϑ˜∈Θ
qn(ϑ˜) + τn
}
, (4.5)
with τn a sequence of non-negative random variables such that τn
p→ 0. In (4.5), qn(ϑ) is a
sample analog of qP(ϑ) that replaces EP(mj(wi;ϑ)) and σP,j(ϑ) in (4.2)-(4.3) with properly
83It was previously used in the mathematical literature on random set theory, for example to formalize
laws of large numbers and central limit theorems for random sets such as the ones in Theorems A.3 and A.4
(Artstein and Vitale, 1975; Gine´, Hahn, and Zinn, 1983).
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chosen estimators, e.g.,
m¯n,j(ϑ) ≡ 1
n
n∑
i=1
mj(wi, ϑ), j = 1, . . . , |J |
σˆn,j(ϑ) ≡
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
[mj(wi, ϑ)]
2 − [m¯n,j(ϑ)]2
)1/2
, j = 1, . . . , |J |.
It can be shown that as long as τn = op(1), under the same assumptions used to prove
consistency of extremum estimators of point identified parameters (e.g., with uniform con-
vergence of qn to qP and continuity of qP on Θ),
sup
ϑ∈HˆPn [θ]
inf
ϑ˜∈HP[θ]
‖ϑ− ϑ˜‖ p→ 0 as n→∞. (4.6)
This yields that asymptotically each point in HˆPn [θ] is arbitrarily close to a point in HP[θ], or
more formally that P(HˆPn [θ] ⊆ HP[θ])→ 1. I refer to (4.6) as inner consistency henceforth.84
Redner (1981) provides an early contribution establishing this type of inner consistency for
maximum likelihood estimators when the true parameter is not point identified.
However, Hausdorff consistency requires also that
sup
ϑ∈HP[θ]
inf
ϑ˜∈HˆPn [θ]
‖ϑ− ϑ˜‖ p→ 0 as n→∞,
i.e., that each point in HP[θ] is arbitrarily close to a point in HˆPn [θ], or more formally
that P(HP[θ] ⊆ HˆPn [θ]) → 1. To establish this result for the sharp identification regions
in Theorem SIR-2.7 (parametric regression with interval covariate) and Theorem SIR-3.1
(semiparametric binary model with interval covariate), Manski and Tamer (2002, Propositions
3 and 5) require the rate at which τn
p→ 0 to be slower than the rate at which qn converges
uniformly to qP over Θ.
What might go wrong in the absence of such a restriction? A simple example can help
understand the issue. Consider a model with linear inequalities of the form
θ1 ≤ EP(w1),
−θ1 ≤ EP(w2),
θ2 ≤ EP(w3) + EP(w4)θ1,
−θ2 ≤ EP(w5) + EP(w6)θ1.
Suppose w ≡ (w1, . . . ,w6) is distributed multivariate normal, with EP(w) = [6 0 2 0 −2 0]>
and CovP(w) equal to the identity matrix. Then HP[θ] = {ϑ = [ϑ1 ϑ2]> ∈ Θ : ϑ1 ∈
84See Blevins (2015, Theorem 1) for a pedagogically helpful proof for a semiparametric binary model.
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[0, 6] and ϑ2 = 2}. However, with positive probability in any finite sample qn(ϑ) = 0 for ϑ
in a random region (e.g., a triangle if qn is the sample analog of (4.3)) that only includes
points that are close to a subset of the points in HP[θ]. Hence, with positive probability the
minimizer of qn cycles between consistent estimators of subsets ofHP[θ], but does not estimate
the entire set. Enlarging the estimator to include all points that are close to minimizing qn
up to a tolerance that converges to zero sufficiently slowly removes this problem.
Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) significantly generalize the consistency results
in Manski and Tamer (2002). They work with a normalized criterion function equal to
qn(ϑ) − inf ϑ˜∈Θ qn(ϑ˜), but to keep notation light I simply refer to it as qn.85 Under suitable
regularity conditions, they establish consistency of an estimator that can be a smaller set
than the one proposed by Manski and Tamer (2002), and derive its convergence rate. Some
of the key conditions required by Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007, Conditions C1 and
C2) to study convergence rates include that qn is lower semicontinuous in ϑ, satisfies various
convergence properties among which supϑ∈HP[θ] qn = Op(1/an) for a sequence of normalizing
constants an → ∞, that τn ≥ supϑ∈HP[θ] qn(ϑ) with probability approaching one, and that
τn → 0. They also require that there exist positive constants (δ, κ, γ) such that for any
 ∈ (0, 1) there are (d, n) such that
∀n ≥ n, qn(ϑ) ≥ κ[min{δ,d(ϑ,HP[θ])}]γ
uniformly on {ϑ ∈ Θ : d(ϑ,HP[θ]) ≥ (d/an)1/γ} with probability at least 1−. In words, the
assumption, referred to as polynomial minorant condition, rules out that qn can be arbitrarily
close to zero outside HP[θ]. It posits that qn changes as at least a polynomial of degree γ in
the distance of ϑ from HP[θ]. Under some additional regularity conditions, Chernozhukov,
Hong, and Tamer (2007) establish that
dH(HˆPn [θ],HP[θ]) = Op(max{1/an, τn})1/γ . (4.7)
What is the role played by the polynomial minorant condition for the result in (4.7)?
Under the maintained assumptions τn ≥ supϑ∈HP[θ] qn(ϑ) ≥ κ[min{δ,d(ϑ,HP[θ])}]γ , and the
latter part of the inequality is used to obtain (4.7). When could the polynomial minorant
condition be violated? In moment (in)equalities models, Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer
85Using this normalized criterion function is especially important in light of possible model misspecification,
see Section 5.
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require γ = 2.86 Consider a simple stylized example with (in)equalities of the form
−θ1 ≤ EP(w1),
−θ2 ≤ EP(w2),
θ1θ2 = EP(w3),
with EP(w1) = EP(w2) = EP(w3) = 0, and note that the sample means (w¯1, w¯2, w¯3) are√
n-consistent estimators of (EP(w1),EP(w2),EP(w3)). Suppose (w1,w2,w3) are distributed
multivariate standard normal. Consider a sequence ϑn = [ϑ1n ϑ2n]
> = [n−1/4 n−1/4]>.
Then [d(ϑn,HP[θ])]γ = Op(n−1/2). On the other hand, with positive probability qn(ϑn) =
(w¯3 − ϑ1nϑ2n)2 = Op
(
n−1
)
, so that for n large enough qn(ϑn) < [d(ϑn,HP[θ])]γ , violating
the assumption. This occurs because the gradient of the moment equality vanishes as ϑ
approaches zero, rendering the criterion function flat in a neighborhood of HP[θ]. As intuition
would suggest, rates of convergence are slower the flatter qn is outside HP[θ].
Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye (2019b) show that in moment inequality models with smooth
moment conditions, the polynomial minorant assumption with γ = 2 implies the Abadie
constraint qualification (ACQ); see, e.g., Bazaraa, Sherali, and Shetty (2006, Chapter 5)
for a definition and discussion of ACQ. The example just given to discuss failures of the
polynomial minorant condition is in fact a known example where ACQ fails at ϑ = [0 0]>.
Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007, Condition C.3, referred to as degeneracy) also
consider the case that qn vanishes on subsets of Θ that converge in Hausdorff distance to
HP[θ] at rate a−1/γn . While degeneracy might be difficult to verify in practice, Chernozhukov,
Hong, and Tamer show that if it holds, τn can be set to zero. Yildiz (2012) provides conditions
on the moment functions, which are closely related to constraint qualifications (as discussed
in Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye, 2019b) under which it is possible to set τn = 0.
Menzel (2014) studies estimation ofHP[θ] when the number of moment inequalities is large
relative to sample size (possibly infinite). He provides a consistency result for criterion-based
estimators that use a number of unconditional moment inequalities that grows with sample
size. He also considers estimators based on conditional moment inequalities, and derives the
fastest possible rate for estimating HP[θ] under smoothness conditions on the conditional
moment functions. He shows that the rates achieved by the procedures in Armstrong (2014,
2015) are (minimax) optimal, and cannot be improved upon.
Key Insight 4.1: Manski and Tamer (2002) extend the notion of extremum estimation
from point identified to partially identified models. They do so by putting forward a general-
ized criterion function whose zero-level set can be used to define HP[θ] in partially identified
structural semiparametric models. It is then natural to define the set valued estimator HˆPn [θ]
86Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007, equation (4.1) and equation (4.6)) set γ = 1 because they report
the assumption for a criterion function that does not square the moment violations.
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as the collection of approximate minimizers of the sample analog of this criterion function.
Manski and Tamer’s analysis of statistical inference focuses exclusively on providing consis-
tent estimators. Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) substantially generalize the analysis
of consistency of criterion function-based set estimators. They provide a comprehensive study
of convergence rates in partially identified models. Their work highlights the challenges a re-
searcher faces in this context, and puts forward possible solutions in the form of assumptions
under which specific rates of convergence attain.
4.2.2 Support Function Based Estimators
Beresteanu and Molinari (2008) introduce to the econometrics literature inference methods
for set valued estimators based on random set theory. They study the class of models where
HP[θ] is convex and can be written as the Aumann (or selection) expectation of a properly
defined random closed set.87 They propose to carry out estimation and inference leveraging
the representation of convex sets through their support function (given in Definition A.5),
as it is done in random set theory; see Molchanov (2017, Chapter 3) and Molchanov and
Molinari (2018, Chapter 4). Because the support function fully characterizes the boundary
of HP[θ], it allows for a simple sample analog estimator, and for inference procedures with
desirable properties.
An example of a framework where the approach of Beresteanu and Molinari can be applied
is that of best linear prediction with interval outcome data in Identification Problem 2.4.88
Recall that in that case, the researcher observes random variables (yL,yU,x) and wishes to
learn the best linear predictor of y|x, with y unobserved and R(yL ≤ y ≤ yU) = 1. For
simplicity let x be a scalar. Given a random sample {yLi,yUi,xi}ni=1 from P, the researcher
can construct a random segment Gi for each i and a consistent estimator Σˆn of the random
matrix ΣP in (2.24) as
Gi =
{(
yi
yixi
)
: yi ∈ Sel(Yi)
}
⊂ R2, and Σˆn =
(
1 x
x x2
)
,
where Yi = [yLi,yUi] and x,x2 are the sample means of xi and x
2
i respectively. Because
in this problem HP[θ] = Σ−1P EPG (see Theorem SIR-2.5 on p. 25), a natural sample analog
estimator replaces ΣP with Σˆn, and EPG with a Minkowski average of Gi (see Appendix A,
87By Theorem A.2, the Aumann expectation of a random closed set defined on a nonatomic probability
space is convex. In this chapter I am assuming nonatomicity of the probability space. Even if I did not make
this assumption, however, when working with a random sample the relevant probability space is the product
space with n → ∞, hence nonatomic (Artstein and Vitale, 1975). If HP[θ] is not convex, Beresteanu and
Molinari’s analysis applies to its convex hull.
88Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye (2019a, Supplementary Appendix F) establish that if x has finite support,
HP[θ] in Theorem SIR-2.5 can be written as the collection of ϑ ∈ Θ that satisfy a finite number of moment
inequalities, as posited in this section.
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p. 118 for a formal definition), yielding
HˆPn [θ] = Σˆ−1n
1
n
n∑
i=1
Gi. (4.8)
The support function of HˆPn [θ] is the sample analog of that of HP[θ] provided in (2.26):
hHˆPn [θ](u) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[(yLi1(f(xi, u) < 0) + yUi1(f(xi, u) ≥ 0))f(xi, u)], u ∈ S,
where f(xi, u) = [1 xi]Σˆ
−1
n u. Beresteanu and Molinari (2008) use the Law of Large Numbers
for random sets reported in Theorem A.3 to show that HˆPn [θ] in (4.8) is
√
n-consistent under
standard conditions on the moments of (yLi,yUi,xi).
Bontemps, Magnac, and Maurin (2012) and Chandrasekhar, Chernozhukov, Molinari,
and Schrimpf (2018) significantly expand the applicability of Beresteanu and Molinari’s 2008
estimator. Bontemps, Magnac, and Maurin show that it can be used in a large class of
partially identified linear models, including ones that allow for the availability of instrumental
variables. Chandrasekhar, Chernozhukov, Molinari, and Schrimpf show that it can be used
for best linear approximation of any function f(x) that is known to lie within two identified
bounding functions. The lower and upper functions defining the band are allowed to be
any functions, including ones carrying an index, and can be estimated parametrically or
nonparametrically. The method allows for estimation of the parameters of the best linear
approximations to the set identified functions in many of the identification problems described
in Section 2. It can also be used to estimate the sharp identification region for the parameters
of a binary choice model with interval or discrete regressors under the assumptions of Magnac
and Maurin (2008), characterized in (3.9) in Section 3.1.1.
Kaido and Santos (2014) develop a theory of efficiency for estimators of sets HP[θ] as
in (4.1) under the additional requirements that the inequalities EP(mj(w, ϑ)) are convex in
ϑ ∈ Θ and smooth as functionals of the distribution of the data. Because of the convexity of
the moment inequalities, HP[θ] is convex and can be represented through its support function.
Using the classic results in Bickel, Klaassen, Ritov, and Wellner (1993), Kaido and Santos
show that under suitable regularity conditions, the support function admits for
√
n-consistent
regular estimation. They also show that a simple plug-in estimator based on the support
function attains the semiparametric efficiency bound, and the corresponding estimator of
HP[θ] minimizes a wide class of asymptotic loss functions based on the Hausdorff distance.
As they establish, this efficiency result applies to the estimators proposed by Beresteanu and
Molinari (2008), including that in (4.8), and by Bontemps, Magnac, and Maurin (2012).
Kaido (2016) further enlarges the applicability of the support function approach by es-
tablishing its duality with the criterion function approach, for the case that qP is a convex
function and qn is a convex function almost surely. This allows one to use the support
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function approach also when a representation of HP[θ] as the Aumann expectation of a ran-
dom closed set is not readily available. Kaido considers HP[θ] and its level set estimator
HˆPn [θ] as defined, respectively, in (4.4) and (4.5), with Θ a convex subset of Rd. Because
qP and qn are convex functions, HP[θ] and HˆPn [θ] are convex sets. Under the same assump-
tions as in Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007), including the polynomial minorant and
the degeneracy conditions, one can set τn = 0 and have dH(HˆPn [θ],HP[θ]) = Op(a−1/γn ).
Moreover, due to its convexity, HP[θ] is fully characterized by its support function, which
in turn can be consistently estimated (at the same rate as HP[θ]) using sample analogs as
hHˆPn [θ](u) = maxanqn(ϑ)≤0 u
>ϑ. The latter can be computed via convex programming.
Kitagawa and Giacomini (2018) consider consistent estimation of HP[θ] in the context
of Bayesian inference. They focus on partially identified models where HP[θ] depends on
a “reduced form” parameter φ (e.g., a vector of moments of observable random variables).
They recognize that while a prior on φ can be revised in light of the data, a prior on θ
cannot, due to the lack of point identification. As such they propose to choose a single
prior for the revisable parameters, and a set of priors for the unrevisable ones. The latter is
the collection of priors such that the distribution of θ|φ places probability one on HP[θ]. A
crucial observation in Kitagawa and Giacomini is that once φ is viewed as a random vector,
as in the Bayesian paradigm, under mild regularity conditions HP[θ] is a random closed set,
and Bayesian inference on it can be carried out using elements of random set theory. In
particular, they show that the set of posterior means of θ|w equals the Aumann expectation
of HP[θ] (with the underlying probability measure of φ|w). They also show that this Aumann
expectation converges in Hausdorff distance to the “true” identified set if the latter is convex,
or otherwise to its convex hull. They apply their method to analyze impulse-response in set-
identified Structural Vector Autoregressions, where standard Bayesian inference is otherwise
sensitive to the choice of an unrevisable prior.89
Key Insight 4.2: Beresteanu and Molinari (2008) show that elements of random set
theory can be employed to obtain inference methods for partially identified models that are easy
to implement and have desirable statistical properties. Whereas they apply their findings to a
specific class of models based on the Aumann expectation, the ensuing literature demonstrates
that random set methods are widely applicable to obtain estimators of sharp identification
regions and establish their consistency.
Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013) propose an alternative to the notion of consistent
estimator. Rather than asking that HˆPn [θ] satisfies the requirement in Definition 4.1, they
89There is a large literature in macro-econometrics, pioneered by Faust (1998), Canova and De Nicolo
(2002), and Uhlig (2005), concerned with Bayesian inference with a non-informative prior for non-identified
parameters. I refer to Kilian and Lu¨tkepohl (2017, Chapter 13) for a thorough review. Frequentist inference
for impulse response functions in Structural Vector Autoregression models is carried out, e.g., in Granziera,
Moon, and Schorfheide (2018) and Gafarov, Meier, and Montiel Olea (2018).
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propose the notion of half-median-unbiased estimator. This notion is easiest to explain in the
case of interval identified scalar parameters. Take, e.g., the bound in Theorem SIR-2.1 for
the conditional expectation of selectively observed data. Then an estimator of that interval
is half-median-unbiased if the estimated upper bound exceeds the true upper bound, and the
estimated lower bound falls below the true lower bound, each with probability at least 1/2
asymptotically. More generally, one can obtain a half-median-unbiased estimator as
HˆPn [θ] =
{
ϑ ∈ Θ : anqn(ϑ) ≤ c1/2(ϑ)
}
, (4.9)
where c1/2(ϑ) is a critical value chosen so that HˆPn [θ] asymptotically contains HP[θ] (or any
fixed element in HP[θ]; see the discussion in Section 4.3.1 below) with at least probability
1/2. As discussed in the next section, c1/2(ϑ) can be further chosen so that this probability
is uniform over P ∈ P.
The requirement of half-median unbiasedness has the virtue that, by construction, an
estimator such as (4.9) is a subset of a 1−α confidence set as defined in (4.10) below for any
α < 1/2, provided c1−α(ϑ) is chosen using the same criterion for all α ∈ (0, 1). In contrast,
a consistent estimator satisfying the requirement in Definition 4.1 needs not be a subset of a
confidence set. This is because the sequence τn in (4.5) may be larger than the critical value
used to obtain the confidence set, see equation (4.10) below, unless regularity conditions such
as degeneracy or others allow one to set τn equal to zero. Moreover, choice of the sequence
τn is not data driven, and hence can be viewed as arbitrary. This raises a concern for the
scope of consistent estimation in general settings.
However, reporting a set estimator together with a confidence set is arguably important
to shed light on how much of the volume of the confidence set is due to statistical uncertainty
and how much is due to a large identified set. One can do so by either using a half-median
unbiased estimator as in (4.9), or the set of minimizers of the criterion function in (4.5) with
τn = 0 (which, as previously discussed, satisfies the inner consistency requirement in (4.6)
under weak conditions, and is Hausdorff consistent in some well behaved cases).
4.3 Confidence Sets Satisfying Various Coverage Notions
4.3.1 Coverage of HP[θ] vs. Coverage of θ
I first discuss confidence sets CSn ⊂ Rd defined as level sets of a criterion function. To
simplify notation, henceforth I assume an = n.
CSn = {ϑ ∈ Θ : nqn(ϑ) ≤ c1−α(ϑ)} . (4.10)
In (4.10), c1−α(ϑ) may be constant or vary in ϑ ∈ Θ. It is chosen to that CSn satisfies
(asymptotically) a certain coverage property with respect to either HP[θ] or each ϑ ∈ HP[θ].
Correspondingly, different appearances of c1−α(ϑ) may refer to different critical values as-
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sociated with different coverage notions. The challenging theoretical aspect of inference in
partial identification is the determination of c1−α and of methods to approximate it.
A first classification of coverage notions pertains to whether the confidence set should cover
HP[θ] or each of its elements with a prespecified asymptotic probability. Early on, within
the study of interval-identified parameters, Horowitz and Manski (1998, 2000) put forward
a confidence interval that expands each of the sample analogs of the extreme points of the
population bounds by an amount designed so that the confidence interval asymptotically
covers the population bounds with prespecified probability.
Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) study the general problem of inference for a set
HP[θ] defined as the zero-level set of a criterion function. The coverage notion that they
propose is pointwise coverage of the set, whereby c1−α is chosen so that:
lim inf
n→∞ P(HP[θ] ⊆ CSn) ≥ 1− α for all P ∈ P. (4.11)
Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) provide conditions under which CSn satisfies (4.11)
with c1−α constant in ϑ, yielding the so called criterion function approach to statistical in-
ference in partial identification. Under the same coverage requirement, Bugni (2010) and
Galichon and Henry (2013) introduce novel bootstrap methods for inference in moment in-
equality models. Henry, Mango, and Queyranne (2015) propose an inference method for finite
games of complete information that exploits the structure of these models.
Beresteanu and Molinari (2008) propose a method to test hypotheses and build confidence
sets satisfying (4.11) based on random set theory, the so called support function approach,
which yields simple to compute confidence sets with asymptotic coverage equal to 1 − α
when HP[θ] is strictly convex. The reason for the strict convexity requirement is that in
its absence, the support function of HP[θ] is not fully differentiable, but only directionally
differentiable, complicating inference. Indeed, Fang and Santos (2018) show that standard
bootstrap methods are consistent if and only if full differentiability holds, and they pro-
vide modified bootstrap methods that remain valid when only directional differentiability
holds. Chandrasekhar, Chernozhukov, Molinari, and Schrimpf (2018) propose a data jitter-
ing method that enforces full differentiability at the price of a small conservative distortion.
Kaido and Santos (2014) extend the applicability of the support function approach to other
moment inequality models and establish efficiency results. Chernozhukov, Kocatulum, and
Menzel (2015) show that an Hausdorff distance-based test statistic can be weighted to en-
force either exact or first-order equivariance to transformations of parameters. Adusumilli
and Otsu (2017) provide empirical likelihood based inference methods for the support func-
tion approach. The test statistics employed in the criterion function approach and in the
support function approach are asymptotically equivalent in specific moment inequality mod-
els (Beresteanu and Molinari, 2008; Kaido, 2016), but the criterion function approach is more
broadly applicable.
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The field’s interest changed to a different notion of coverage when Imbens and Manski
(2004) pointed out that often there is one “true” data generating θ, even if it is only partially
identified. Hence, they proposed confidence sets that cover each ϑ ∈ HP[θ] with a prespecified
probability. For pointwise coverage, this leads to choosing c1−α so that:
lim inf
n→∞ P(ϑ ∈ CSn) ≥ 1− α for all P ∈ P and ϑ ∈ HP[θ]. (4.12)
If HP[θ] is a singleton then (4.11) and (4.12) both coincide with the pointwise coverage
requirement employed for point identified parameters. However, as shown in Imbens and
Manski (2004, Lemma 1), if HP[θ] contains more than one element, the two notions differ,
with confidence sets satisfying (4.12) being weakly smaller than ones satisfying (4.11). Rosen
(2008) provides confidence sets for general moment (in)equalities models that satisfy (4.12)
and are easy to compute.
Although confidence sets that take each ϑ ∈ HP[θ] as the object of interest (and which
satisfy the uniform coverage requirements described in Section 4.3.2 below) have received the
most attention in the literature on inference in partially identified models, this choice merits
some words of caution. First, Henry and Onatski (2012) point out that if confidence sets are
to be used for decision making, a policymaker concerned with robust decisions might prefer
ones satisfying (4.11) (respectively, (4.13) below once uniformity is taken into account) to
ones satisfying (4.12) (respectively, (4.14) below with uniformity). Second, while in many
applications a “true” data generating θ exists, in others it does not. For example, Manski
and Molinari (2010) and Giustinelli, Manski, and Molinari (2019a) query survey respondents
(in the American Life Panel and in the Health and Retirement Study, respectively) about
their subjective beliefs on the probability chance of future events. A large fraction of these
respondents, when given the possibility to do so, report imprecise beliefs in the form of inter-
vals. In this case, there is no “true” point-valued belief: the “truth” is interval-valued. If one
is interested in (say) average beliefs, the sharp identification region is the (Aumann) expec-
tation of the reported intervals, and the appropriate coverage requirement for a confidence
set is that in (4.11) (respectively, (4.13) below with uniformity).
4.3.2 Pointwise vs. Uniform Coverage
In the context of interval identified parameters, such as, e.g., the mean with missing data in
Theorem SIR-2.1 with θ ∈ R, Imbens and Manski (2004) pointed out that extra care should
be taken in the construction of confidence sets for partially identified parameters, as otherwise
they may be asymptotically valid only pointwise (in the distribution of the observed data) over
relevant classes of distributions.90 For example, consider a confidence interval that expands
each of the sample analogs of the extreme points of the population bounds by a one-sided
90This discussion draws on many conversations with Jo¨rg Stoye, as well as on notes that he shared with me,
for which I thank him.
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critical value. This confidence interval controls the asymptotic coverage probability pointwise
for any DGP at which the width of the population bounds is positive. This is because the
sampling variation becomes asymptotically negligible relative to the (fixed) width of the
bounds, making the inference problem essentially one-sided. However, for every n one can
find a distribution P ∈ P and a parameter ϑ ∈ HP[θ] such that the width of the population
bounds (under P) is small relative to n and the coverage probability for ϑ is below 1 − α.
This happens because the proposed confidence interval does not take into account the fact
that for some P ∈ P the problem has a two-sided nature.
This observation naturally leads to a more stringent requirement of uniform coverage,
whereby (4.11)-(4.12) are replaced, respectively, by
lim inf
n→∞ infP∈P
P(HP[θ] ⊆ CSn) ≥ 1− α, (4.13)
lim inf
n→∞ infP∈P
inf
ϑ∈HP[θ]
P(ϑ ∈ CSn) ≥ 1− α, (4.14)
and c1−α is chosen accordingly, to obtain either (4.13) or (4.14). Sets satisfying (4.13) are
referred to as confidence regions for HP[θ] that are uniformly consistent in level (over P ∈ P).
Romano and Shaikh (2010) propose such confidence regions, study their properties, and
provide a step-down procedure to obtain them.
Chen, Christensen, and Tamer (2018) propose confidence sets that are contour sets of
criterion functions using cutoffs that are computed via Monte Carlo simulations from the
quasiposterior distribution of the criterion and satisfy the coverage requirement in (4.13).
They recommend the use of a Sequential Monte Carlo algorithm that works well also when the
quasi-posterior is irregular and multi-modal. They establish exact asymptotic coverage, non-
trivial local power, and validity of their procedure in point identified and partially identified
regular models, and validity in irregular models (e.g., in models where the reduced form
parameters are on the boundary of the parameter space). They also establish efficiency of
their procedure in regular models that happen to be point identified.
Sets satisfying (4.14) are referred to as confidence regions for points in HP[θ] that are
uniformly consistent in level (over P ∈ P). Within the framework of Imbens and Manski
(2004), Stoye (2009) shows that one can obtain a confidence interval satisfying (4.14) by
pre-testing whether the lower and upper population bounds are sufficiently close to each
other. If so, the confidence interval expands each of the sample analogs of the extreme
points of the population bounds by a two-sided critical value; otherwise, by a one-sided.
Stoye provides important insights clarifying the connection between superefficient (i.e., faster
than Op(1/
√
n)) estimation of the width of the population bounds when it equals zero, and
certain challenges in Imbens and Manski’s proposed method.91 Bontemps, Magnac, and
91Indeed, the confidence interval proposed by Stoye (2009) can be thought of as using a Hodges-type
shrinkage estimator (see, e.g., van der Vaart, 1997) for the width of the population bounds.
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Maurin (2012) leverage Stoye (2009)’s results to obtain confidence sets satisfying (4.14) using
the support function approach for set identified linear models.
Obtaining confidence sets that satisfy the requirement in (4.14) becomes substantially
more complex in the context of general moment (in)equalities models. One of the key chal-
lenges to uniform inference stems from the fact that the behavior of the limit distribution
of the test statistic depends on
√
nEP(mj(wi;ϑ)), j = 1, . . . , |J |, which cannot be consis-
tently estimated. Romano and Shaikh (2008); Andrews and Guggenberger (2009); Andrews
and Soares (2010); Canay (2010); Andrews and Barwick (2012); Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf
(2014), among others, make significant contributions to circumvent these difficulties in the
context of a finite number of unconditional moment (in)equalities. Andrews and Shi (2013);
Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013); Lee, Song, and Whang (2013); Armstrong (2014,
2015); Armstrong and Chan (2016); Chetverikov (2018), among others, make significant con-
tributions to circumvent these difficulties in the context of a finite number of conditional
moment (in)equalities (with continuously distributed conditioning variables). Chernozhukov,
Chetverikov, and Kato (2018) and Andrews and Shi (2017) study, respectively, the challeng-
ing frameworks where the number of moment inequalities grows with sample size and where
there is a continuum of conditional moment inequalities.
I refer to Canay and Shaikh (2017, Section 4) for a thorough discussion of these methods
and a comparison of their relative (de)merits (see also Bugni, Canay, and Guggenberger,
2012; Bugni, 2016).
4.3.3 Coverage of the Vector θ vs. Coverage of a Component of θ
The coverage requirements in (4.13)-(4.14) refer to confidence sets in Rd for the entire θ
or HP[θ]. Often empirical researchers are interested in inference on a specific component
or (smooth) function of θ (e.g., the returns to education; the effect of market size on the
probability of entry; the elasticity of demand for insurance to price, etc.). For simplicity,
here I focus on the case of a component of θ, which I represent as u>θ, with u a standard
basis vector in Rd. In this case, the (sharp) identification region of interest is
HP[u>θ] = {s ∈ [−hΘ(−u), hΘ(u)] : s = u>ϑ and ϑ ∈ HP[θ]}.
One could report as confidence interval for u>θ the projection of CSn in direction ±u. The
resulting confidence interval is asymptotically valid but typically conservative. The extent of
the conservatism increases with the dimension of θ and is easily appreciated in the case of
a point identified parameter. Consider, for example, a linear regression in R10, and suppose
for simplicity that the limiting covariance matrix of the estimator is the identity matrix.
Then a 95% confidence interval for u>θ is obtained by adding and subtracting 1.96 to that
component’s estimate. In contrast, projection of a 95% confidence ellipsoid for θ on each
component amounts to adding and subtracting 4.28 to that component’s estimate.
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It is therefore desirable to provide confidence intervals CIn specifically designed to cover
u>θ rather then the entire θ. Natural counterparts to (4.13)-(4.14) are
lim inf
n→∞ infP∈P
P(HP[u>θ] ⊆ CIn) ≥ 1− α, (4.15)
lim inf
n→∞ infP∈P
inf
ϑ∈HP[θ]
P(u>ϑ ∈ CIn) ≥ 1− α. (4.16)
As shown in Beresteanu and Molinari (2008) and Kaido (2016) for the case of pointwise
coverage, obtaining asymptotically valid confidence intervals is simple if the identified set is
convex and one uses the support function approach. This is because it suffices to base the test
statistic on the support function in direction u, and it is often possible to easily characterize
the limiting distribution of this test statistic. See Molchanov and Molinari (2018, Chapters
4 and 5) for details.
The task is significantly more complex in general moment inequality models when HP[θ]
is non-convex and one wants to satisfy the criterion in (4.15) or that in (4.16). Romano and
Shaikh (2008) and Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2017) propose confidence intervals of the form
CIn =
{
s ∈ [−hΘ(−u), hΘ(u)] : inf
ϑ∈Θ(s)
nqn(ϑ) ≤ c1−α(s)
}
, (4.17)
where Θ(s) = {ϑ ∈ Θ : u>ϑ = s} and c1−α is such that (4.16) holds. An important idea in
this proposal is that of profiling the test statistic nqn(ϑ) by minimizing it over all ϑs such that
u>ϑ = s. One then includes in the confidence interval all values s for which the profiled test
statistic’s value is not too large. Romano and Shaikh (2008) propose the use of subsampling
to obtain the critical value c1−α(s) and provide high-level conditions ensuring that (4.16)
holds. Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2017) substantially extend and improve the profiling approach
by providing a bootstrap-based method to obtain c1−α so that (4.16) holds. Their method is
more powerful than subsampling (for reasonable choices of subsample size). Belloni, Bugni,
and Chernozhukov (2018) further enlarge the domain of applicability of the profiling approach
by proposing a method based on this approach that is asymptotically uniformly valid when
the number of moment conditions is large, and can grow with the sample size, possibly at
exponential rates.
Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye (2019a) propose a bootstrap-based calibrated projection ap-
proach where
CIn = [−hCn(c1−α)(−u), hCn(c1−α)(u)], (4.18)
with
hCn(c1−α)(u) ≡ sup
ϑ∈Θ
u>ϑ s.t.
√
nm¯n,j(ϑ)
σˆn,j(ϑ)
≤ c1−α(ϑ), j = 1, . . . , |J | (4.19)
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and c1−α a critical level function calibrated so that (4.16) holds. Compared to the simple
projection of CSn mentioned at the beginning of Section 4.3.3, calibrated projection (weakly)
reduces the value of c1−α so that the projection of θ, rather than θ itself, is asymptotically
covered with the desired probability uniformly.
Chen, Christensen, and Tamer (2018) provide methods to build confidence intervals and
confidence sets on projections of HP[θ] as contour sets of criterion functions using cutoffs
that are computed via Monte Carlo simulations from the quasiposterior distribution of the
criterion, and that satisfy the coverage requirement in (4.15). One of their procedures,
designed specifically for scalar projections, delivers a confidence interval as the contour set
of a profiled quasi-likelihood ratio with critical value equal to a quantile of the Chi-squared
distribution with one degree of freedom.
4.3.4 A Brief Note on Bayesian Methods
The confidence sets discussed in this section are based on the frequentist approach to infer-
ence. It is natural to ask whether in partially identified models, as in well behaved point
identified models, one can build Bayesian credible sets that at least asymptotically coincide
with frequentist confidence sets. This question was first addressed by Moon and Schorfheide
(2012), with a negative answer for the case that the coverage in (4.14) is sought out. In
particular, they showed that the resulting Bayesian credible sets are a subset of HP[θ], and
hence too narrow from the frequentist perspective.
This discrepancy can be ameliorated when inference is sought out forHP[θ] rather than for
each ϑ ∈ HP[θ]. Norets and Tang (2014), Kline and Tamer (2016), Kitagawa and Giacomini
(2018), and Liao and Simoni (2019) propose Bayesian credible regions that are valid for
frequentist inference in the sense of (4.11), where the first two build on the criterion function
approach and the second two on the support function approach. All these contributions rely
on the model being separable, in the sense that it yields moment inequalities that can be
written as the sum of a function of the data only, and a function of the model parameters only
(as in, e.g., (3.22)-(3.25)). In these models, the function of the data only (the reduced form
parameter) is point identified, it is related to the structural parameters θ through a known
mapping, and under standard regularity conditions it can be
√
n-consistently estimated. The
resulting estimator has an asymptotically Normal distribution. The various approaches place
a prior on the reduced form parameter, and standard tools in Bayesian analysis are used to
obtain a posterior. The known mapping from reduced form to structural parameters is then
applied to this posterior to obtain a credible set for HP[θ].
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5 Misspecification in Partially Identified Models
Although partial identification often results from reducing the number of assumptions main-
tained in counterpart point identified models, care still needs to be taken in assessing the
possible consequences of misspecification. This section’s goal is to discuss the existing litera-
ture on the topic, and to provide some additional observations. To keep the notation light, I
refer to the functional of interest as θ throughout, without explicitly distinguishing whether
it belongs to an infinite dimensional parameter space (as in the nonparametric analysis in
Section 2), or to a finite dimensional one (as in the semiparametric analysis in Section 3).
The original nonparametric “worst-case” bounds proposed by Manski (1989) for the anal-
ysis of selectively observed data and discussed in Section 2 are not subject to the risk of
misspecification, because they are based on the empirical evidence alone. However, often
researchers are willing and eager to maintain additional assumptions that can help shrink the
bounds, so that one can learn more from the available data. Indeed, early on Manski (1990)
proposed the use of exclusion restrictions in the form of mean independence assumptions.
Section 2.2 discusses related ideas within the context of nonparametric bounds on treatment
effects, and Manski (2003, Chapter 2) provides a thorough treatment of other types of ex-
clusion restriction. The literature reviewed throughout this chapter provides many more
examples of assumptions that have proven useful for empirical research.
Broadly speaking, assumptions can be classified in two types (Manski, 2003, Chapter 2).
The first type is non-refutable: it may reduce the size of HP[θ], but cannot lead to it being
empty. An example in the context of selectively observed data is that of exogenous selection,
or data missing at random conditional on covariates and instruments (see Section 2.1, p. 10):
under this assumption HP[θ] is a singleton, but the assumption cannot be refuted because it
poses a distributional (independence) assumption on unobservables.
The second type is refutable: it may reduce the size of HP[θ], and it may result in
HP[θ] = ∅ if it does not hold in the DGP. An example in the context of treatment effects is
the assumption of mean independence between response function at treatment t and instru-
mental variable z, see (2.14) in Section 2.2. There the sharp bounds on EQ(y(t)|x = x) are
intersection bounds as in (2.15). If the instrument is invalid, the bounds can be empty.
Ponomareva and Tamer (2011) consider the impact of misspecification on semiparametric
partially identified models. One of their examples concerns a linear regression model of the
form EQ(y|x) = θ>x when only interval data is available for y (as in Section 2.3). In this
context, HP[θ] = {ϑ ∈ Θ : EP(yL|x) ≤ ϑ>x ≤ EP(yU|x), x-a.s.}. The concern is that the
conditional expectation might not be linear. Ponomareva and Tamer make two important
observations. First, they argue that the set HP[θ] is of difficult interpretation when the model
is misspecified. When y is perfectly observed, if the conditional expectation is not linear, the
output of ordinary least squares can be readily interpreted as the best linear approximation
to EQ(y|x). This is not the case for HP[θ] when only the interval data [yL,yU] is observed.
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They therefore propose to work with the set of best linear predictors for y|x even in the
partially identified case (rather than fully exploit the linearity assumption). The resulting
set is the one derived by Beresteanu and Molinari (2008) and reported in Theorem SIR-2.5.
Ponomareva and Tamer work with projections of this set, which coincide with the bounds in
Stoye (2007).
Ponomareva and Tamer also point out that depending on the DGP, misspecification can
cause HP[θ] to be spuriously tight. This can happen, for example, if EP(yL|x) and EP(yU|x)
are sufficiently nonlinear, even if they are relatively far from each other (e.g., Ponomareva and
Tamer, 2011, Figure 1). Hence, caution should be taken when interpreting very tight partial
identification results as indicative of a highly informative model and empirical evidence, as
the possibility of model misspecification has to be taken into account. These observations
naturally lead to the questions of how to test for model misspecification in the presence of
partial identification, and of what are the consequences of misspecification for the confidence
sets discussed in Section 4.3.
With partial identification, a null hypothesis of correct model specification (and its alter-
native) can be expressed as
H0 : HP[θ] 6= ∅; H1 : HP[θ] = ∅.
Tests for this hypothesis have been proposed both for the case of nonparametric as well as
semiparametric partially identified models. I refer to Santos (2012) for specification tests
in a partially identified nonparametric instrumental variable model; to Kitamura and Stoye
(2018) for a nonparametric test in random utility models that checks whether a repeated cross
section of demand data might have been generated by a population of rational consumers
(thereby testing for the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference); and to Guggenberger,
Hahn, and Kim (2008) and Bontemps, Magnac, and Maurin (2012) for specification tests in
linear moment (in)equality models.
For the general class of moment inequality models discussed in Section 4, Romano and
Shaikh (2008), Andrews and Guggenberger (2009), Galichon and Henry (2009), and Andrews
and Soares (2010) propose a specification test that rejects the model if CSn in (4.10) is empty,
where CSn is defined with c1−α(ϑ) determined so as to satisfy (4.14) and approximated
according to the methods proposed in the respective papers. The resulting test, commonly
referred to as by-product test because obtained as a by-product to the construction of a
confidence set, takes the form
φ = 1(CSn = ∅) = 1
(
inf
ϑ∈Θ
nqn(ϑ) > c1−α(ϑ)
)
.
Denoting by P0 the collection of P ∈ P such that HP[θ] 6= ∅, one has that the by-product
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test achieves uniform size control (Bugni, Canay, and Shi, 2015, Theorem C.2):
lim sup
n→∞
sup
P∈P0
EP(φ) ≤ α. (5.1)
An important feature of the by-product test is that the critical value c1−α(ϑ) is not ob-
tained to test for model misspecification, but it is obtained to insure the coverage requirement
in (4.14); hence, it is obtained by working with the asymptotic distribution of nqn(ϑ). Bugni,
Canay, and Shi (2015) propose more powerful model specification tests, using a critical value
c1−α that they obtain to ensure that (5.1), rather than (4.14), holds. In particular, they
show that their tests dominate the by-product test in terms of power in any finite sample
and in the asymptotic limit. Their critical value is obtained by working with the asymptotic
distribution of infϑ∈Θ nqn(ϑ). As such, their proposal resembles the classic approach to model
specification testing (J-test) in point identified generalized method of moments models.
While it is possible to test for misspecification also in partially identified models, a word of
caution is due on what might be the effects of misspecification on confidence sets constructed
as in (4.10) with c1−α determined to insure (4.14), as it is often done in empirical work.
Bugni, Canay, and Guggenberger (2012) show that in the presence of local misspecification,
confidence sets CSn designed to satisfy (4.14) fail to do so. In practice, the concern is that
when the model is misspecified CSn might be spuriously small. Indeed, we have seen that it
can be empty if the misspecification is sufficiently severe. If it is less severe but still present,
it may lead to inference that is erroneously interpreted as precise.
It is natural to wonder how this compares to the effect of misspecification on inference
in point identified models.92 In that case, the rich set of tools available for inference allows
one to avoid this problem. Consider for example a point identified generalized method of
moments model with moment conditions EP(mj(w; θ)) = 0, j = 1, . . . , |J |, and |J | > d. Let
m denote the vector that stacks each of the mj functions, and let the estimator of θ be
θˆn = arg min
ϑ∈Θ
nm¯n(ϑ)
>Ξˆ−1m¯n(ϑ), (5.2)
with Ξˆ a consistent estimator of Ξ = EP[m(w; θ)m(w; θ)>] and m¯n(ϑ) the sample analog of
EP(m(w;ϑ)). As shown by Hansen (1982b) for correctly specified models, the distribution
of
√
n(θˆn − θ) converges to a Normal with mean vector equal to zero and covariance matrix
Σ. Hall and Inoue (2003) show that when the model is subject to non-local misspecification,√
n(θˆn−θ∗) converges to a Normal with mean vector equal to zero and covariance matrix Σ∗,
where θ∗ is the pseudo-true vector (the probability limit of (5.2)) and where Σ∗ equals Σ if the
model is correctly specified, and differs from it otherwise. Let Σˆ∗ be a consistent estimator
92The considerations that I report here are based on conversations with Joachim Freyberger and notes that
he shared with me, for which I thank him.
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of Σ∗ as in Hall and Inoue (2003). Define the Wald-statistic based confidence ellipsoid
{ϑ ∈ Θ : n(θˆn − ϑ)>Σˆ−1∗ (θˆn − ϑ) ≤ cd,1−α}, (5.3)
with cd,1−α the 1 − α critical value of a χ2d (chi-squared random variable with d degrees of
freedom). Under standard regularity conditions (see Hall and Inoue, 2003) the confidence set
in (5.3) covers with asymptotic probability 1 − α the true vector θ if the model is correctly
specified, and the pseudo-true vector θ∗ if the model is incorrectly specified. In either case,
(5.3) is never empty and its volume depends on Σˆ∗.93
Even in the point identified case a confidence set constructed similarly to (4.10), i.e.,
{ϑ ∈ Θ : nm¯n(ϑ)Ξˆ−1m¯n(ϑ) ≤ c|J |,1−α}, (5.4)
where c|J |,1−α is the 1 − α critical value of a χ2|J |, incurs the same problems as its partial
identification counterpart. Under standard regularity conditions, if the model is correctly
specified, the confidence set in (5.4) covers θ with asymptotic probability 1 − α, because
nm¯n(ϑ)Ξˆ
−1m¯n(ϑ) ⇒ χ2|J |. However, this confidence set is empty with asymptotic proba-
bility P(χ2|J |−d > c|J |,1−α), due to the facts that P(CSn = ∅) = P(θˆn /∈ CSn) and that
nm¯n(θˆn)Ξˆ
−1m¯n(θˆn)⇒ χ2|J |−d. Hence, it can be arbitrarily small.
In the very special case of a linear regression model with interval outcome data stud-
ied by Ponomareva and Tamer (2011), the procedure proposed by Beresteanu and Moli-
nari (2008) yields confidence sets that are always non-empty and whose volume depends
on a covariance function that they derive (see Beresteanu and Molinari, 2008, Theorem
4.3). If the linear regression model is correctly specified, and hence {ϑ ∈ Θ : EP(yL|x) ≤
ϑ>x ≤ EP(yU|x), x-a.s.} 6= ∅, these confidence sets cover {ϑ ∈ Θ : EP(yL|x) ≤ ϑ>x ≤
EP(yU|x), x-a.s.} with asymptotic probability at least equal to 1 − α, as in (4.11). Even
if the model is misspecified and {ϑ ∈ Θ : EP(yL|x) ≤ ϑ>x ≤ EP(yU|x), x-a.s.} = ∅, the
confidence sets cover the sharp identification region for the parameters of the best linear
predictor of y|x, which can be viewed as a pseudo-true set, with probability exactly equal to
1−α. The test statistic that Beresteanu and Molinari use is based on the Hausdorff distance
between the estimator and the hypothesized set, and as such is a generalization of the stan-
dard Wald-statistic to the set-valued case. These considerations can be extended to other
models. For example, Lee and Bhattacharya (2019) study empirical measurement of Hick-
93The effect of misspecification for maximum likelihood, least squares, and GMM estimators in “point
identified” models (by which I mean models where the population criterion function has a unique optimizer)
has been studied in the literature; see, e.g., White (1982), Gallant and White (1988), Hall and Inoue (2003),
Hansen and Lee (2019), and references therein. These estimators have been shown to converge in probability
to pseudo-true values, and it has been established that tests of hypotheses and confidence sets based on these
estimators have correct asymptotic level with respect to the pseudo-true parameters, provided standard errors
are computed appropriately. In the specific case of GMM discussed here, the pseudo-true value θ∗ depends
on the choice of weighting matrix in (5.2): I have used Ξˆ, but other choices are possible. I do not discuss this
aspect of the problem here, but refer to Hall and Inoue (2003).
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sian consumer welfare with interval data on income. When the model is misspecified, they
provide a best parametric approximation to demand and welfare based on the support func-
tion method, and inference procedures for this approximation. For other moment inequality
models, Kaido and White (2013) propose to build a pseudo-true set H∗P[θ] that is obtained
through a two-step procedure. In the first step one obtains a nonparametric estimator of the
function(s) for which the researcher wants to impose a parametric structure. In the second
step one obtains the set H∗P[θ] as the collection of least squares projections of the set in the
first step, on the parametric class imposed. Kaido and White show that under regularity
conditions the pseudo-true set can be consistently estimated, and derive rates of convergence
for the estimator; however, they do not provide methods to obtain confidence sets. While
conceptually valuable, their construction appears to be computationally difficult. Masten
and Poirier (2018) propose that when a model is falsified (in the sense that HP[θ] is empty)
one should report the falsification frontier : the boundary between the set of assumptions
which falsify the model and those which do not, obtained through continuous relaxations
of the baseline assumptions of concern. The researcher can then present the set HP[θ] that
results if the true model lies somewhere on this frontier. This set can be interpreted as a
pseudo-true set. However, Masten and Poirier do not provide methods for inference.
The implications of misspecification in partially identified models remain an open and
important question in the literature. For example, it would be useful to have notions of
pseudo-true set that parallel those of pseudo-true value in the point identified case. It would
also be important to provide methods for the construction of confidence sets in general mo-
ment inequality models that do not exhibit spurious precision (i.e., are arbitrarily small)
when the model is misspecified. Recent work by Andrews and Kwon (2019) addresses some
of these questions.
6 Computational Challenges
As a rule of thumb, the difficulty in computing estimators of identification regions and confi-
dence sets depends on whether a closed form expression is available for the boundary of the
set. For example, often nonparametric bounds on functionals of a partially identified dis-
tribution are known functionals of observed conditional distributions, as in Section 2. Then
“plug in” estimation is possible, and the computational cost is the same as for estimation and
construction of confidence intervals (or confidence bands) for point-identified nonparametric
regressions (incurred twice, once for the lower bound and once for the upper bound).
Similarly, support function based inference is easy to implement when HP[θ] is convex.
Sometimes the extreme points of HP[θ] can be expressed as known functionals of observed
distributions. Even if not, level sets of convex functions are easy to compute.
But as it was shown in Section 3, many problems of interest yield a set HP[θ] that is not
convex. In this case, HP[θ] is obtained as a level set of a criterion function. Because HP[θ]
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(or its associated confidence set) is often a subset of Rd (rather than R), even a moderate
value for d, e.g., 8 or 10, can lead to extremely challenging computational problems. This is
because if one wants to computeHP[θ] or a set that covers it or its elements with a prespecified
asymptotic probability (possibly uniformly over P ∈ P), one has to map out a level set in Rd.
If one is interested in confidence intervals for scalar projections or other smooth functions
of ϑ ∈ HP[θ], one needs to solve complex nonlinear optimization problems, as for example
in (4.17) and (4.19). This can be difficult to do, especially because c1−α(ϑ) is typically an
unknown function of ϑ for which gradients are not available in closed form.
Mirroring the fact that computation is easier when the boundary of HP[θ] is a known
function of observed conditional distributions, several portable software packages are available
to carry out estimation and inference in this case. For example, Beresteanu and Manski
(2000) provide STATA and MatLab packages implementing the methods proposed by Manski
(1989, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1997b), Horowitz and Manski (1998, 2000), and Manski and Pepper
(2000). Tauchmann (2014) provides a STATA package to implement the bounds proposed
by Lee (2009). McCarthy, Millimet, and Roy (2015) provide a STATA package to implement
bounds on treatment effects with endogenous and misreported treatment assignment and
under the assumptions of monotone treatment selection, monotone treatment response, and
monotone instrumental variables as in Manski (1997b), Manski and Pepper (2000), Kreider
and Pepper (2007), Gundersen, Kreider, and Pepper (2012), and Kreider, Pepper, Gundersen,
and Jolliffe (2012). The code computes the confidence intervals proposed by Imbens and
Manski (2004). In the more general context of inference for a one-dimensional parameter
defined by intersection bounds, as for example the one in (2.15), Chernozhukov, Kim, Lee, and
Rosen (2015) and Andrews, Kim, and Shi (2017) provide portable STATA code implementing,
respectively, methods to test hypotheses and build confidence intervals in Chernozhukov, Lee,
and Rosen (2013) and in Andrews and Shi (2013).
Beresteanu, Molinari, and Morris (2010) provide portable STATA code implementing
Beresteanu and Molinari (2008)’s method for estimation and inference for best linear pre-
diction with interval outcome data as in Identification Problem 2.4. Chandrasekhar, Cher-
nozhukov, Molinari, and Schrimpf (2012) provide R code implementing Chandrasekhar, Cher-
nozhukov, Molinari, and Schrimpf (2018)’s method for estimation and inference for best linear
approximations of set identified functions.
On the other hand, there is a paucity of portable software implementing the theoretical
methods for inference in structural partially identified models discussed in Section 4. Ciliberto
and Tamer (2009) compute Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) confidence sets for a
parameter vector in Rd in an entry game with six players, with d in the order of 20 and with
tens of thousands of inequalities, through a “guess and verify” algorithm based on simulated
annealing (with no cooling) that visits many candidate values ϑ ∈ Θ, evaluates qn(ϑ), and
builds CSn by retaining the visited values ϑ that satisfy nqn(ϑ) ≤ c1−α(ϑ) with c1−α defined
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to satisfy (4.12). Given the computational resources commonly available at this point in
time, this is a tremendously hard task, due to the dimension of θ and the number of moment
inequalities employed.
As explained in Section 3.2.1, these inequalities, which in a game of entry with J play-
ers and discrete observable payoff shifters are 2J |X | (with X the support of the observable
payoff shifters), yield an outer region OP[θ]. It is natural to wonder what are the additional
challenges faced to compute HP[θ] as described in Section 3.2.2. A definitive answer to this
question is hard to obtain. If one employs all inequalities listed in Theorem A.1, the num-
ber of inequalities jumps to (22
J − 2)|X |, increasing the computational cost. However, as
suggested by Galichon and Henry (2006) and extended by other authors (e.g., Beresteanu,
Molchanov, and Molinari, 2008, 2011; Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski, 2013; Chesher and
Rosen, 2017a), often many moment inequalities are redundant, substantially reducing the
number of inequalities to be checked. Specifically, Galichon and Henry (2006) propose the
notion of core determining sets, a collection of compact sets such that if the inequality in The-
orem A.1 holds for these sets, it holds for all sets in K, see Definition A.8 and the surrounding
discussion in Appendix A. This often yields a number of restrictions similar to the one in-
curred to obtain outer regions. For example, Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2008,
Section 4.2) analyze a four player, two type entry game with pure strategy Nash equilibrium
as solution concept, originally proposed by Berry and Tamer (2006), and show that while a
direct application of Theorem A.1 entails 512|X | inequality restrictions, 26|X | suffice. In this
example, Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)’s outer region is based on checking 18|X | inequalities.
A related but separate question is how to best allocate the computational effort. As
one moves from partial identification analysis to finite sample considerations, one may face
a trade-off between sharpness of the identification region and statistical efficiency. This
is because inequalities that are redundant from the perspective of identification analysis
might nonetheless be estimated with high precision, and hence improve the finite sample
statistical properties of a confidence set or of a test of hypothesis. Recent contributions by
Andrews and Shi (2017), Chernozhukov, Chetverikov, and Kato (2018) and Belloni, Bugni,
and Chernozhukov (2018), provide methods to build confidence set, respectively, with a
continuum of conditional moment inequalities, and with a number of moment inequalities
that may exceed sample size. These contributions, however, do not yet answer the question of
how to optimally select inequalities to yield confidence sets with best finite sample properties
according to some specified notion of “best”.
A different approach proposed by Chen, Christensen, and Tamer (2018) uses directly a
quasi-likelihood criterion function. In the context, e.g., of entry games, this entails assuming
that the selection mechanism depends only on observable payoff shifters, using it to obtain the
exact model implied distribution as in (3.21), and partially identifying an enlarged parameter
vector that includes θ and the selection mechanism. In an empirical application with discrete
covariates, Chen, Christensen, and Tamer (2018) apply their method to a two player entry
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game with correlated errors, where θ ∈ R9 and the selection mechanism is a vector in R8, for
a total of 17 parameters. In another application to the analysis of trade flows, their empirical
application includes 46 parameters.
In terms of general purpose portable code that can be employed in moment inequality
models, I am only aware of the MatLab package provided by Kaido, Molinari, Stoye, and
Thirkettle (2017) to implement the inference method of Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye (2019a)
for projections and smooth functions of parameter vectors in models defined by a finite
number of unconditional moment (in)equalities. More broadly, their method can be used
to compute confidence intervals for optimal values of optimization problems with estimated
constraints. Here I summarize their approach to further highlight why the computational
task is challenging even in the case of projections.
The confidence interval in (4.18)-(4.19) requires solving two nonlinear programs, each with
a linear objective and nonlinear constraints involving a critical value which in general is an
unknown function of ϑ, with unknown gradient. When the dimension of the parameter vector
is large, directly solving optimization problems with such constraints can be expensive even if
evaluating the critical value at each ϑ is cheap.94 Hence, Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye propose
to use an algorithm (called E-A-M for Evaluation-Approximation-Maximization) to solve
these nonlinear programs, which belongs to the family of expected improvement algorithms
(see e.g. Jones, Schonlau, and Welch, 1998; Schonlau, Welch, and Jones, 1998; Jones, 2001,
and references therein). Given a constrained optimization problem of the form
max
ϑ∈Θ
u>ϑ s.t. gj(ϑ) ≤ c(ϑ), j = 1, . . . , J,
to which (4.19) belongs,95 the algorithm attempts to solve it by cycling over three steps:
1. The true critical level function c is evaluated at an initial (uniformly randomly drawn
from Θ) set of points ϑ1, . . . , ϑk. These values are used to compute a current guess
for the optimal value, u>ϑ∗,k = max{u>ϑ : ϑ ∈ {ϑ1, . . . , ϑk} and g¯(ϑ) ≤ c(ϑ)}, where
g¯(ϑ) = maxj=1,...,J gj(ϑ). The “training data” (ϑ
`, c(ϑ`)k`=1 is used to compute an
approximating surface ck through a Gaussian-process regression model (kriging), as
described in Santner, Williams, and Notz (2013, Section 4.1.3);
2. For L ≥ k + 1, with probability 1−  the next evaluation point θL for the true critical
level function c is chosen by finding the point that maximizes expected improvement with
respect to the approximating surface, EIL−1(ϑ) = (u>ϑ − u>ϑ∗,L−1)+{1 − Φ([g¯(ϑ) −
cL−1(ϑ)]/[ςˆsL−1(ϑ)])}. Here cL−1(ϑ) and ςˆ2s2L−1(ϑ) are estimators of the posterior mean
and variance of the approximating surface. To aim for global search, with probability
94Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye (2019a) propose a linearization method whereby c1−α is calibrated through
repeatedly solving bootstrap linear programs, hence it is reasonably cheap to compute.
95To see this it suffices to set gj(ϑ) =
√
nm¯n,j(ϑ)
σˆn,j(ϑ)
and c(ϑ) = c1−α(ϑ).
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, ϑL is drawn uniformly from Θ. The approximating surface is then recomputed using
(ϑ`, c(ϑ`)L`=1). Steps 1 and 2 are repeated until a convergence criterion is met.
3. The extreme point of CIn is reported as the value u
>ϑ∗,L that maximizes u>ϑ among
the evaluation points that satisfy the true constraints, i.e. u>ϑ∗,L = max{u>ϑ : ϑ ∈
{ϑ1, . . . , ϑL} and g¯(ϑ) ≤ c(ϑ)}.
The only place where the approximating surface is used is in Step 2, to choose a new eval-
uation point. In particular, the reported extreme points of CIn in (4.18) are the extreme
values of u>ϑ that are consistent with the true surface where this surface was computed, not
with the approximating surface. Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye (2019a) establish convergence of
their algorithm and obtain a convergence rate, as the number of evaluation points increases,
for constrained optimization problems in which the constraints are sufficiently smooth “black
box” functions, building on an earlier contribution of Bull (2011). Bull establishes conver-
gence of an expected improvement algorithm for unconstrained optimization problems where
the objective is a “black box” function. The rate of convergence that Bull derives depends
on the smoothness of the black box objective function. The rate of convergence obtained by
Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye depends on the smoothness of the black box constraints, and is
slightly slower than Bull’s rate. Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye’s Monte Carlo experiments sug-
gest that the E-A-M algorithm is fast and accurate at computing their confidence intervals.
The E-A-M algorithm also allows for very rapid computation of projections of the confidence
set proposed by Andrews and Soares (2010), and for a substantial improvement in the com-
putational time of the profiling-based confidence intervals proposed by Bugni, Canay, and Shi
(2017).96 In all cases, the speed improvement results from a reduced number of evaluation
points required to approximate the optimum. In an application to a point identified set-
ting, Freyberger and Reeves (2017, Supplement Section S.3) use Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye
(2019a)’s E-A-M method to construct uniform confidence bands for an unknown function of
interest under (nonparametric) shape restrictions. They benchmark it against gridding and
find it to be accurate at considerably improved speed.
7 Conclusions
This chapter provides a discussion of the econometrics literature on partial identification.
It first reviews what can be learned about (functionals of) probability distributions in the
absence of parametric restrictions, under various scenarios of data incompleteness. It then
reviews what can be learned about functionals characterizing semiparametric structural eco-
nomic models, under various scenarios of model incompleteness. Finally, it discusses finite
96Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2017)’s method does not require solving a nonlinear program such as the one in
(4.19). Rather it obtains CIn as in (4.17). However, it approximates c1−α by repeatedly solving bootstrap
nonlinear programs, thereby incurring a very high computational cost at that stage.
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sample inference, the consequences of misspecification, and the computational challenges that
a researcher needs to face when implementing partial identification methods.
Taking stock, I argue that several areas emerge where more progress is needed to bring the
partial identification approach to empirical research to full fruition. Whereas the last twenty
years have seen the development of a burgeoning theoretical literature on the topic, empirical
applications of the methods still lag behind. I conjecture that part of the reason for this
discrepancy is due to the lack of easy-to-implement procedures for computation of estimators
and confidence sets (or intervals) in complex structural models. While the literature so far
has aimed at developing methods that have desirable asymptotic properties for very general
classes of models, there is arguably scope for more problem-specific methods that exploit the
particularities of a certain model to obtain easy to implement statistical procedures. It would
also seem desirable that portable software accompanies the proposed methodologies, perhaps
more in line with the current practice in the Statistics literature.
However, computational concerns cannot be the cause of the relative paucity of appli-
cations of partial identification methods as the ones reviewed in Section 2, e.g., bounds on
treatment effects. These bounds are extremely easy to estimate and confidence intervals
covering them can readily be computed. I therefore conjecture that the lack of applications
might be due to a misconception, whereby nonparametric bounds are perceived as “always
too wide to learn anything”. While it is true that, for example, worst-case nonparametric
bounds on the average treatment effect cover zero by construction, the partial identification
approach to empirical research proposes a wide array of assumptions that can be brought
to bear to augment the empirical evidence and tighten the bounds. The philosophy of the
method is that the systematic reporting of bounds obtained under an increasingly strong set
of assumptions illuminates the relative role played by assumptions and data in shaping the
conclusions that the researcher draws. Point identification is the limit of this process, and
carefully assessing how this limit is reached is key to learning about the quantities of interest.
In Sections 2 and 3, special attention is devoted to characterizing sharp identification
regions. Sharpness often requires many moment inequalities, the number of which can exceed
the available sample size. Hence, there is a need of appropriate statistical inference methods.
As briefly mentioned in Sections 4 and 6, methods designed to provide valid test of hypotheses
and confidence sets in this scenario already exist. However, I would argue that there is a need
to better understand the trade-off between sharpness of the population identification region,
and statistical efficiency, especially in the context of conditional moment inequalities where
instrument functions are needed to transform the inequalities in unconditional ones. Similarly,
there is a need of more research on data driven procedures for the choice of tuning parameters
for the construction of confidence sets, in particular in the case of projection inference where
the question has not yet been addressed. Another open and arguably important question in
the literature, is how to build confidence sets for general moment inequality models that do
not exhibit spurious precision (i.e., are arbitrarily small) when the model is misspecified.
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A Basic Definitions and Facts from Random Set Theory
This appendix provides basic definitions and results from random set theory that are used
throughout this chapter.97 I refer to Molchanov (2017) for a textbook presentation of random
set theory, and to Molchanov and Molinari (2018) for a discussion focusing on its applications
in econometrics.
The theory of random closed sets generally applies to the space of closed subsets of a
locally compact Hausdorff second countable topological space X, see Molchanov (2017). In
this chapter I let X = Rd to simplify the exposition. Closedness is a property satisfied
by random points (singleton sets), so that the theory of random closed sets includes the
classical case of random points or random vectors as a special case. A random closed set is
a measurable map X : Ω 7→ F , where measurability is defined by specifying the family of
functionals of X that are random variables.
Definition A.1 (Random closed set): A map X from a probability space (Ω,F,P) to the
family F of closed subsets of Rd is called a random closed set if
X−(K) = {ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) ∩K 6= ∅} (A.1)
belongs to the σ-algebra F on Ω for each compact set K in Rd.
A random compact set is a random closed set which is compact with probability one, so
that almost all values of X are compact sets. A random convex closed set is defined similarly,
so that X(ω) is a convex closed set for almost all ω.
Definition A.1 means that X is explored by its hitting events, i.e., the events where X
hits a compact set K. The corresponding hitting probabilities are very important in random
set theory, because they uniquely determine the probability distribution of a random closed
set X, see Molchanov (2017, Section 1.1.3). The formal definition of the hitting probabilities,
and the closely related containment probabilities, follows.
Definition A.2 (Capacity functional and containment functional): 0
1. A functional TX(K) : K 7→ [0, 1] given by
TX(K) = P{X ∩K 6= ∅}, K ∈ K,
is called capacity (or hitting) functional of X.
2. A functional CX(F ) : F 7→ [0, 1] given by
CX(F ) = P{X ⊂ F}, F ∈ F ,
97The treatment here summarizes a few of the topics presented in Molchanov and Molinari (2018).
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is called the containment functional of X.
I write T(K) instead of TX(K) and C(K) instead of CX(K) where no ambiguity occurs.
Ever since the seminal work of Aumann (1965), it has been common to think of random
sets as bundles of random variables – the selections of the random sets.
Definition A.3 (Measurable selection): For any random set X, a (measurable) selection
of X is a random element x with values in Rd such that x(ω) ∈X(ω) almost surely. I denote
by Sel(X) the set of all selections from X.
The space of closed sets is not linear, which causes substantial difficulties in defining
the expectation of a random set. One approach, inspired by Aumann (1965) and pioneered
by Artstein and Vitale (1975), relies on representing a random set using the family of its
selections, and considering the set formed by their expectations. If X possesses at least one
integrable selection, then X is called integrable. The family of all integrable selections of X
is denoted by Sel1(X).
Definition A.4 (Unconditional and conditional Aumann –or selection– expectation):
The (selection or) Aumann expectation of an integrable random closed set X is given by
EX = cl
{∫
Ω
xdP : x ∈ Sel1(X)
}
.
For each sub-σ-algebra B ⊂ F, the conditional (selection or) Aumann expectation of X given
B is the B-measurable random closed set Y = E(X|B) such that the family of B-measurable
integrable selections of Y , denoted Sel1B(Y ), satisfies
Sel1B(Y ) = cl
{
E(x|B) : x ∈ Sel1(X)
}
,
where the closure in the right-hand side is taken in L1.
If X is almost surely non-empty and its norm ‖X‖ = sup{‖x‖ : x ∈X} is an integrable
random variable, then X is said to be integrably bounded and all its selections are integrable.
In this case, since X takes its realizations in Rd, the family of expectations of these integrable
selections is already closed and there is no need to take an additional closure as required in
Definition A.4, see Molchanov (2017, Theorem 2.1.37). The selection expectation depends on
the probability space used to define X, see Molchanov (2017, Section 2.1.2) and Molchanov
and Molinari (2018, Section 3.1). In particular, if the probability space is non-atomic and
X is integrably bounded, the selection expectation EX is a convex set regardless of whether
or not X might be non-convex itself Molchanov and Molinari (2018, Theorem 3.4). This
convexification property of the selection expectation implies that the expectation of the closed
convex hull of X equals the closed convex hull of EX, which in turn equals EX. It is
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then natural to describe the Aumann expectation through its support function, because this
function traces out a convex set’s boundary and therefore knowing the support function is
equivalent to knowing the set itself, see equation (A.2) below.
Definition A.5 (Support function): Let K be a convex set. The support function of K
is
hK(u) = sup{k>u : k ∈ K} , u ∈ Rd ,
where k>u denotes the scalar product.
The support function is finite for all u if K is bounded, and is sublinear (positively
homogeneous and subadditive) in u. Hence, it can be considered only for u ∈ Bd or u ∈ Sd−1.
Moreover, one has
K = ∩u∈Bd{k : k>u ≤ hK(u)} = ∩u∈Sd−1{k : k>u ≤ hK(u)}. (A.2)
Next, I define the Hausdorff metric, a distance on the family K of compact sets:
Definition A.6 (Hausdorff metric): Let K,L ∈ K. The Hausdorff distance between K
and L is
dH(K,L) = inf
{
r > 0 : K ⊆ Lr, L ⊆ Kr
}
,
where Kr = {x : d(x,K) ≤ r} is the r-envelope of K.
Since K ⊆ L if and only if hK(u) ≤ hL(u) for all u ∈ Sd−1 and hKr(u) = hK(u) + r, the
uniform metric for support functions on the sphere turns into the Hausdorff distance between
compact convex sets. Namely,
dH(K,L) = sup
{
|hK(u)− hL(u)| : ‖u‖ = 1
}
. (A.3)
It follows that
‖K‖ = dH(K, {0}) = sup
{|hK(u)| : ‖u‖ = 1}.
Finally, I define independently and identically distributed random closed sets (see Molchanov,
2017, Proposition 1.1.40 and Theorem 1.3.20, respectively):
Definition A.7 (i.i.d. random closed sets): Random closed sets X1, . . . ,Xn in Rd are
independent if and only if P{X1 ∩ K1 6= ∅, . . . ,Xn ∩ Kn 6= ∅} =
∏n
i=1 TXi(Ki) for all
K1, . . . ,Kn ∈ K. They are identically distributed if and only if for each open set G, P{X1 ∩
G 6= ∅} = P{X2 ∩G 6= ∅} = · · · = P{Xn ∩G 6= ∅}.
With these definitions in hand, I can state the theorems used throughout the chapter. The
first is a dominance condition due to Artstein (1983) (and Norberg, 1992) that characterizes
probability distributions of selections (see Molchanov and Molinari, 2018, Section 2.2):
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Theorem A.1 (Artstein). A probability distribution µ on Rd is the distribution of a selection
of a random closed set X in Rd if and only if
µ(K) ≤ T(K) = P{X ∩K 6= ∅} (A.4)
for all compact sets K ⊆ Rd. Equivalently, if and only if
µ(F ) ≥ C(F ) = P{X ⊂ F} (A.5)
for all closed sets F ⊂ Rd. If X is a compact random closed set, it suffices to check (A.5)
for compact sets F only.
If µ from Theorem A.1 is the distribution of some random vector x, then it is not guar-
anteed that x ∈ X a.s., e.g. x can be independent of X. Theorem A.1 means that for each
such µ, it is possible to construct x with distribution µ that belongs to X almost surely. In
other words, x and X can be realized on the same probability space (coupled) as random
elements x′ and X ′ such that x d= x′ and X d= X ′ with x′ ∈X ′ a.s.
The definition of the distribution of a random closed set (Definition A.2) and the charac-
terization results for its selections in Theorem A.1 require working with functionals defined
on the family of all compact sets, which in general is very rich. It is therefore important
to reduce the family of all compact sets required to describe the distribution of the random
closed set or to characterize its selections.
Definition A.8: A family of compact sets M is said to be a core determining class for
a random closed set X if any probability measure µ satisfying the inequalities
µ(K) ≤ P{X ∩K 6= ∅} (A.6)
for all K ∈ M, is the distribution of a selection of X, implying that (A.6) holds for all
compact sets K.
The notion of a core determining class was introduced by Galichon and Henry (2006). A
simple and general, but still mostly too rich, core determining class is obtained as a subfamily
of all compact sets that is dense in a certain sense in the family K. For instance, in the
Euclidean space, it suffices to consider compact sets obtained as finite unions of closed balls
with rational centers and radii (e.g., Galichon and Henry, 2006, Theorem 3c). For the case
that X is a subset of a finite space, Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2008, Algorithm
5.1) propose a simple algorithm to compute core determining classes. Chesher and Rosen
(2012) provide a related algorithm. Throughout this chapter, several results are mentioned
where the class of sets over which (A.4) is verified is reduced from the class of compact subsets
of the carrier space, to a (significantly) smaller collection.
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The next result characterizes a dominance condition that can be used to verify the exis-
tence of selections of X with specific properties for their means (see Molchanov and Molinari,
2018, Sections 3.2-3.3)
Theorem A.2 (Convexification in Rd). Let X be an integrable random set. If X is defined
on a non-atomic probability space, or if X is almost surely convex, then EX = E convX and
EhX(u) = hEX(u), u ∈ Rd. (A.7)
If P is atomless over B,98 then E(X|B) is convex and
E(hX(u)|B) = hE(X|B)(u), u ∈ Rd. (A.8)
Hence, for any vector b ∈ Rd, it holds that
b ∈ EX ⇔ b>u ≤ EhX(u) ∀u ∈ Sd−1, (A.9)
b ∈ E(X|B)⇔ b>u ≤ E(hX(u)|B) ∀u ∈ Sd−1. (A.10)
An important consequence of Theorem A.2 is that it allows one to verify whether b ∈ EX
without having to compute EX but only EhX(u) (and similarly for the conditional case), a
substantially easier task.
Finally, i.i.d. random closed sets satisfy a law of large numbers and a central limit theorem
that are similar to the ones for random singletons. Recall that the Minkowski sum of two
sets K and L in a linear space (which in this chapter I assume to be the Euclidean space Rd)
is obtained by adding each point from K to each point from L, formally,
K + L =
{
x+ y : x ∈ K, y ∈ L}.
Below, X1 + · · ·+Xn denotes the Minkowski sum of the random closed sets X1, . . . ,Xn, and
(X1 + · · ·+Xn)/n denotes their Minkowski average.
Theorem A.3 (Law of large numbers for integrably bounded random sets). Let X,X1,X2, . . .
be i.i.d. integrably bounded random compact sets. Define Sn = X1 + · · ·+Xn. Then
dH
(
Sn
n
,EX
)
→ 0 a.s. as n→∞. (A.11)
The support function of a random closed set X such that E‖X‖2 < ∞, is a random
continuous function hX(u) on Sd−1 with square integrable values. Define its covariance
98An event A′ ∈ B is called a B-atom if P{0 < P(A|B) < P(A′|B)} = 0 for all A ⊂ A′ such that A ∈ F.
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function as
ΓX(u, v) ≡ E [(hX(u)− hEX(u))(hX(v)− hEX(v))] , u, v ∈ Sd−1. (A.12)
Let ζ(u) be a centered Gaussian random field on Sd−1 with the same covariance structure
as X, i.e. E
[
ζ(u)ζ(v)
]
= ΓX(u, v), u, v ∈ Sd−1. Since the support function of a compact
set is Lipschitz, it is easy to show that the random field ζ has a continuous modification by
bounding the moments of |ζ(u)− ζ(v)|.
Theorem A.4 (Central limit theorem). Let X1,X2, . . . be i.i.d. copies of a random closed
set X in Rd such that E‖X‖2 <∞, and let Sn = X1 + · · ·+Xn. Then as n→∞,
√
n
(
hSn
n
(u)− hEX(u)
)
⇒ ζ (A.13)
in the space of continuous functions on the unit sphere with the uniform metric. Furthermore,
√
ndH
(
Sn
n
,EX
)
⇒ ‖ζ‖∞ = sup
{|ζ(u)| : u ∈ Sd−1}. (A.14)
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